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Abstract
Aﬀect Control Theory (ACT), as a model of human interaction, attempts to capture
a part of the human psyche that tends to go overlooked in the study of Artiﬁcial In-
telligence: the role of emotion in decision making. It provides an empirically derived
mathematical framework for the otherwise ethereal feeling that guide our every action,
even in ways that may appear irrational. In this work, we apply BayesACT, a variant
on classical ACT, to the much-studied Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, showing that it ap-
pears to human players to approach the game more like a human than other computerized
agents. Additionally, we expand into the networked version of this game, showing that
the observed human behaviours of decision hysteresis, network structure invariance, and
anti-correlation of cooperation and reward, are all emergent properties of the networked
BayesACT agents.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A social dilemma may be deﬁned as a situation[] in which individual rationality leads
to collective irrationality [33], which is to say that agents acting out of purely rational
self-interest will decrease the total reward received by all agents. Such situations are
ubiquitous in modern society: cutting oﬀ a fellow driver, jumping a queue, and accepting
under-the-table payment are minor, if not quite innocuous, examples. Of course, not all
such conﬂicts need be small. For instance, the annexation of a territory could be viewed
as a social dilemma of sorts. Solutions to social dilemmas can therefore have broad
application, and have seen much study by psychologists, sociologists, and more recently,
computer scientists.
As a means of abstraction, social dilemmas are frequently cast as normal-form games. In
the simplest case, these games involve two players who must simultaneously choose an
action to perform. The unique combination of their choices is then used to assign each
a payoﬀ from a pre-deﬁned reward matrix. In general, the players' matrices need not be
identical (i.e. they may be rewarded under diﬀerent circumstances), but must be known
by both parties before choosing their actions.
Over decades of research, several canonical dilemmas/games have emerged, each framing
an otherwise sterile reward matrix within a relatable story. Examples include Assurance,
Chicken, Public Goods, and the Tragedy of the Commons. None, however, is better
studied than the Prisoner's Dilemma, a game which has produced thousands of studies [33]
and at least a few television game shows. In its case, one version of the canonical story
may be told as follows.
The police are holding two partners-in-crime in separate rooms with no way for
them to communicate with each other. During their interrogations, each has the
option to either defect and snitch on the other, or cooperate with their partner
and remain silent. Their choices produce one of the following results.
• If both partners cooperate, the prosecution fails to make a strong case, and
each receives a 2 year sentence reduction.
• If only one partner defects, he receives a 3 year sentence reduction, and the
1
C D
C R,R S,T
D T,S P,P
C D
C 2,2 0,3
D 3,0 1,1
Table 1.1: The general reward matrix and an example reward matrix for the Prisoner's
Dilemma. For all pairs, the row player's reward is shown ﬁrst, and the column player's
second.
other gets no reduction.
• If both partners defect, each receives only a 1 year sentence reduction.
The reward structure of this game is summarized in Table 1.1, where cooperation and
defection are represented by C and D respectively, R is the reward for cooperation, S is
the sucker's payoﬀ for being duped, T is the temptation payoﬀ, and P is the punishment
payoﬀ. For a game to be considered a true Prisoner's Dilemma, the following inequality
must be obeyed [33] 1.
T > R > P > S (1.1)
As a direct result, for a single play of this game (or any ﬁnite number of repeated games
between two players) defection is a dominant strategy and there is a Nash equilibrium
for pure defection [34]. In other words, regardless of the choice the other makes, a player
is rewarded more for defection than cooperation. However, it has repeatedly been shown
that, in spite of this, human players do not adhere to an all-defect strategy [13, 12, 20].
Humans, it would seem, are not strictly rational creatures. This allows us to pursue a
goal that could be viewed as non-traditional within the scope of Artiﬁcial Intelligence:
rather than attempting to ﬁnd the best strategy that collects the highest reward, we
instead look for one that appears to best model the (frequently erratic) play of actual
people. To that end, we have created several bots, or computerized agents, that each
play diﬀerent strategies in the Prisoner's Dilemma. In particular, this work examines the
eﬀectiveness of our BayesACT bot, which plays in accordance with a modiﬁed version of
Aﬀect Control Theory (ACT) [29].
Standard ACT, as ﬁrst formalized by David Heise [26] in 1977, begins by positing that
every idea carries with it a culturally shared emotional sentiment [38]. That is to say, two
individuals within a society will tend to make similar intuitive evaluations of a given thing
(car, dog, hospital, etc.), action (hug, kick, kill, etc.), or person (banker, child, senior,
etc.). Further, ACT posits that this identity can be measured with three numerical values
∈ [−4.3, 4.3] [26] 2:
• Evaluation (E) - roughly good vs. bad
1Note that other permutations of this inequality may produce other social dilemmas (eg. the Assur-
ance Game is characterized by R > T > P > S) or no dilemma at all (eg. R > S > T > P , where
cooperation dominates).
2This range is employed by David Heise's Interact tool [24], eﬀectively standardizing it.
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• Potency (P) - roughly strong vs. weak
• Activity (A) - roughly fast or loud vs. slow or quiet
Combined, Evaluation, Potency, and Activity form the EPA triple, which encapsulates a
sentiment in ACT. Such values have been gathered for many common words by conducting
large, cross-cultural studies [27, 40]. As such, they represent the fundamental (or out-of-
context) sentiments held by the particular group surveyed.
However, an individual's feelings about a person/thing/action may change temporarily
upon encountering unusual circumstances [26]. To formalize this idea, ACT deﬁnes tran-
sient sentiments to be EPA values that have been altered by context. In this case, context
entails an Actor-Behaviour-Object (ABO) interaction, in which an Actor (A) performs a
Behaviour (B) on an Object (O). We will examine the mathematics of such interactions
in section 2.2, but intuitively, it is fair to say that the diﬀerence between fundamental and
transient sentiments increases with the unexpectedness of the interaction. This diﬀerence
is called the deﬂection, and is best demonstrated through example.
Suppose that a babysitter (EPA [1.01, 0.80, 0.11]) is acting on a baby (EPA [1.63,
-1.64, 0.30]). If the behaviour performed is feed something to (EPA [1.01, 0.98,
2.2]), then the resulting deﬂection is just 0.9. This indicates that a babysitter
feeding a baby would be an aﬀectively expected action. Similarly, comfort (EPA
[1.50, 1.70, -0.62]) produces a deﬂection of only 2.2. However, beat up (EPA
[-1.92, 1.00, 1.62]), an unexpectedly aggressive action, gives a high deﬂection of
11.0, while suck up to (EPA [-1.23, -1.36, -0.50]), an action which is less negative
but disrespects the power dynamic, produces a deﬂection of 8.6. 3
It is from the deﬂection that ACT draws its predictive power as a model of human
behaviour; it states that people naturally act in a way that minimizes the deﬂection
they create [26]. That is, one's default action is that which aligns best with society's
expectations. Certainly, one may choose to act in a diﬀerent way, but then must incur
the penalties of deﬂection. This may entail feelings of being disingenuous to one's true
self (discomfort, guilt, etc.), as well as receiving an EPA re-estimation in the eyes of any
observers. Given an Actor and an Object, it is therefore possible to predict a Behaviour
by choosing for it an EPA proﬁle that minimizes the deﬂection.
BayesACT, the version of ACT used in this work, augments conventional ACT with
Bayesian mathematics [29]. We discuss its workings further in section 2.2.2.
Our goal in this work is to show that an application of symbolic interactionist principles
(i.e. BayesACT) produces more human-like agents in simple games than approaches
typical to the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence. The motivation for this is twofold: we wish to
produce an agent that can act as a human analogue in the context of games or game-like
situations, and we would like it to determine its actions in a way that is as consistent with
human cognition as is possible. Meeting the ﬁrst condition grants enormous predictive
3These values were found via Interact, an ACT tool provided by David Heise [24] using the Indiana
2002-4 dataset [14].
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power, as very many important activities may be cast as games, (with auctions and
elections being canonical examples). While Game Theory provides us tools for predicting
the actions of self-interested agents, it generally ignores the emotional impact of actions
taken. In situations where emotion takes a considerable toll (as, we will argue, is the
case for the Prisoner's Dilemma), a robust model of human behaviour must take it into
consideration.
Meeting our second condition is desirable for its implications to our understanding of the
human mind. While any model that produces human-like behaviour can tell us how a
person might act, one that does so through a process that could plausibly be ascribed
to humans gives us insight as to why. To show that BayesACT is such a model gives
evidence of its validity as a general explanation of human behaviour and its usefulness as
tool for social scientists.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
This chapter reviews publications that fall into one of two broad categories: work involving
the Prisoner's Dilemma (and a few other social dilemmas), or work related to Aﬀect
Control Theory.
2.1 The Prisoner's Dilemma
The very ﬁrst example of a Prisoner's Dilemma is credited to Merrill Flood in collaboration
with Melvin Dresher [13]. Inspired by von Neumann and Morgenstern's Theory of Games
and Economic Behaviour, which formalized many normal-form games [53], Flood created
and tested several experimental games with human participants. Among these was A
Non-Cooperative Pair, a game which satisﬁed the T > R > P > S requirement, as can
be observed from Table 2.1. It would later be associated with the canonical Prisoner's
Dilemma story by Albert W. Tucker.
Flood conducted a single trial of the iterated version of this game, using two of his
colleagues at the RAND Corporation as players. Unfortunately, Flood's collection of
experiments were conducted in 1952 and not published until 1958, by which time records
of the actual experiments had been lost. However, Flood was able to recall that the
subjects of that one trial had converged towards a split-the-diﬀerence (cooperative)
strategy, thereby beginning the trend of human players cooperating in a game that actively
encourages defection.
C D
C 0.5,1 −1,2
D 1,−1 0,0.5
Table 2.1: Reward matrix for Flood and Dresher's A Non-Cooperative Pair. Though
not symmetric as has come to be expected from Prisoner's Dilemma rewards, this structure
satisﬁes the T > R > P > S requirement.
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2.1.1 Rational Strategies
For a single play of the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which each player makes their choice,
collects their reward, and then walks away, it can be immediately seen that defection is a
dominant strategy and that there is a Nash equilibrium for defect-defect. This is a result
of the fact that defection always gives a higher payout, regardless of the what the other
player chooses. A rational agent will therefore always choose to defect.
For the ﬁnitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma, in which the number of iterations, I, is
known to both players in advance, we get a similar result of pure defection for two rational
agents as a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Summarizing from Kreps et al. [34],
this can be shown by the following argument.
In the ﬁnal iteration, a rational agent must seek to immediately maximize its score,
as its choice can have no impact on the future. This last iteration is therefore equiv-
alent to the single-play Prisoner's Dilemma, for which defection must be chosen
by a rational agent. As both players are rational, the ﬁnal round therefore be
defect-defect.
In any round for which all future rounds have already been determined, a rational
agent must immediately maximize its score, as its choice can have no impact on
the future. Then, by the same logic applied to the ﬁnal iteration, this round must
be defect-defect.
So, by induction proceeding backwards from the last round to the ﬁrst, all rounds
must result in defect-defect between two rational agents.
It is still possible for a rational agent to cooperate if it is assumed that the other player
is not rational. Such cases will be discussed in section 2.1.3.
Alternatively, we may instead look to versions of the game in which players do not know
the number of rounds. In the extreme case, this is because I = ∞. Unfortunately, this
causes rewards to go to inﬁnity regardless of strategy. We must therefore slightly modify
the rules of the game.
One potential modiﬁcation is to apply a discounting factor, δ, to the players' payouts
with the reasoning that a reward now is considered to be worth more than a reward in
the future. This may be represented as:
Qa(~a) = (1− δ)
∞∑
i=0
δiqa(a
i
a, a
i
o) (2.1)
where Qa is the agent's total payout for the full action set ~a, qa is the agent's payout for
a pair of actions, aia is the agent's action at iteration i, and a
i
o is the opponent's action at
iteration i.
In this case, it can be shown that there may be cooperative equilibrium strategies when δ
exceeds some combination of the reward matrix values R, T , S, and P [15]. For example,
a grim trigger strategy (cooperate until the opponent defects, then defect thereafter) is
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equilibrium when δ > 1−R/T , and Tit-for-tat (cooperate ﬁrst, and thereafter emulate the
opponent's last choice) is equilibrium when δ > (T−R)/(T−P ) and δ > (T−R)/(R−S).
However, this is somewhat unsatisfactory as a model for human behaviour. It requires
knowledge of the opponent's strategy, predicts sharp changes in behaviour when reward
values are slightly altered, and requires that the number of iterations be actually inﬁnite,
which no study has yet achieved.
We might therefore choose to alter the game in a diﬀerent way, at least nominally. Rather
than applying a discount factor, we instead give the game some probability, q, of continu-
ing after every round, as in the work of Nowak [37]. This results in identical mathematics
to those above, but replacing δ with q. Of course, though no longer (practically) inﬁ-
nite, this line of reasoning shares the other shortcomings of discounting and additionally
requires changing the rules of the game as presented to the players.
2.1.2 Humans and the Prisoner's Dilemma
Fundamentally, social dilemmas are designed to produce conﬂict in human players, and
have existed for much longer than computerized agents have been a possibility. As such,
the earliest studies conducted in this ﬁeld involved only human players under diﬀerent
experimental conditions. Though there are now also many studies involving human-bot or
bot-bot interactions, human-human experiments remain a staple topic of social psychology
journals.
Among the earliest of such studies is Martin Deutsch's 1958 work [12], in which the
Prisoner's Dilemma is employed as a means of gauging trust between individuals. This
study set college students against each other in several variations of the classic normal-
form game. One group was assigned to the single-trial version, and then subdivided into
games played:
• with no communication allowed,
• with communication allowed via written notes,
• with communication and the possibility of reversing one's decision,
• with communication, reversibility, and with players taking turns rather than playing
simultaneously.
Each group was then subdivided further by the manner in which the players were inﬂu-
enced before the game, where some were encouraged to be:
• cooperative by an appeal to empathy for the other player,
• individualistic by emphasizing self-interest,
• competitive by suggesting a goal of defeating the other player.
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Note that none of these inﬂuencing factors actually changed the reward matrix or the
rules of the game in any way; they were purely a means of aﬀecting a desired state of
mind.
The results of these tests can be summarized as follows. Compared to the non-communicative
case, cooperation generally increases when communication is allowed, increases further
when reversing one's decision is allowed, and decreases somewhat when plays are non-
simultaneous. Additionally, the inﬂuenced orientation of the subjects had very large
eﬀects, with cooperation rates decreasing from cooperative to individualistic, and again
from individualistic to competitive. For example, in the case of no communication, coop-
eration rates were 89.1%, 35.9%, and 12.5% respectively. Note that even 12.5% is not the
0% predicted by rationality.
Similar results were observed for a second group of subjects assigned to a ten-trial ﬁnitely
repeated game with communication disallowed. Cooperation rates were approximately
70%, 35%, and 25% for each of the cooperative, individualistic, and competitive groups.
Of particular note was that cooperation dropped sharply among the individualistic and
competitive in the ﬁnal few trials, but remained fairly constant for the cooperative. This
strongly hints at the existence of emotional factors aﬀecting play.
While it is the results where communication was banned that are the most directly ap-
plicable to our work, Deutsch nevertheless makes observations about communication that
are worth noting. Firstly, it greatly increased cooperation among individualistically in-
ﬂuenced players (i.e. those representing the most pure form of the game) from 35.9%
to 70.6% in the single-trial case. Additionally, Deutsch identiﬁes several features of the
dialogue used by the most successful cooperators, namely:
• expectation (i.e. I want you to cooperate)
• intention (i.e. I will cooperate)
• retaliation (i.e. I will defect if you defect)
• forgiveness (i.e. I will cooperate if you return to cooperation)
These features strongly foreshadow those advocated by Axelrod for use in Prisoner's
Dilemma bots [8], to be discussed in section 2.1.3.
As another example of a human-human iterated Prisoner's Dilemma study, we refer to
Andreoni and Miller [3], who conducted their study as a follow up to the proof of all-defect
as the only rational strategy in the ﬁnitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma by Kreps et al.
Four tests were conducted with the intent to show that anomalously high cooperation
rates could be attributed to some form of altruism. The test conditions were as follows
(with each using computer terminals to provide anonymity):
1. pair participants with each other for ten rounds, and then switch partners
2. switch the pairings every round
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3. same as (1), but tell the participants that there is a 50% chance of being paired
with a Tit-for-tat bot
4. same as (3), but reduce the chance to 0.1%
By cooperation rate, the conditions ranked as 3 > 1 > 4 > 2. This ordering contains
two important pieces of information. First, partnering for ten rounds produced more
cooperation than switching partners every round, which indicates a tendency towards
reputation building in the hopes of reciprocal altruism. That is to say, in the early
rounds, players found it worthwhile to establish themselves as trustworthy to encourage
later cooperation from their partners. In the case where partners were exchanged every
round, reputation building was clearly not possible, and so the cooperation rate was
predictably lower.
The second major observation is that a (supposed) 50% rate of occurrence for Tit-for-tat
engendered more cooperation than a 0.1% rate, which incorporates altruism in another
fashion. It was known that a rational agent would subscribe to an all-defect strategy
if playing against another rational agent. However, if there were some probability that
the opponent were irrational, then even a rational agent might choose to cooperate. In
this case, Tit-for-tat, which always begins by cooperating, can be viewed as an irrational
altruist. As such, a higher rate of cooperation amidst a more altruistic population supports
the rationality argument.
In addition to their two major points, Andreoni and Miller also note that among their
subjects were some number of true altruists, which they infer from cooperation patterns
over 10-round sets not deteriorating in the sets near the end of the experiment. That
being the case, rationality can clearly not be ascribed to all participants.
This is an interesting development, as altruism in a competitive environment requires its
own explanation. After all, if early humans truly sacriﬁced their own well-being to aid
their confederates, surely they would have been out-competed by less well-intentioned
individuals. It stands to reason, then, that if altruists do in fact exist, there must have
been conditions under which altruism was evolutionarily favoured. Nowak [37] shows this
for ﬁve versions of altruism as applied to the Prisoner's Dilemma.
The ﬁrst of these is kin selection, which posits that if the coeﬃcient of relatedness (the
probability of a particular gene being shared) between partners exceeds the cost-to-beneﬁt
ratio (1− R/T ) of the altruistic act (cooperation), then altruism is favoured. Of course,
given that the individuals must be related, kin selection is of limited applicability. For-
tunately, Nowak goes on to argue that direct reciprocity (i.e. reciprocal altruism) and
indirect reciprocity (altruism within a group, based on reputation) are also evolutionarily
stable if the chance of meeting someone again or knowing their reputation exceeds the
cost-to-beneﬁt ratio.
He additionally proposes two mechanisms for Prisoner's Dilemma games with altered rule
sets. Group selection applies when evolutionary cohorts stay together within groups that
only split upon reaching a size threshold. Among the works we survey, this scenario is
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unique to Nowak's, and so we omit the details here. However, Nowak's take on network
reciprocity is worth noting, particularly with an eye to Section 2.1.5. This mechanism
applies to a Prisoner's Dilemma game on a network, in which an agent has a ﬁxed number
of neighbours that all beneﬁt if that agent chooses to act altruistically (cooperate). Ulti-
mately, it is found that such altruism is favoured if the beneﬁt-to-cost ratio (T/(T −R))
is greater than the average degree of the network.
Here, we have boiled down altruism to an act that is (paradoxically) actually self-serving.
Note, however, that this interpretation of altruism is most useful on an evolutionary
scale, and is not mutually exclusive with altruism as the product of an emotional re-
sponse. Trivers [51], for example, argues that emotions exist because evolution needed a
mechanism by which to encourage altruism.
Trivers ﬁrst establishes that some degree of altruism would almost certainly have been
an advantageous trait for early groups of humans to have, citing cases that come at a
small cost to the giver, but result in a large beneﬁt for the receiver. Examples include
sharing food and tools, helping the wounded, sick, or very young, and sharing knowledge.
Further, small, stable groups would have provided ample opportunity for acts of altruism
to be applied to kin, or to be reciprocated by the receiver in the future. As a means
of encouraging such acts, Trivers proposes the development (or at least co-option) of
emotion. Sympathy is an impetus to help those in need. Gratitude promotes returning
the favour. Guilt dissuades from cheating others in the group.
This is all to say that a person playing the Prisoner's Dilemma might choose not to defect
out of guilt, which, to that person, is simply an immediate emotional response. However,
that guilt exists as a means of promoting altruism through a long evolutionary process.
2.1.3 Bots and the Prisoner's Dilemma
When writing a bot to play the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma game (the single-shot version
being too limiting to be very interesting), a logical goal to pursue is the one presented
by the game itself: maximizing the reward received. While this is not the goal that we
pursue in this work, it has nevertheless been the focus of much research since Axelrod's
famous bot tournaments of 1980.
The ﬁrst of these tournaments [6] was entered by fourteen academics from computer
science, economics, psychology, and various other disciplines. Each submitted a bot to
take part in an automated round-robin tournament. Surprisingly, it was Tit-for-tat, the
simplest of the bots, that ultimately won with an average of score of 504 out of a possible
1000. (For reference, the next closest bot scored 500, and the worst scored 276).
Following this result, Axelrod held a second tournament [7] and this time received entries
from 63 participants, each of whom knew that Tit-for-tat had won previously. Despite
this, Tit-for-tat triumphed yet again, with an average score of 434.73 (compared to the
runner-up with 433.88 and the worst bot with 220.50). These results led Axelrod to make
several observations about the most successful bots [8]. In general, they were:
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• nice, meaning that they always opened with cooperation and would not be the ﬁrst
to defect,
• provocable, meaning that they would respond to defectors with defection of their
own,
• not envious, meaning that they sought only to maximize their own reward and not
necessarily do better than any particular opponent,
• clear, meaning that they did not try to hide their strategy from their opponents or
attempt anything too tricky.
Notably, Tit-for-tat fulﬁlled all of these requirements and, at just ﬁve lines of code, was the
simplest bot to do so. This extraordinary success led to its further analysis by Hamilton
and Axelrod in an evolutionary setting [23]. Three key characteristics that a cooperator
must exhibit in order to succeed and proliferate are identiﬁed:
1. Robustness - the ability to thrive in an environment of many diﬀerent, varied strate-
gies,
2. Stability - the ability for a population using one strategy to resist invasion by a rare
mutant employing a diﬀerent strategy,
3. Initial viability - the ability to grow from a small initial group to a position of
dominance within a population that is primarily non-cooperative.
Axelrod's tournaments are cited as proof that Tit-for-tat is robust. Of course, having
the best performance in two tournaments does not imply that it is the optimal strategy,
especially since the concept of optimality here depends on which strategies comprise the
rest of the population. However, robustness requires only that a strategy do well, not
that it necessarily be the best possible, and it is undeniable that Tit-for-tat did well.
To show stability, it is argued that Tit-for-tat will never be the ﬁrst to defect, and so if
any defection is to occur, it must be initiated by the invading strategy. An invader who
does not initiate defection will only ever cooperate with Tit-for-tat, doing neither better
nor worse, and thereby failing in its invasion. On the other hand, an invader willing to
defect will fail if the chance of two agents meeting again exceeds both (T − R)/(T − P )
and (T −R)/(R− S), which is the same condition found by Nowak and others [15, 37].
The initial viability of Tit-for-tat is presented in a more speculative fashion. It is argued
that, in an environment of defectors, Tit-for-tat could potentially invade by changing the
rules slightly. For example, if the reward function were altered such that kinship were
considered (i.e. give each agent a stake in the well-being of like agents), then Tit-for-tat
would naturally have an advantage because it is cooperative with itself. Alternatively, a
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group of Tit-for-tat agents could enter the population as a cluster and interact primar-
ily with each other, leading to higher ﬁtness when compared to their non-cooperative
neighbours. 1
Outside of an evolutionary or tournament setting, it is not hard to produce a bot that
always does at least as well as any particular opponent. The simplest example of such a
strategy is all-defect, which on every turn guarantees a score of either T or P for the agent
and a score of S or P for the opponent, and is therefore impossible to defeat one-on-one.
However, all-defect makes no attempt to maximize its own score in the process.
Press and Dyson, on the other hand, present a bot that can both dominate its opponent
and decide by how much [42]. This zero-determinant strategy (so named because it
exploits the mathematics of the Prisoner's Dilemma by setting the determinant of a matrix
of parameters to zero) is deﬁned by four probabilities, corresponding to the probability
of cooperation after each of the four possible outcomes of the previous round (cooperate-
cooperate, cooperate-defect, defect-cooperate, and defect-defect). It is the choice of these
probabilities that allows the zero-determinant bot to unilaterally set the ratio of its score
to its opponent's score in the case where the opponent does as well as is allowed.
Additionally, if played against evolutionary opponents (that is, strategies that are updated
in generations to maximize score), the zero-determinant bot can set the evolutionary
landscape to anything it wants, with the obvious choice being to demand an increasingly
extortionate share every few generations.
While a zero-determinant strategy cannot be beaten in the long term, it is possible for
another bot to ﬁght against the extortion, but it requires that bot to have a theory of
mind. That is, if the opponent is aware that it is being oﬀered an unfair division of reward,
then it can refuse that share (i.e. all-defect) until the zero-determinant bot increases it to
an acceptable level. This reduces the Prisoner's Dilemma to an ultimatum game, in which
resources are divided unilaterally by one player (here, the zero-determinant bot), but the
other may choose to veto. Of course, by this argument, we are ascribing a relatively high
level of sophistication to both the zero-determinant bot and its opponent, neither of which
is guaranteed to exhibit such qualities.
Entered into a larger population, zero-determinant strategies have been shown to perform
poorly [1]. This is largely a result of two factors: they do not beneﬁt from playing
against each other, and (in an evolutionary setting) their mutants no longer possess the
ﬁnely-tuned constants that makes them zero-determinant. As a result, they are not
evolutionarily stable.
1It is worth noting that all-defect, like Tit-for-tat, is evolutionarily stable. Arguing that Tit-for-tat
could invade it in any case calls into question the value (and even deﬁnition) of stability. However, these
concerns are not addressed.
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2.1.4 Human-Bot Interaction
We have now seen how humans and bots each play the Prisoner's Dilemma game amongst
themselves, but the question remains: how do they interact with each other? In particular,
do human players react diﬀerently to artiﬁcial agents than they do to other people in the
context of a game? Kiesler et al. [32] demonstrate that, in fact, they do, and that these
diﬀerences can be quite large.
In their experiment, a group of undergraduates played the single-shot Prisoner's Dilemma
against:
• another person (an associate of the experimenter playing from a script),
• a bot with an animated rendering of a woman's face and a voice,
• a bot with a voice only,
• a bot with a text interface only,
each of which chose cooperation against one group of participants and defection against
another. These conditions were further divided into those that allowed communication and
those that did not, where communication was used to try to make participants verbally
commit to cooperation.
Among the various bots, the one presenting a face was found to be the most human-like
by a questionnaire, with the other two receiving fairly similar ratings. Despite this, the
face-bot was actually betrayed the most of all the bots, with 43% of participants actually
cooperating after committing to do so, compared to 51% for each of the other bots. It is
not clear, however, if this was simply a result of small sample size (around 50 participants
per bot). When playing another person, a more clear diﬀerence emerges. After committing
to cooperation, 87% of participants followed through, a far higher fraction than for any of
the bots. With communication disallowed, only 32.5% chose cooperation with the human
associate, while only 20% did so with the various bots.
From these results, we can make two important observations. First, people feel more
strongly obliged to keep their promises when those promises are made to real people. As
a result, when attempting to elicit genuine reactions to the play of a bot, the artiﬁcial
nature of that bot must remain hidden. Second, even though the eﬀect is not as strong,
a bot may still encourage cooperation by appealing to human emotions (in this case,
honour).
The latter result is also supported by de Melo et al. [11], who found that people could be
manipulated by emotions shown by an artiﬁcial agent. In their study, participants played
a price negotiation game with a bot set to show emotion either verbally (in this case, via
emotionally-charged on-screen text) or non-verbally (via a simulated man's face capable
of displaying neutral, happy, or angry expressions). In each case, the diﬀerence in price
the participants were willing to oﬀer was observed. In general, the emotions of the verbal
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Number of neighbouring cooperators
0 1 2 ... N-1
C 0 2 4 ... 2(N − 1)
D 1 3 5 ... 2(N − 1) + 1
Table 2.2: Reward matrix for a single agent in Yao and Darwen's N-player iterated
Prisoner's Dilemma [55]
.
bot had a slightly larger eﬀect (i.e. the diﬀerence between emotions was greater), but in
both cases a happy bot elicited a signiﬁcantly smaller average oﬀer than a neutral bot,
which in turn received less than an angry bot.
2.1.5 Networked Prisoner's Dilemma Games
When generalizing the Prisoner's Dilemma to include more than two players (i.e. the N-
Person [Iterated] Prisoner's Dilemma), we must choose how to expand the reward matrix
to accommodate the additional agents. Perhaps the simplest option is the Broadcast
model, in which an agent chooses to either cooperate or defect, and this choice is applied
to all partners according to the same matrix we have used previously. It is this model we
will adopt for the remainder of this work; however, another reward scheme exists, and it
is worth mentioning brieﬂy.
This second matrix (given in Table 2.2) was used by Yao and Darwen to show that
cooperation decreases as N increases in the N-Person Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma [55].
Under this reward structure, an agent beneﬁts from each other player who cooperates,
and gains nothing from cooperating itself. So far, this is identical to the Broadcast model.
Where this scheme diﬀers is in the result of defection. Here, an agent beneﬁts only once
from defecting, as opposed to N-1 times under Broadcast. This greatly reduces the direct
eﬀect an agent has upon its own score.
Yao and Darwen applied this structure to an evolutionary setting, letting agents adapt over
up to 1000 generations. Ultimately, they found that the fraction of cooperators decreased
seemingly monotonically as N increased, with 7/10 runs reaching 90% cooperation in
the 2-player case, 3/10 runs reaching 80% cooperation in the 4-player case, and no runs
reaching a signiﬁcant level of cooperation in either the 8-player or 16-player case. This
result conﬂicts with the results of actual human N-player experiments [20].
Returning now to the Broadcast model, we must further choose with whom a particular
agent will interact. That is, if we have very many agents and do not wish for each
to interact with every other (which would result in N2 interactions, quickly becoming
impractical as N increases), then how should we design the network of partnerships?
Several human studies have been performed with slightly diﬀerent answers to this question.
For example:
• Gruji¢ et al. [19] arranged 169 participants on a grid (digitally), with each playing
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against their 8 neighbours. Testing was conducted in three stages. First neighbours
remained constant between iterations. Second, neighbours were shued after every
iteration. Third, neighbours remained constant, but were not the same as in the
ﬁrst stage.
It was observed that individual participants tended to fall into one of ﬁve categories:
pure cooperators, pure defectors, mostly cooperators (cooperated ∼ 2/3 of the time),
mostly defectors (defected ∼ 2/3 of the time), and moody conditional cooperators.
Here, Moody Conditional Cooperation (MCC) is deﬁned as a strategy in which
the probability of an agent cooperating increases with the number of cooperating
neighbours, but also has a hysteresis. That is, an agent who cooperated last turn is
more likely to cooperate again than one who defected last turn, assuming the two
have the same number of cooperating neighbours. This behaviour applied even in
the second experimental stage, when neighbours were constantly shued.
Additionally, it was found that, regardless of the experimental stage, cooperation
declined from the ﬁrst iteration until approximately the 25th, at which point it
remained fairly constant at around 20%.
• Gruji¢ et al. [21] conducted a smaller version of their previous study, this time with
grids of size 16, in which each participant was connected to 4 neighbours. Again,
tests were conducted for both a ﬁxed lattice and one that was randomized after
every iteration, and no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in behaviour was found between the
two conditions. This conﬁrmation is interesting, as it suggests that strategy is not
necessarily the primary motivator when choosing between cooperation and defection.
• Rand et al. [43] conducted experiments with networks of approximately size 20 in
which participants were not only allowed to choose cooperation or defection, but
were additionally given the opportunity to create or destroy links in the network.
These choices were oﬀered stochastically, with some fraction of connections being
reviewed after every iteration. Unsurprisingly, players generally sought to punish
defectors by severing ties with them when possible, which resulted in cooperation
increasing as the fraction of reviewed links increased. It was also observed that
many defectors reformed after receiving such punishment.
Gruji¢ et al. [20] examine several such studies and make ﬁve important observations
regarding general player behaviour:
1. Network Invariance - Once the number of neighbours has exceeded two, the
average degree and structure of the network cease to signiﬁcantly aﬀect cooperation
rates.
2. Declining Cooperation Over Time - The global cooperation rate begins high,
but asymptotically declines to a near constant, but non-zero value.
3. Anti-Correlation of Earnings and Cooperation - On average, cooperation
yields a lower reward than defection.
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4. Moody Conditional Cooperation - The largest fraction of players exhibit be-
haviour consistent with MCC.
5. Player Type Stratiﬁcation - The remaining players are stratiﬁed into the other
four groups identiﬁed by Gruji¢ et al. [19] (Pure Cooperators, Mostly Cooperators,
Mostly Defectors, and Pure Defectors).
We will return to these observations when evaluating the BayesACT bot as a human-like
agent.
Imitation-based models have been employed as a means of explaining behaviour in these
games, as was done by Vilone et al. [52]. In this work, every agent in a simulated network
plays by the following strategy:
• With probability q, imitate the action of a randomly chosen neighbour.
• With probability (1− q), perform a strategic imitation. (Several diﬀerent methods
were tried, but the main one presented is Unconditional Imitation, in which the
single best scoring neighbour (including self) is imitated.)
This model was tested over varying values of q, diﬀering reward values, and diﬀerent
network types (in this case, Erdös-Rényi [random], and scale-free). Ultimately, it was
found that, for particular values of the parameters, MCC and network-independence could
be recreated, but notably, these values did not include the actual reward matrices used in
any human experiments. Also of note is that other researchers have found that evidence
for imitation strategies is lacking in general [20].
2.2 Aﬀect Control Theory
Aﬀect Control Theory (ACT) has its roots in Osgood's pioneering The Nature and Mea-
surement of Meaning [38], which sets out to identify and formalize the feelings that words
implicitly represent. 2 This is accomplished by an adaptation of so-called scaling tech-
niques, which were becoming popular at the time of Osgood's work. Such techniques
involved the surveying of hundreds of people, asking each to rank words on several scales.
Haagen [22], for example, asked participants to assign seven-point values for each of
synonymity, vividness, familiarity, and association value. Though potentially useful for
understanding the links between words, such scales were inadequate to fully capture their
meaning.
2Note that although it is with words and phrases that we are primarily interested, Osgood's work is
not limited to them. He wrote about signs, which include anything that conjures the original object to
mind, but is not that object itself. For instance, the words alarm clock, the sound of a buzzer, and a
video of an alarm clock ringing are all signs for an alarm clock.
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Figure 2.1: Results of Osgood's semantic diﬀerential surveys for the word polite [38].
Notably, both groups, on average, gave very similar ratings on every scale.
To that end, Osgood proposes the use of semantic diﬀerentials, continuous sliding scales
onto which a word may fall between two fundamentally opposite ideas. For instance, on
a scale ranging between kind and cruel, we would expect paciﬁst to generally be
rated as closer to kind. Osgood's original results for polite rated on several semantic
diﬀerentials are given by Figure 2.1.
Ultimately, it was not only found that words could be diﬀerentiated on the basis of
these scales, but that additionally, similar groups of people tended to rate words in a
very similar fashion. This lends credence to the idea that words have distinct, implicit,
culturally-shared meanings.
Osgood ﬁnishes his seminal work by postulating that, if some subset of his semantic
diﬀerentials could be proved suﬃcient to capture the meaning of any given word, then
that subset could serve as a standard basis for meaning. By the time of writing his book,
The Measurement of Meaning [39], a suitable subset had been found in evaluation,
potency, and activity by factor analysis, with evaluation being the most descriptive of the
three, and activity the least. Through the conduction of many more surveys, these results
were found to hold across 21 diﬀerent communities around the world [40], and thus the
standard EPA scale was born.
Gollob [16, 18] and Heise [25] expand this work by showing (through yet more surveys)
that, in an ABO interaction, an observer's change in attitude can be predicted to a large
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extent by the three fundamental EPA values involved. This altered altitude towards each
of the actor, behaviour, and object is also measured in EPA-space, and was termed a
transient impression.
The mathematics of transient impression formation were formalized by Heise [25] in the
form of simple polynomial expressions, whose coeﬃcients were found via regression. For
example, the evaluation of each sentiment was found to change as: 3
Tae = −0.15 + 0.37Fae + 0.55Fbe + 0.07Foe + 0.25FbeFoe (2.2)
Tbe = −0.24 + 0.23Fae + 0.60Fbe + 0.07Foe + 0.25FbeFoe (2.3)
Toe = −0.13 + 0.17Fae + 0.40Fbe + 0.36Foe + 0.30FbeFoe (2.4)
with similar equations being found for the potency and activity. These equations would
later be reﬁned by Smith-Lovin [49] to the more accurate (and complicated) versions in
use today. For example, the transient for the actor's evaluation is given by:
Tae =− 0.98 +0.468Fae −0.15Faa +0.425Fbe
− 0.069Fbp −0.106Fba +0.055Foe −0.020Fop
− 0.001Foa +0.048FaeFbe +0.130FbeFoe +0.027FapFbp
+ 0.068FbpFop +0.007FaaFba −0.038FaeFbp −0.010FaeFba
+ 0.013FapFbe −0.014FapFoa −0.058FbeFop −0.070FbpFoe
− 0.002FbpFoa +0.010FbaFoe +0.019FbaFop +0.026FaeFbeFoe
− 0.006FapFbpFop +0.031FaaFbaFoa +0.033FaeFbpFop +0.018FapFbpFoa
(2.5)
with similar equations existing for each of the other components of the transient. It is
worth noting here that although this version includes many more terms, some of which ex-
tend to third order, it is still fundamentally a polynomial combination of the fundamental
sentiment components.
From calculable transients comes the deﬂection, and from the deﬂection comes ﬁnally the
control principle. Heise [26] deﬁnes the deﬂection, D, as:
D = (~F − ~T )2
= (Tae − Fae)2+ (Tap − Fap)2+ (Taa − Faa)2+ (Tbe − Fbe)2+ (Tbp − Fbp)2+
(Tbe − Fbe)2+ (Toe − Foe)2+ (Top − Fop)2+ (Toa − Foa)2
(2.6)
3In order to be consistent with notation, we do not use the same naming scheme
as Heise. Instead, here and elsewhere, we adopt the notation of Hoey et al. [29],
where ~F = [Fae, Fap, Faa, Fbe, Fbp, Fba, Foe, Fop, Foa] is the fundamental sentiment and ~T =
[Tae, Tap, Taa, Tbe, Tbp, Tba, Toe, Top, Toa] is the transient. Here, the ﬁrst subscript designates by a, b,
or o the actor, behaviour, or object respectively, and the second subscript denotes by e, p, or a the
evaluation, potency, or activity components respectively.
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and proposed that a person naturally follows the path of least deﬂection (i.e. the action
that is expected by society). That is to say, the higher the deﬂection of an ABO interac-
tion, the less likely that interaction is to occur. This principle is backed by psychological
literature [9, 41] and empirical observations [17, 54, 45]. It follows that if we wish to
know which of several options a person will most likely choose (say, cooperate or defect),
due purely to aﬀect, we have only to calculate the deﬂection of each and ﬁnd the lowest
value. Alternatively, if our options are not limited, then we can ﬁnd the EPA of an ideal
behaviour that minimizes the deﬂection. This action can be interpreted by mapping it
onto a behaviour with a known, similar EPA.
2.2.1 Sentiment Modiﬁcations
Although we have now explored as much of classical ACT as is used in this work, there
is another development worthy of note: the modiﬁcation of EPA values due to emotion.
Averett and Heise [5] deﬁne a modiﬁer-identity hybrid EPA proﬁle that can be used in
place of a standard sentiment. This combination, ~C = [Ce, Cp, Ca], has elements of the
form:
Cx = α1 + α2fe + α3fp + α4fa + α5Me + α6Mp + α7Ma (2.7)
where x can be any of e, p, or a, ~f refers to the three-dimensional fundamental identity
being modiﬁed, ~M is the EPA of the modiﬁcation, and the α are constants determined
by regression. The eﬀect of this modiﬁcation can be seen by example:
Recall that the baseline EPA of a babysitter is [1.01, 0.80, 0.11]. Cheerful has
an EPA of [2.11, 1.43, 1.42]. A cheerful babysitter then has a modiﬁed EPA of
[1.30, 1.11, 1.01]. For the sake of contrast, furious has an EPA of [-1.66, 0.06,
1.72], and a furious babysitter has [-1.32, 0.65, 1.15]. 4
As a corollary, if we have an ABO interaction, we can calculate an emotion (as applied to
the actor, in this case) that minimizes the deﬂection, and may help us to explain why the
actor behaved in an otherwise inconsistent way. This characteristic emotion is inﬂuenced
roughly equally by the EPA of the transient and the size of the deﬂection [5].
We may similarly modify EPA values based on the location in which an interaction takes
place. It is logical, for example, for pushing to cause less deﬂection at a hockey arena
than at an opera house. For a full discussion of these mathematics, we refer the reader to
Smith-Lovin [48].
The idea of sentiment modiﬁcation is further explored by Heise [28] in an application
to jury modelling. In this work, a virtual jury driven by ACT is compared to data
from human mock juries recorded in the 1950s. As 32% of these jurors were female, a
corresponding proportion of the virtual agents were assigned an EPA of [1.2, 0.7, 0.0] for
4These values were again found via Interact [24].
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female juror, as opposed to the standard (male) EPA of [0.8, 1.6, -0.5] for juror. 5
Actions of the mock juries were recorded as belonging to one of twelve Interaction Process
Analysis (IPA) categories grouping similar behaviours. For example, the shows solidarity
category includes help, compliment, and gratify. These behaviours are then mapped
to EPA values whose average becomes the characteristic EPA for an IPA category. This
mapping provides a means for comparing the output of the ACT agents to those of the
human jurors.
This development leaves but one major question that must be answered before a com-
plete model can be claimed: namely, who will be involved in an interaction? Classical
ACT, after all, is only equipped to handle a single actor acting on a single object. To
address this, Heise deﬁnes personal tension to be just the squared diﬀerence between
an agent's fundamental self-sentiment, and the transient self-sentiment resulting from the
last interaction in which it participated. He then proposes that, in a group of agents, the
one to act next will be the one with the highest personal tension, and it will act on the
other agent that gives it the largest reduction in tension. This policy is then altered to
only apply after an 80% chance for transposition (i.e. ﬂip the actor and object of the last
interaction) and a 40% chance for an address of the group as a whole.
With these modiﬁcations, Heise ﬁnds that his virtual jury acts more consistently like the
mock juries than a random distribution of actions in several key ways:
• distribution of IPA categories chosen, on average,
• distribution of IPA categories by gender,
• number of actions taken, by gender (where females took disproportionately few
actions),
• number of actions taken by as a distribution over the jurors (i.e. a few jurors took
the majority of the actions).
Although it is perhaps unsatisfying to have a comparison only against purely random
actions, the fact that seemingly accurate gender dynamics fall out of the model is certainly
in the favour of ACT.
2.2.2 Bayesian Aﬀect Control Theory
Bayesian Aﬀect Control Theory, or BayesACT, is an extension of classical ACT that in-
corporates uncertainty using a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP),
as developed by Hoey et al. [29]. Rather than having one EPA triple to represent self-
sentiment and another for the interacting partner, each has an associated distribution of
5One can argue as to whether male juror should have been the counterpart to female juror, but,
given the time period in which the data was collected (1950s), it was deemed appropriate for juror to
be thought of as a man.
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possible EPA values weighted probabilistically. When choosing a deﬂection-minimizing
action, then, it is with respect to these distributions rather than static values. Further,
since it cannot be assumed that the partner's EPA is known, it is instead inferred through
a set of observables using Bayesian reasoning. Additionally, unlike in classical ACT, fun-
damental identities are allowed to drift over time. In general, this is assumed to be slow,
but ultimately allows a BayesACT agent to develop a feel for its partner, as well as its
own role.
The use of a POMDP also allows the inclusion of game elements normally outside the
purview of ACT, such as a reward function for actions chosen. When choosing an action,
then, there are potentially competing inﬂuences, as minimizing the deﬂection may not cor-
respond with the highest reward. However, this is handled such that these forces do not
compete directly. For discrete decision spaces (as in the case of the Prisoner's Dilemma), a
Partially Observable Monte-Carlo Planning (POMCP) [47] scheme is employed, in which
nodes in a decision tree are expanded with probability inversely proportional to the de-
ﬂection their respective action creates. That is to say, a desire to minimize the deﬂection
guides the direction in which the tree expands, but the actual action taken is ultimately
decided by maximization of the reward received. This is accomplished by repeated sam-
pling of the state space distribution for as much time as is allowed, where a longer running
time results in a more densely-ﬁlled tree, and therefore a more scheming agent.
This framework is applied to normal-form games (in this case, both the Prisoner's Dilemma
and Battle of the Sexes) by Asghar and Hoey [4]. This is not done with the explicit in-
tention of appearing to be human, but instead compares the performance of BayesACT
agents with varying POMCP timeout values. Interestingly, it is found that power dy-
namics frequently develop between agents, with the strong exploiting the weak, where
strength generally correlates with longer timeouts.
Other recent applications of BayesACT include sentiment analysis of newspaper head-
lines [2], and the development of assistive technology for those coping with Alzheimer's
disease [35].
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Chapter 3
Prisoner's Dilemma Study
This chapter recounts the methodology and results of our study exploring the interaction
between human players and BayesACT agents in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. 1
3.1 Description of the Experiment
We recruited 70 students (55 male and 15 female) from an undergraduate class on artiﬁcial
intelligence at the University of Waterloo to participate in our study. These participants
were required to sign up online ﬁrst, and were given an automatically generated username.
As part of this process, they were briefed on both ACT, including how to assign EPA
ratings, and on the Prisoner's Dilemma.
Note that the latter was deliberately presented in a manner that made no mention of
crooks, snitching, or any other traditional story elements. Instead, emphasis was placed
on how each action either beneﬁted the player herself, or the player's partner instead. To
that end, the usual options of cooperation or defection were semantically replaced with
give 2 or take 1. This scheme is sensible if one views the game, as deﬁned by Table 3.1,
as an allocation of resources from a communal pool. Cooperation corresponds to giving
two units to the partner, while defection corresponds to taking a single unit for oneself.
Though such a description may reduce a player's emotional connection to the game, it
was deemed necessary, as the telling of the Prisoner's Dilemma story is not standardized
and leaves much room for manipulation on the part of the experimenter.
In addition to this brieﬁng, participants were given an information and consent form and
chose with the option to either withhold or consent to the use of their data. All materials
shown to participants (including those yet to be discussed), as approved by the University
of Waterloo Oﬃce of Research Ethics, are given in the Appendix.
The participants were divided into four groups of size 12-20 by last name, with each group
playing together for 40 minutes in a computer lab environment. Groups of this size were
necessary to minimize the time taken in ﬁnding new opponents. In total, 360 games were
1Portions of this chapter have been previously reported [31].
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C D
C 2,2 0,3
D 3,0 1,1
Table 3.1: Reward matrix used in our Prisoner's Dilemma study. It employs the smallest
non-negative integers that satisfy the T > R > P > S requirement.
played, where the length of each game was uniformly randomly chosen between 12 − 18
rounds (plays of cooperation or defection). For any given game, a participant played
against one of four possible opponents:
1. another randomly chosen participant,
2. the BayesACT bot,
3. a Tit-for-tat bot,
4. Jerkbot, a bot that plays a ﬁxed strategy of three moves of cooperation followed by
pure defection thereafter, independent of the participant's play.
Participants played through all opponent types on a rotation, which was randomized
individually for each participant at the start of play. Notably, they were led to believe
that all opponents were other participants. It was not revealed to them until after testing
was complete that the majority of their games were played against bots.
Upon sign-up (i.e. before playing any games), and after each game (of between 12 − 18
rounds), participants were asked to rate each of the following terms on a sliding scale (se-
mantic diﬀerential) for each dimension of EPA space (Evaluation, Potency and Activity):
• two options presented by the game (i.e. take 1 or give 2),
• themselves (their self identity),
• their opponent in the game they just played.
The BayesACT agent for the ﬁrst session was initialized using the 48 ratings that were
given during the advanced sign-up phase. Speciﬁcally, this entailed appropriating the
participants' ratings of self, other player, give, and take for use as the BayesACT bot's
corresponding sentiments. In the case of the self and other sentiments, the sets of in-
dividual ratings were sampled uniformly randomly with replacement up to populations
of 2000, which would form BayesACT's initial sentiment distributions for self and other.
As BayesACT does not support similar distributions for the actions, give and take, we
instead took an average of the given EPA ratings for their sentiments.
Figure 3.1 gives the distribution of ratings for the identities of self and other after all
sign-ups were completed. The self is seen as more positive than the other player (means
1/0.25 for self/other), but about the same power (0.56/0.64) and activity (0.41/0.33).
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Figure 3.1: Out-of-context (sign-up) ratings of self (blue) and other (red).
Applying an ANOVA analysis along each dimension to check for a statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence (i.e. the observed diﬀerences were not the result of chance) reveals that the
Evaluation dimension is almost certainly diﬀerent (p-value < 0.01), while along the Po-
tency and Activity dimensions, ratings are not distinguishable (p-values of 0.73 and 0.76,
respectively). Intuitively, this makes sense, as it is easy to see the Prisoner's Dilemma as
adversarial in nature. If this view is taken, then the opponent must be aligned against
the self, which manifests as a good vs. bad diﬀerence in the Evaluation dimension. It is
much harder to say anything about the Potency or Activity of a general other, and so
we see no signiﬁcant diﬀerence along those axes.
For the second session, we reassigned sentiments to BayesACT in a similar fashion using
the same method, but incorporated ratings given by the participants of the ﬁrst session.
This expanded pool contained 89 ratings. 2
It must be noted here that an error was made with the BayesACT bot's internal reward
matrix. Rather than the one given by Table 3.1, it was playing by a matrix with values
R = 10, S = 0, T = 11, P = 1. This corresponds to the actions give 10 and take 1.
While this mistake did not impact on the aﬀective portion of BayesACT's decision making
process (deﬂection calculations do not consider the reward matrix), it may have aﬀected
choices produced by the POMCP. Resulting deviations in play are mitigated somewhat
by the relatively short POMCP timeout of 1 second that was used for this study, however
it is likely that the increased score for giving encouraged more cooperative play. 3
3.2 Results
Before discussing speciﬁc results, we note here the process by which we cleaned our data.
Data associated with 8 (out of 70) participants whose pattern of ratings indicated that
they did not take the experiment seriously was eliminated. To make these determinations,
we considered each participant's proportion of extreme ratings, as well as their relative
2Technical diﬃculties encountered during the ﬁrst session prevented this number from being greater.
3Indeed, as can be seen in Figure 3.2, BayesACT is a little too cooperative compared to humans. We
therefore may have observed even better results had the correct reward matrix been used.
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proportions of positive, neutral, and negative ratings. Speciﬁcally, a participant's data
was eliminated if that participated met at least two of the following conditions:
• The participant rated more than 50% of the questions in an extreme manner (be-
tween 4 and 4.3).
• The participant rated more than 50% of the questions in a neutral manner (between
0 and 0.3).
• The participant rated more than 65% of the questions in a single direction on the
slider (either positive or negative).
• The participant rated more than 65% of the questions at exactly 0.
3.2.1 Game Play and Scores
Figure 3.2 gives the mean, standard deviation, and median reward gathered for each round
of the game, by each of the opponents. The blue lines show the human play, while the
red lines show the opponent (one of human, BayesACT, Tit-for-tat, or Jerkbot). (For
the sake of visual consistency, we have split the human-human graph into blue and red,
though there is no practical diﬀerence between the groups.) From these plots (and Tables
3.2 and 3.3), we make the following observations:
• When playing against each other (i.e. human-human games), participants main-
tained moderately high levels of cooperation until near the end of a game. This is
logical from a reward-maximization perspective, as there is less opportunity for the
opponent to punish defection late in the game.
• The BayesACT bot also tends to mostly cooperate, and does so at a slightly higher
rate than its human opponents. As the end of the game approaches, human players
begin to defect, but the BayesACT bot, which has not been programmed with
knowledge of the game length, does not.
• Tit-for-tat cooperates at a very high level throughout the game and promotes simi-
larly high cooperation from its human opponents. Interestingly, the human players
are dissuaded from defection even near the end of a game.
• Jerkbot follows its script, eliciting from its opponent high cooperation followed by
a sharp descent into pure defection.
Table 3.2 gives the cooperation rates of the agents and their human opponents averaged
over all rounds of play. It also provides a statistical analysis (using ANOVA) comparing
each case to human-human games. This reveals that there is a statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence in the play of Tit-for-tat and Jerkbot when compared to humans, and a similarly
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Figure 3.2: Scores per round obtained by the agents (human, BayesACT, Tit-for-tat,
and Jerkbot) in red vs. human participants in blue. Solid lines with markers indicate the
mean, thick solid lines indicate the median, and dashed lines give the standard deviation.
signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the play that they elicit from their human opponents. BayesACT,
on the other hand, does not produce a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in either case.
Over the course of a whole game, then, BayesACT can be said to play more like a human
than either of the other two bots.
To gain insight into the end-eﬀects observed in Figure 3.2, we have performed the same
analysis using only rounds 10 and later. These results are given by Table 3.3. Here, we
again observe play that signiﬁcantly deviates from that of humans by both Tit-for-tat
and Jerkbot. (It is, in fact, even more signiﬁcant for Tit-for-tat given the lower p-values.)
For BayesACT, we now do observe a signiﬁcant diﬀerence from human play (due to
BayesACT's ignorance of the end approaching, as previously mentioned), but it becomes
even more diﬃcult (higher p-value) to diﬀerentiate the plays of its human opponents from
those playing other humans. That is to say, in the ﬁnal rounds of a game, our participants
treated BayesACT far more like another person than they did either of the other bots.
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3.2.2 EPA Ratings
Table 3.4 gives all mean EPA ratings, collected either on sign-up (initial), or after play-
ing one of the possible opponents. Of particular interest is the EPA of other, which
is the most direct measurement possible of how the participants felt about each of their
opponents. If we compare each of the bots as an opponent to human opponents, we
ﬁnd (as expected) that Tit-for-tat has noticeably higher Evaluation that humans, while
Jerkbot is rated noticeably lower. Quantifying these diﬀerences with ANOVA, we ﬁnd
that Tit-for-tat diﬀers signiﬁcantly along each of Evaluation/Potency/Activity (p-values
<0.001/<0.001/0.001), Jerkbot diﬀers signiﬁcantly in Evaluation (p-values<0.001/0.198/0.231),
and BayesACT does not diﬀer signﬁcantly in any dimension (p-values 0.843/0.721/0.131).
We therefore conclude, by direct rating, that BayesACT appeared to our participants to
be the most human-like.
3.3 Discussion and Future Work
By all of our metrics, BayesACT appears more human than either of the other two bots
tested. Of course, neither of them was designed with the purpose of modelling human
players, but at a minimum, Tit-for-tat serves as a baseline for the way in which Prisoner's
Dilemma bots typically operate. We address this issue (albeit, in a somewhat diﬀerent
setting) in the coming chapter with our comparisons to imitation-based bots.
When designing this study, there were several places where we had a free choice over which
direction to take. With an eye to future work, we now explore a few of the alternatives that
were passed over. The easiest of these to identify are the various numerical parameters
for which arbitrary values had to be chosen. These include the reward matrix values, the
number of rounds per game and the amount of variance in that number, and the POMCP
timeout of the BayesACT bot (1 second), among others. Due to the cost (in both dollars
and time) of conducting a study with human participants, it was simply not possible to
check more than one set of these values. In the network simulations of Chapter 4, which
were run in much greater number, we test many more combinations.
It would additionally be interesting to expand the pool of bots. Tit-for-tat was selected for
its ubiquity in Prisoner's Dilemma literature, while Jerkbot was created with the express
purpose of eliciting a strong reaction from the participants. Of course, these are not the
only bots with the potential to produce interesting results, but including more brought
the risk of spreading our data too thin. Were a follow-up to be performed, we would
consider including:
• a pure-random bot (i.e. 50% chance to cooperate every turn), which is the most
logical strategy to use as a baseline,
• the zero-determinant bot presented by Press and Dyson [42], which has the potential
to rival Jerkbot as a highly negative partner,
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• the imitator bot of Vilone et al. [52],
• BayesACT under the original settings described by Asghar and Hoey [4].
The manner in which information was presented to the participants also oﬀers opportuni-
ties for variation. While we chose to deliberately strip the Prisoner's Dilemma of its story
elements, leaving them in would likely have produced more extreme EPA ratings. This is
particularly true for the two actions, which instead of give 2 and take 1, would have
become the traditional cooperate and defect, or perhaps keep quiet and snitch.
Additionally, it could be interesting to keep hidden the approximate number of rounds
per game, which would very likely reduce the magnitude of the end-eﬀects we observed.
Of course, this information can be deduced after only a few games, so participants would
have to be rotated out much more frequently.
Looking to a further future, we recognize that BayesACT need not be limited to the
Prisoner's Dilemma. In principle, any problem that can be cast as a normal-form game
can be played by the BayesACT bot, and by conducting a similar study, BayesACT can
be tuned to act as a human analogue. This has the potential to be a useful predictor of
actual human behaviour.
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Agent Num. Agent Agent-Human Human Human-Human
Games C % ANOVA p-value C % ANOVA p-value
Human 35 63.9 − 63.9 −
BayesACT 73 71.5 0.180 60.8 0.664
Tit-for-tat 82 85.1 0.001 83.5 0.004
Jerkbot 83 20.3 < 0.001 34.5 < 0.001
Table 3.2: A comparison of cooperation rates among agents and their human partners
averaged over all rounds. Two ANOVA p-values are provided, which indicate the statis-
tical signiﬁcance of the diﬀerence between two distributions, where we consider p < 0.05
to be signiﬁcant. The Agent-Human analysis examines the diﬀerence between the agent's
cooperation rate and that of humans playing against other humans. The Human-Human
analysis is instead for the diﬀerence in cooperation rate for a human playing the given
agent, and a human playing other humans. Shaded rows indicate agents for which neither
analysis could discern a signiﬁcant diﬀerence from human-human play.
Agent Num. Agent Agent-Human Human Human-Human
Games C % ANOVA p-value C % ANOVA p-value
Human 35 55.4 − 55.4 −
BayesACT 73 71.1 0.028 53.3 0.796
Tit-for-tat 82 83.4 < 0.001 81.8 < 0.001
Jerkbot 83 0.0 < 0.001 8.9 < 0.001
Table 3.3: A comparison of cooperation rates among agents and their human partners
averaged over rounds 10 and later. Columns are as described in the caption of Table 3.2.
give 2 take 1 self (human) other (human/bot)
opponent E P A E P A E P A E P A
(initial) 1.4 0.1 0.2 −0.6 0.9 0.6 1.1 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.6 0.3
jerkbot 1.3 −0.3 −0.1 −1.3 0.8 0.7 1.3 −0.1 0.9 −1.9 0.4 0.5
bayesact 1.3 0.1 0.0 −0.9 1.1 1.0 0.7 1.4 1.2 0.4 −0.1 −0.3
human 1.7 0.7 0.3 −1.2 0.4 0.3 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.5 0.0 0.1
titfortat 2.3 1.2 1.1 −1.2 0.5 0.3 1.9 1.7 1.7 2.2 1.1 1.1
Table 3.4: Means of pre-game (initial) and post-game impressions for each opponent
type.
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Chapter 4
Networked Experiments
This chapter describes our experimental application of BayesACT to the Networked Iter-
ated Prisoner's Dilemma (NIPD).
4.1 Description of the Experiment
For each test, 169 bots of one type (where 169 was chosen to correspond with a 13 by
13 grid) were arranged on a static network to play the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma with
their neighbours. These games each lasted for 60 individual rounds, a number comparable
to those of the largest human studies [20]. For each setting of our test parameters (to
be described shortly), 20 independent games were played, resulting in approximately
3000 total simulations. Those involving BayesACT were carried out on the University of
Waterloo's Daytona computing cluster, which consists of four Intel R© Xeon R© processors,
each with 12 cores, and 128 Gb RAM.
4.1.1 Modiﬁed Game Rules
As before, games consisted of several rounds, and for each round, agents chose between
cooperation and defection. However, unlike the standard Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma,
one agent could simultaneously play with several partners, and was forced to send each the
same action. (This adheres to the Broadcast model introduced in Section 2.1.5.) Scores
were then determined by summing the rewards earned in each of the resulting one-on-one
games.
Partners were selected on the basis of static network connections determined before start-
ing the game. (We discuss the three network types used in Section 4.1.3.) It was therefore
possible (depending on the type of network used) for some agents to have more partners,
and therefore more earning potential, than others. Though this could certainly be viewed
as unfair from a player's perspective, it should not in principle have aﬀected the way the
game was played by BayesACT agents, as their goal was not necessarily to beat any
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other player. However, in the case of the imitator agents (to be introduced in Section
4.1.2), this property gives more inﬂuence to highly connected agents. (i.e. Even if their
average score per neighbour were low, they could still have the highest total score in their
neighbourhood.) This results directly from the work of Vilone et al. [52], and is neither
clearly beneﬁcial nor detrimental to an adherence to human-like play.
4.1.2 Bots of Interest
BayesACT Bot Naturally, we were interested in testing the BayesACT bot described
in Section 2.2.2 in this networked setting. However, it is designed to keep a single EPA
distribution for its self-identity and another such distribution for its opponent. It is
therefore not equipped to handle multiple opponents at once without alteration. Several
options were considered to make BayesACT compatible with the network:
1. Allow BayesACT to keep its two EPA distributions (i.e. one for self, and one
for a generic other encompassing all opponents), but instead of applying multiple
cooperate or defect actions, average them into one aggregate action. When choosing
an action to take, do so as normal, treating the aggregate opponent as any other.
2. Allow BayesACT to keep its single self-identity, but add one EPA distribution for
the identity of each opponent. When choosing an action to take, use the result of
the majority vote from interactions against all opponents.
3. Expand BayesACT such that it keeps an independent self-identity and opponent-
identity for every neighbour in the network. When choosing an action to take, use
the result of the majority vote from interactions against all opponents.
All actions within a round are supposed to occur simultaneously, but BayesACT oﬀers no
mechanism for processing simultaneous actions. Therefore, if multiple opponent actions
are to be processed, they must be arranged in some order. This poses a serious problem
for Option 2, as, with a single self-identity that changes after every interaction, a dif-
ferent ordering of these interactions can yield diﬀerent results. This makes Option 2 an
inappropriate choice.
Option 3 alleviates this problem, as each of its self-opponent identity pairs are indepen-
dent, but strays too far from the sociological roots of BayesACT. While it is certainly
possible for a person to act diﬀerently when dealing with diﬀerent people, this is not
the same as taking on a completely new, independent identity each time that is wholly
unaﬀected by interactions with anyone else.
This leaves Option 1, which, while comparatively simple, is not obviously ﬂawed and has
the additional beneﬁt of being the least computationally expensive of the three. This
is therefore the system under which our BayesACT bot operates for these networked
experiments.
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Imitation-Based (Imitator) Bot For the purposes of comparison, we required an-
other bot to test. However, neither Tit-for-tat (which almost immediately goes to either
full cooperation or full defection) or Jerkbot (which ignores completely the actions of its
opponents) were suitable choices. Instead, we turn to the imitation-based bot advocated
by Vilone et al. [52] as a possible explanation for human behaviour in the Networked
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma. A full description of this bot is given in Section 2.1.5.
4.1.3 Experimental Parameters
Network Types In the literature, we have observed a few classes of networks employed
in similar experiments:
• Grid: Agents are arranged on a square grid and interact with their nearest neigh-
bours. These neighbours may belong to either a Moore (four neighbours, cardinal
directions only) or von Neumann (eight neighbours, diagonals included) neighbour-
hood.
• Erdös-Rényi (ER): Given a desired average node degree, all networks with that
property are equally likely to be chosen. i.e. Edges are chosen randomly with
uniform probability until some threshold is reached.
• Scale-free: The number of nodes with a given degree decreases according to a power
law. Unlike that of an ER network, the degree distribution of a scale-free network is
characterized by a long tail, resulting in a number of "hub" nodes that have much
higher degree than the average.
Given that these network types (which, of course, are not the only possible valid networks)
can be varied in inﬁnite ways (for instance, by density), we had a free choice over which
would actually be incorporated into this experiment. The selections we made are as
follows:
1. a grid layout with a Moore neighbourhood (Grid),
2. an ER network with average degree 5.14 (ER5),
3. an ER network with average degree 8.48 (ER8).
We included a grid network on the basis that it is the most common type found in human
studies in the literature [20]. The additional inclusion of ER networks with varied densities
were intended to highlight any contrast in play resulting from diﬀerent, but fundamentally
similar networks. The particular values of 5.14 and 8.48 were chosen to mirror those
employed by Vilone et al. [52] It is additionally convenient that our ﬁrst and third networks
had similar density, diﬀering primarily in the regularity of their connections.
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1.
C D
C 2,2 0,3
D 3,0 1,1
2.
C D
C 1,1 0,1.4
D 1.4,0 0,0
3.
C D
C 10,10 0,11
D 11,0 1,1
Table 4.1: Reward matrices chosen for our network experiments.
Reward Matrices Despite (or perhaps because of) the enormous number of Prisoner's
Dilemma studies, there has been little agreement on reward values outside the basic
inequality given by Equation 1.1. They therefore present another free choice. In this
experiment, we use the matrices given by Table 4.1. Matrix 1 is the same as was used in
Chapter 3, Matrix 2 is one setting employed by Vilone et al. [52] 1, and Matrix 3 emulates
that of Asghar and Hoey [4].
Other Parameters Additionally, each of the two bots tested had their own unique
parameters. In the case of BayesACT, we chose to vary the initial EPA distribution
between the following two options:
• the original set as presented by Hoey et al. [29]. This required that each agent be as-
signed a random sampling of good (friend:[2.75,1.88,1.38], buddy:[2.28,1.61,1.65],
pal:[2.73,1.87,1.75]) and bad (scrooge:[-2.15,-0.21,-0.54], traitor:[-2.52,-0.29,-0.48],
crook:[-2.8,-0.72,-0.31]) identities for self-sentiment, and another such sampling for
the sentiment of the other player. We refer to this setting as the default.
• the complete set of EPA ratings that the participants of our Prisoner's Dilemma
study (described in Chapter 3) assigned to themselves and their opponents when
playing against other participants. 2
We also applied several diﬀerent computation time limits (0, 1, and 10 seconds) to
BayesACT's POMCP search, where a zero second limit results in myopic agents that
do no planning beyond their immediate state. This setting is the closest to the deﬂection
minimization of classical ACT, but of course, still includes the EPA distributions and
other machinery of BayesACT.
When a particular setting of these parameters must be identiﬁed, we use the shorthand
BACT[X][Y], where X is one of D or S (denoting default or study EPA settings) and Y is
one of 0, 1, or 10 (denoting the POMCP timeout).
For the imitation-based bots, we varied q, the probability of randomly selecting any
neighbour instead of the highest scorer, from 0% to 100% in 10% intervals. We identify
this via the shorthand IM[X], where X ∈ [0, 100] is value of q.
1Vilone et al. [52] tested a continuum of matrices by varying T . Matrix 2 uses a value of T that saw
a large variation in behaviour depending on the value of their randomization parameter, q. It is possibly
worth noting that this value does not adhere to the strict inequality of Equation 1.1, but nevertheless
remains true to the spirit of the Prisoner's Dilemma.
2Note that we did not use the EPA ratings of humans playing against the BayesACT bot (or either
of the other bots), as it is the human-human case that we are trying to emulate.
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 32.81 33.05 33.46 0.33 0.85
R1 33.67 33.76 33.64 0.01 0.99
R2 31.12 32.51 32.87 2.64 0.27
R3 30.50 30.00 31.54 1.95 0.38
R4 30.30 30.15 30.24 0.02 0.99
... ... ... ... ... ...
R57 29.23 28.17 28.79 0.95 0.62
R58 27.43 27.31 28.14 0.68 0.71
R59 28.22 28.02 28.99 0.88 0.64
Table 4.2: Comparing cooperation rates by round across our three network types for a
BayesACT agent using the default EPA distribution, a timeout of 1 second, and the ﬁrst
of our three reward matrices. Rows are shaded for p-values > 0.05, indicating that the
distributions for the three network type are not statistically discernible. A full version of
this table can be found with those of all other parameter settings in the Appendix.
4.2 Results
We now examine the results of these experiments with respect to the 5 observations of
Gruji¢ et al. [20]. For nominal variables, we apply the G-test to show independence (or
lack thereof) of two distributions. It produces the likelihood ratio G = 2
∑
iOilog(Oi/Ei),
where Oi is the observed count and Ei is the expected count [36]. This can be converted
to a p-value, for which we consider a value of 0.05 to constitute strong evidence that the
distributions in question are diﬀerent. For continuous variables, we use ANOVA, which
produces a similar p-value.
4.2.1 Network Invariance
For all parameter settings of the BayesACT agents, we do not ﬁnd evidence that network
structure impacts agent behaviour. This is demonstrated by the consistently high p-
values obtained when performing a G-test of cooperation rate per round across the 3
network types, indicating that the three distributions are not statistically discernible. In
particular, for BACTD agents, 96.1% of rows have p > 0.05, while for BACTS agents,
this is true of 90.7% of rows. As an example, Table 4.2 gives these data for one BayesACT
setting. Full tables (for both BACT and IM bots) are given in the Appendix.
Imitation-based agents, on the other hand, do not seem to consistently exhibit this in-
variance. For IM agents, only 5.6% of rows have p > 0.05. We ﬁnd that there is a strong
tendency for these agents to gradually move towards full defection, but they frequently
do so at diﬀerent rates, depending on the network (with the cooperation rate of the com-
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 51.36 49.67 48.91 4.27 0.12
R1 25.15 30.83 26.09 31.18 < 0.001
R2 12.69 17.10 12.96 33.01 < 0.001
R3 6.27 8.82 5.98 24.46 < 0.001
R4 2.75 4.76 3.11 22.00 < 0.001
... ... ... ... ... ...
R57 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R58 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R59 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
Table 4.3: Comparing cooperation rates by round across our three network types for an
imitation agent using q = 0.5 and the ﬁrst of our three reward matrices. Rows are shaded
for p-values > 0.05, indicating that the distributions for the three network type are not
statistically discernible. A full version of this table can be found with those of all other
parameter settings in the Appendix.
.
paratively low density ER5 network frequently decaying the slowest 3). Further, when full
defection has been reached for one network, any deviation in the others becomes statisti-
cally signiﬁcant. This results in low G-test p-values when observing cooperation rates on
a per-round basis, indicating that behaviour is indeed aﬀected by network structure. An
example of this behaviour is given by Table 4.3.
Little changes if we look at only the best parameter settings for each agent per matrix.
The best BACTD agents have p > 0.05 for 100%, 100%, and 97% of rows for M1, M2,
and M3, respectively. For BACTS agents, we have 97%, 98%, and 95%. For IM agents,
we have 27%, 43%, and 12%, though the latter two values reduce to 10% and 3% if we
exclude IM100 agents, which do not perform strategic imitation at all. This paints much
the same picture as the aggregations of all parameter settings: that imitator bots show
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerences in behaviour on diﬀerent networks, while BayesACT
agents do not.
4.2.2 Cooperation Rate Over Time
In human studies, the global cooperation rate has been observed to drop from 55%-
70% to 20%-40% after around 20 rounds of play, after which it remains approximately
constant [20]. We do not in general observe this behaviour in our BayesACT agents.
While some settings of BayesACT do demonstrate a reduction in global cooperation rate
over time (i.e. round number), this diﬀerence is typically less than 5%.
3In fact, if we consider only the Grid and ER8 networks, which have very similar average degree, the
number of rows with p > 0.05 increases signiﬁcantly to 27.7%, indicating that density may have a large
eﬀect on the behaviour of imitator agents
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Figure 4.1: Histograms of the number of simulations at various cooperation rates for
imitator agents (left) and BayesACT agents (right) at rounds 0, 10, 30, and 60 (top
to bottom). BayesACT agents tend to remain fairly constant in their behaviour, while
imitator agents have a strong tendency towards full defection (and to a lesser extent, full
cooperation).
The imitation-based agents, on the other hand, tended to display one of two extreme
behaviours: either the cooperation rate decayed to zero, or it ballooned to some constant
greater that its starting value. In some cases, individual simulations of the same parameter
settings were split between these ﬁnal states, though a descent into full defection was
generally the more common of the two. Such behaviour is also diﬀers vastly from that of
humans. These results are summarized by Figure 4.1.
4.2.3 Anti-Correlation of Earnings and Cooperation
Before calculating correlation coeﬃcients, it is worth examining the relative scores of
cooperators and defectors, which ought to be higher for the defectors. Across all parameter
settings, BayesACT agents score lower when cooperating than when defecting (i.e. test
passed for 100% of both BACTD and BACTS agents). While the imitator agents do
display this property for Matrix 1 (for 100% of settings), they do not generally do so for
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Agent Avg. C Avg. D ANOVA ANOVA
Score Score stat. p-val.
BACTD0 25.72 30.54 4.01× 103 < 0.001
BACTD1 23.67 28.64 4.78× 103 < 0.001
BACTD10 19.61 24.97 6.27× 103 < 0.001
BACTS0 35.69 40.82 3.09× 103 < 0.001
BACTS1 32.52 37.48 3.40× 103 < 0.001
BACTS10 25.33 30.20 4.35× 103 < 0.001
IM0 45.19 22.51 4.05× 104 < 0.001
IM10 47.41 21.81 4.20× 104 < 0.001
IM20 46.11 19.14 6.14× 104 < 0.001
IM30 42.35 21.69 4.28× 104 < 0.001
IM40 35.92 14.03 6.59× 104 < 0.001
IM50 26.89 11.96 3.49× 104 < 0.001
IM60 19.80 8.51 2.08× 104 < 0.001
IM70 19.58 8.87 1.87× 104 < 0.001
IM80 20.41 9.06 2.06× 104 < 0.001
IM90 22.97 12.69 1.58× 104 < 0.001
IM100 25.12 22.57 9.57× 102 < 0.001
Table 4.4: Comparing scores earned by cooperators and defectors among diﬀerent agent
types. Shaded rows indicate that the average score for defection is higher than that
of cooperation, as per Requirement 3, and that the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant
(p < 0.05). This table presents results for network ER5 and Matrix 3. Tables for all
network/matrix combinations can be found in the Appendix.
Matrices 2 and 3 (6.7% and 0% of settings, where the only successful agents were the
purely random imitators, IM100). It is important to note that reward matrix values are
parameters of the simulation, not of the agents. That is to say, a successful agent must
have at least some parameter setting that can gracefully cope with any possible reward
matrix. A failure of the imitator agents for M3 (and M2 as well, if we exclude IM100)
indicates a failure overall.
Table 4.4 gives an example of these results. Full tables are given in the Appendix. In all
cases, there was a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between the scores of cooperators and
defectors, as calculated with ANOVA.
We see similar results when calculating the Pearson Correlation between the cooperation
rates of individual agents and their scores (normalized by the average score of all agents
in their simulation). To consider Requirement 3 satisﬁed, we must see a negative corre-
lation coeﬃcient that is statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.05). By this metric, we ﬁnd that
100% of BACTD settings and 74.1% of BACTS settings (100% for M1, 88.9% for M2,
33.3% for M3) display the desired anti-correlation. Given that even the best BACTS
settings (BACTS0 or BACTS10) only achieved 77.8% requirement satisfaction, they may
be considered less successful than their BACTD counterparts. However, this diﬀerence is
38
Agent Avg. Avg. Pearson Pearson
C % Score coef. p-val.
BACTD0 49.79 28.13 −0.10 < 0.001
BACTD1 45.93 26.36 −0.12 < 0.001
BACTD10 38.60 22.90 −0.16 < 0.001
BACTS0 69.49 37.26 −0.02 0.212
BACTS1 63.14 34.35 0.00 0.949
BACTS10 48.99 27.81 0.00 0.857
IM0 74.06 39.30 0.16 < 0.001
IM10 80.49 42.41 0.07 < 0.001
IM20 71.99 38.56 0.09 < 0.001
IM30 64.49 35.01 0.08 < 0.001
IM40 35.96 21.90 0.10 < 0.001
IM50 21.66 15.19 0.14 < 0.001
IM60 9.89 9.63 0.04 0.021
IM70 10.74 10.02 0.05 0.007
IM80 11.49 10.37 0.05 0.004
IM90 21.11 14.86 0.05 0.008
IM100 39.95 23.59 0.10 < 0.001
Table 4.5: Comparing cooperation rates with scores earned. Shaded rows indicate that
the correlation between cooperation rate and score is negative and statistically signiﬁcant
(p < 0.05). This table presents results for network ER5 and Matrix 3. Tables for all
network/matrix combinations can be found in the Appendix.
small compared to the imitator agents, which displayed cooperation-score anti-correlation
in only 30.3% of settings (81.8% for M1, 9.1% for M2, 0% for M3), with the best setting,
IM10, succeeding in 44.4% of matrix/network combinations. By both of our metrics, then,
BayesACT satisﬁes Requirement 3 more adequately than the imitator bots.
Table 4.5 gives an example of these results. Full tables are given in the Appendix.
4.2.4 Moody Conditional Cooperation
Moody Conditional Cooperation has two requirements: hysteresis (i.e. an agent must be
more likely to cooperate if it cooperated on the last turn) and conditionality (i.e. an agent
must be more likely to cooperate if its neighbours were predominantly cooperators on the
last turn) [19]. Example settings for each of these are given by Table 4.6 and Table 4.7
respectively.
Though the various BayesACT agents had performed fairly similarly until this point, we
see here that those using the default set of initial EPA values seem to display a strong
hysteresis (in 100% of test settings), while those using the study set do not (only 4% of
all test settings). Additionally, even the best of the BACTS agents, BACTS0, showed a
hysteresis in only 11% of network/matrix combinations. We believe that this is most likely
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Agent C After C After G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 68.51 31.26 2.69× 104 < 0.001
BACTD1 64.96 29.68 2.53× 104 < 0.001
BACTD10 60.37 24.74 2.54× 104 < 0.001
BACTS0 69.44 69.56 0.31 0.58
BACTS1 62.89 63.42 5.67 0.017
BACTS10 48.07 49.61 47.28 < 0.001
IM0 95.93 13.48 1.35× 105 < 0.001
IM10 95.33 22.77 9.12× 104 < 0.001
IM20 92.79 20.62 1.04× 105 < 0.001
IM30 86.23 26.15 7.42× 104 < 0.001
IM40 73.77 14.30 7.26× 104 < 0.001
IM50 56.78 11.19 3.70× 104 < 0.001
IM60 43.26 5.41 1.97× 104 < 0.001
IM70 40.84 6.33 1.72× 104 < 0.001
IM80 40.85 6.88 1.72× 104 < 0.001
IM90 44.94 14.02 1.72× 104 < 0.001
IM100 48.76 33.81 4.45× 103 < 0.001
Table 4.6: A comparison of cooperation rates after either cooperating or defecting on the
last turn. Shaded rows indicate that cooperation is higher after previously cooperating
than it is after previously defecting (i.e. hysteresis is observed) and that the diﬀerence
is statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.05). This table presents results for network ER5 and
Matrix 3. Tables for all network/matrix combinations can be found in the Appendix.
a result of the larger diﬀerence between the EPAs of the cooperate and defect actions in
the default set ([2.1,1.45,0.82] and [-2.28,-0.48,-0.84] vs [1.42, 0.10, 0.18] and [-0.65, 0.85,
0.70]) resulting in higher deﬂections and hence more severe reactions.
Viewed in aggregate, relatively few BayesACT agents exhibit statistically signiﬁcant con-
ditionality (22% of BACTD and 44% of BACTS). Looking at the best settings reveals that
BACTD0 displays conditionality in 44% of network/matrix combinations, while BACTS1
does so in 67% of them. Unfortunately, it must be noted that the actual diﬀerence in
cooperation percentage tends to be very small (frequently < 1%), and it is for this reason
that we do not claim to observe conditionality in BayesACT agents.
All imitator agents, on the other hand, have both strong hysteresis and conditionality
(i.e. 100% of settings). (Given the tendency of these systems to develop towards either
high cooperation or total defection, this is not surprising.)
4.2.5 Player Type Stratiﬁcation
According to Gruji¢ et al. [19], human players can be broadly classiﬁed as belonging to
one of 5 groups: those who only cooperate, those who mostly cooperate (at least two
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Agent C Near C Near G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 50.49 49.12 28.77 < 0.001
BACTD1 46.40 45.90 3.88 0.049
BACTD10 37.36 38.96 35.79 < 0.001
BACTS0 69.49 69.33 0.25 0.62
BACTS1 63.35 62.29 14.71 < 0.001
BACTS10 49.55 48.22 28.85 < 0.001
IM0 91.01 16.70 8.15× 104 < 0.001
IM10 94.57 18.88 8.08× 104 < 0.001
IM20 93.07 15.73 1.06× 105 < 0.001
IM30 88.39 17.87 9.14× 104 < 0.001
IM40 81.65 9.99 9.83× 104 < 0.001
IM50 72.69 8.15 5.76× 104 < 0.001
IM60 67.73 4.21 2.88× 104 < 0.001
IM70 68.14 4.44 3.11× 104 < 0.001
IM80 69.59 4.47 3.71× 104 < 0.001
IM90 75.84 8.38 5.79× 104 < 0.001
IM100 77.40 17.68 6.22× 104 < 0.001
Table 4.7: A comparison of cooperation rates after being surrounded by a majority of
either cooperators or defectors on the last turn. Shaded rows indicate that cooperation
is higher near other cooperators than near defectors (i.e. conditionality is observed) and
that the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.05). This table presents results for
network ER5 and Matrix 3. Tables for all network/matrix combinations can be found in
the Appendix 5.
times in three), moody conditional cooperators, those who mostly defect (at least two
times in three), and those who only defect. These groups tend to be unevenly populated,
with the most in the middle group, fewer in either of the mostly groups, and very few
in either of the pure groups.
For human systems that settle on a comparatively high level of cooperation, it makes
sense to consider MCC as the middle group. However, given the imitator agents tendency
towards full defection, MCC behaviour is not limited to the middle third of cooperation
rates. Hence, we have simply called the middle group Mixed, and dealt with MCC on
its own. For one experimental setting, this data is given by Table 4.8, where we have
shaded rows that meet the stratiﬁcation condition 4:
(Mixed% > MostlyD% > PureD% > 0) ∧ (Mixed% > MostlyC% > PureC% > 0)
(4.1)
4Note that this inequality is never explicitly stated by Gruji¢ et al. [19], but is our interpretation of
his result.
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Agent Pure Mostly Mixed Mostly Pure
D % D % % C % C %
BACTD0 5.77 28.55 31.57 28.88 5.24
BACTD1 5.92 33.08 32.34 25.56 3.11
BACTD10 6.27 43.99 28.43 20.06 1.24
BACTS0 0.00 0.00 33.25 66.75 0.00
BACTS1 0.00 0.00 72.46 27.54 0.00
BACTS10 0.00 0.47 99.32 0.21 0.00
IM0 11.42 7.22 4.35 60.89 16.12
IM10 3.55 2.57 5.83 80.74 7.31
IM20 4.76 6.48 13.73 71.21 3.82
IM30 4.32 10.33 25.65 58.28 1.42
IM40 9.35 39.91 33.58 16.69 0.47
IM50 3.91 70.00 25.53 0.38 0.18
IM60 8.91 87.40 3.46 0.00 0.24
IM70 3.34 95.21 1.18 0.00 0.27
IM80 2.69 93.91 3.20 0.00 0.21
IM90 0.92 84.44 9.64 4.79 0.21
IM100 0.24 38.67 52.25 8.73 0.12
Table 4.8: A comparison of agent stratiﬁcation according to the 5 groups of Gruji¢ et
al. [19]. Shaded rows indicate adherence to Equation 4.1. This table presents results for
network ER5 and Matrix 3. Tables for all network/matrix combinations can be found in
the Appendix.
Aggregating all parameter settings, none of our agent types appear to display strong strat-
iﬁcation, with 33% of BACTD, 0% of BACTS, and 3% of IM agents adhering to Equation
4.1. However, when viewing only the best parameter setting from each category, a diﬀer-
ent picture emerges. While BACTS remains unstratiﬁed, we see see 100% satisfaction of
Equation 4.1 from BACTD0. There is therefore at least one setting of BayesACT that
behaves in a human-like fashion according to Requirement 5 of Gruji¢ et al. [19].
On the other hand, the best IM bot, IM100, only satisﬁes Equation 4.1 in 33% of net-
work/matrix combinations. If IM100 is discounted (because p = 100 corresponds to never
actually using strategic imitation, but rather always imitating a neighbour at random),
then there are no imitator bots that meet the stratiﬁcation requirement in any test setting.
4.3 Discussion and Future Work
BayesACT agents meet the criteria of network invariance and cooperation-score anti-
correlation where imitation does not, and in all areas where BayesACT is deﬁcient, ex-
cepting the conditionality requirement of MCC, imitation is as well. (Arguably, BayesACT
displays stratiﬁcation as well, but as this is for only one setting, we are cautious of making
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this claim.) Additionally, exposing more of BayesACT's parameters may alleviate some
of its deﬁciencies.
A BayesACT agent keeps an EPA distribution for the perception of its opponent. (As
one action must be chosen to be applied to all partners, we modeled the complete set of
them as one general opponent.) Both this distribution and the one for self are allowed to
change as observations are received. For instance, after its partner defects, a BayesACT
agent will view that partner through a more negative EPA. However, this process of
change is slow by default. By increasing the value of the corresponding tuning parameter
(which was held at its default value for these experiments), larger changes in identity may
be allowed after every round, allowing for sooner retributive action. Such an outcome
could help these agents to better conform to both the conditionality aspect of MCC and
the overall drop in cooperation rate over time observed in human players.
While the imitation-based agents appear to come up short in all requirements but one, it
must be noted here that due to the computational cost of BayesACT, we were not able
to test the full space of reward as completely as Vilone et al. [52]. It is therefore possible
that an ideal setting for the imitator agents was missed amidst that continuous space.
Looking to future work, we would be interested in applying BayesACT to other types of
networks. In particular, scale-free networks, which were examined by Vilone et al. [52],
are highly non-uniform, unlike their grid and ER counterparts, and more closely resemble
human social networks [30]. However, given that Gruji¢ et al. [20] did not have data from
human studies on scale-free networks when making their observations, it is not clear that
invariance ought to continue in that domain.
It would also be interesting to adjust the clustering of agents within a network. Currently,
BayesACT agents are given random initial EPA distributions, creating a continuum of
good to bad identities. However, these agents are mixed homogeneously through-
out the network. If clusters of nodes were assigned similar identities, it could produce
persistent microcosms within a wider network, much as envisioned by Hamilton and Ax-
elrod [23].
Removing the Broadcast restriction opens up further opportunities for future work. If
agents do not act simultaneously, then there is freedom in selecting the ordering of these
actions. A simple solution would be to rotate the agents such that each gets a turn, but
this is not the only option. Recalling Heise's jury model [28], we could allow the agent with
the highest personal tension (i.e. the squared diﬀerence between that agent's fundamental
self-sentiment, and the transient self-sentiment resulting from the last interaction in which
it participated) to act next, although the computational costs of checking this quantity
for every agent after every action may be prohibitive.
Finally, we introduce the possibility of applying BayesACT to networks in the wild.
Though such networks do not generally explicitly involve the Prisoner's Dilemma, they
may contain features that can be cast as normal-form games. When a FaceBook user
ignores a friend request, or a GitHub user denies a pull request, there is an implicit
defection-like interaction with another agent somewhere in the world. If one supposes
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that such scenarios come with even a portion of the emotional baggage of a Prisoner's
Dilemma, then BayesACT may be able to help explain them.
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Chapter 5
Conclusions
In both of our experiments, BayesACT appeared deﬁnitively more human (or at least,
human in more areas) than the bots against which it was compared. As a result, we
believe that this work brings us a step closer to reproducing human behaviour in the
Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, with ample opportunity for expansion into other normal-
form games. For detailed discussions of these results and possibilities for future work, we
refer the reader to Sections 3.3 and 4.3.
Final Remarks In the ﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence, it has often been the case that a
game is studied with the explicit goal of creating a program that can play it better than the
best humans, and many researchers have had great success in the pursuit of that goal. We
now have bots that can defeat human world champions in very computationally diﬃcult
games, like chess (IBM's Deep Blue [10]) and Go (Google DeepMind's AlphaGo [46]),
and provably unbeatable bots for simpler games like checkers and heads-up limit hold'em
poker (the University of Alberta's Chinook [44] and Cepheus [50], respectively).
However, as impressive as such advances are, they exploit the computer's ability to per-
form a humanly impossible number of calculations at a humanly impossible speed, and
so oﬀer little insight into a person's approach to the game. Of course, doing so was never
their goal, but it is nevertheless a goal worthy of pursuit. For, what larger purpose can a
game with no implicit value serve once it is over, if not to give insight into the mind of
the player?
We have experimented with BayesACT, a model of human behaviour that not only strives
to behave like a person, but attempts to do so in a way consistent with the human mind.
For certain, it is not the highest scoring bot to have ever played the Iterated Prisoner's
Dilemma, but generating such a bot was never our goal. We wanted to show that our
BayesACT bot played the game more like a human than other bots, and have done so.
There is a place in AI for both the study of bots that play to win, and those that strive
to emulate human behaviour. We have here helped to bolster that oft-overlooked second
category.
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Appendix
Study Materials
Here, we reproduce the Prisoner's Dilemma application as it was seen by participants
of the study. Upon entering the Prisoner's Dilemma URL, participants arrived at the
welcome screen shown in section 5. They were instructed to review the game information
given in section 5 before signing up. Signing up consisted of three phases: answering a
short demographic questionnaire, reviewing and accepting/declining an informed consent
form, and assigning E, P, and A values to each of the key concepts of Self, Other Player,
Give, and Take. These materials can be found in sections 5 and 5 respectively.
Once signed up, participants were able to begin play. Upon being assigned a match, a
participant would arrive at the Start of Game screen given in section 5 with the option
to either Give 2 or Take 1. After making a selection, the participant had to wait for
the server to respond with her opponent's move. Note that, even in the case where the
opponent was a bot, some time was always allowed before a reply was sent to preserve the
illusion that all players were human. On completion of the ﬁnal round (decided randomly
to be a value in the range 12-18), the participant was asked to again evaluate E, P, and A
values for each of the four key concepts. An example End of Game screen can be found
in section 5 and sliders, as before, in section 5.
When the allotted play time of a group of participants ran out, they were instructed to
stop playing and open the (previously hidden) debrieﬁng page. This page, which can be
found in section 5, revealed to the participants that they played against bots as well as
each other, and gave them the option to withdraw their data from the study. This was
the ﬁnal interaction participants had with the Prisoner's Dilemma application.
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Welcome Screen
Game Information
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Sign-Up Questionnaire
Consent Information
Study Title: Applying BayesACT to the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Jesse Hoey, Department of Computer Science, (***) ***-****
ext. *****, ****@****
Student Investigator: Josh Jung, Department of Computer Science, (***) ***-**** ext.
*****, ****@****
Course Assignment
During class on October 20 and 22, instead of the lectures, you will be asked to play a
series of iterated prisoner's dilemma games in ****/****. You may bring your own laptop
or use one of the Macs in the lab. The game is very simple; you select one of two options
and receive a score based on the combined choices made by you and your opponent. After
each set of approximately 20 such games, you will be asked to rate both yourself and your
opponent on the evaluation, potency, and activity scales prescribed by Aﬀect Control
Theory. You will then be matched with another player to play another set.
For this course assignment you will be asked to sign up online at **********. You will
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be asked for your UWaterloo ID, as well as your major and gender, which you can choose
not to share if you wish. You will also be assigned an ID, which you must bring to class
on the days of the assignment. Completion of the assignment is worth 5% of your mark
and is expected to take approximately 3 hours of your time. At the end of the assignment
each point you earn while playing the game will be counted as one entry into a draw for
one of ten (10) $20 Amazon gift cards.
If you are unable to attend these two classes you can choose to complete a paper review
instead and will still be entered into the draw with odds equivalent to the median player
participating in the study. This requires that you choose a research paper in artiﬁcial
intelligence, read it, and write a 2-page review of the paper. Reviews will be assigned a
pass/fail (5%/0%) grade based on the suitability of the review, where a suitable review is
one that is coherent and makes it clear that its author has read the paper. Your odds of
winning one of the prizes is based on the number of individuals who complete the in-class
assignment or paper review. We expect that approximately 120 individuals will complete
the in-class assignment.
You are invited to participate in a study
You are invited to participate in a study assessing the validity of Bayesian Aﬀect Control
Theory (BayesACT) as a predictor of human behaviour. The study is being conducted by
Josh as a Master's student in the Department of Computer Science under the supervision
of Dr. Jesse Hoey.
Aﬀect Control Theory posits that people strive to behave in the manner most in line
with the expectations of their society. BayesACT extends this theory to allow it to deal
with uncertainty. This study will provide data from humans playing a game, the iterated
prisoner's dilemma, for the purposes of comparing human behaviour to the predictions of
BayesACT.
We would like to use the results from the course assignment described above (the Prisoner's
dilemma assignment) for our research.
You are under no obligation to provide your consent for the use of your assignment for
our research. Further, a decision to participate or not will have no impact on your grade
in ****. Professor Hoey will not know who consented to the use of their assignment in
this research. Note that completion of the assignment does not imply consent to use your
assignment, which you may choose not to give after reading this form. You will receive
5% credit for the assignment regardless of whether or not you give consent to be part of
the research.
Information collected to draw for the prizes will not be linked to the data in any way,
and this identifying information will be stored separately, then destroyed after the prizes
have been provided. The amount received is taxable. It is your responsibility to report
this amount for income tax purposes.
You may opt out of the study at any time by contacting Josh. Also note that the student
IDs of consenting students will not be viewable by Jesse Hoey or any of the TAs associated
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with this course.
Personal Beneﬁts of the Study
This study will help to determine the eﬃcacy and generalizability of BayesACT. It will
also produce initial conditions based on real data that can be used in future BayesACT
projects. BayesACT has, for example, been used to create assisted living devices for
patients with Alzheimer's disease, including hand-washing stations developed at the Uni-
versity of Waterloo.
Risks to Participation in the Study
There is some risk that you may feel coerced into consenting to the use of your assign-
ment due to Jesse Hoey's dual roles as professor and researcher. However, we would like
to assure you that he will never see a list of students who give/don't give their consent,
and that he will not be involved in the drawing or distribution of Amazon gift cards.
Conﬁdentiality
All information you provide is considered completely conﬁdential; indeed, your name will
not be included or in any other way associated, with the data collected in the study.
Furthermore, because the interest of this study is in the average responses of the entire
group of participants, you will not be identiﬁed individually in any way in any written
reports of this research. The data, with identifying information removed, will be kept for
a period of 10 years following publication of the research, after which it will be deleted.
The data will be securely stored in the research laboratory of Dr. Jesse Hoey in the DC
building to which only researchers associated with this study have access.
Questions and Research Ethics Clearance
If after receiving this letter, you have any questions about this study, or would like ad-
ditional information to assist you in reaching a decision about participation, please feel
free to ask the student investigator or faculty supervisor listed at the top of this sheet.
Alternatively, you may contact *****, a senior PhD student in the Computational Health
Informatics Lab, at ****@****, who is not directly aﬃliated with the study, but can
provide additional information to assist you in reaching a decision about consent.
We would like to assure you that this study has been reviewed and received ethics clearance
through a University of Waterloo Research Ethics Committee. However, the ﬁnal decision
about consent is yours. Should you have any comments or concerns resulting from your
participation in this study, please contact *********, the Director, Oﬃce of Research
Ethics, at *-***-***-****, Ext. ***** or ****@****.
Thank you for your interest in our research and for your assistance with this project.
Consent of Participant
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By consenting to the use of your assignment below, you are not waiving your legal rights
or releasing the investigator(s) or involved institution(s) from their legal and professional
responsibilities.
I have read the information presented in the information letter about a study being
conducted by Josh Jung under the supervision of Dr. Jesse Hoey of the Department of
Computer Science at the University of Waterloo. I have had the opportunity to ask any
questions related to this study, to receive satisfactory answers to my questions, and any
additional details I wanted. I am aware that I may withdraw consent for the use of my
assignment from the study without loss of credit at any time by advising Josh of this
decision.
This project has been reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through a University of
Waterloo Research Ethics Committee. I was informed that if I have any comments or
concerns resulting from my participation in this study, I may contact the Director, Oﬃce
of Research Ethics, at *-***-***-****, Ext. ***** or ****@****.
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ACT Sliders
Note that each of Yourself, Other Player, Give, and Take had its own page of three
sliders.
Game Interface
Start of Game
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Example End of Game
Debrieﬁng
Debrieﬁng Letter
Study Title: Applying BayesACT to the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
Faculty Supervisor: Dr. Jesse Hoey, Department of Computer Science, (***) ***-****
ext. *****, ****@****
Student Investigator: Josh Jung, Department of Computer Science, (***) ***-**** ext.
*****, ****@****
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Thank-you for completing this assignment. When you began the assignment, you were
told that the purpose of this assignment was to observe human behavior in the iterated
prisoner's dilemma game. However, the game was slightly more complicated than we
explained at the beginning. Only 25% of the games you played were against your fellow
classmates. The remainder were played in equal parts against three diﬀerent artiﬁcially
intelligent (AI) opponents (bots). One of the three bots was built using BayesACT and
initialized with the ratings given by you over the course of the study. The other two
played static strategies: one played Tit-for-tat (i.e. always did exactly the same as what
you did the last time you played), and the other cooperated three times and defected
thereafter.
It was necessary to conceal this information to avoid spoiling the ratings you gave to
yourselves and your opponents. We thought it likely that if you knew there was a high
probability that your opponent was a bot, you would be unlikely to have a signiﬁcant
emotional response to the plays of your opponent. We apologize for omitting details about
the tasks in this assignment. We hope that you understand the need for not informing
you of this aspect of the assignment now this it has been more fully explained to you.
If you consented to the use of your assignment in our research please note that once all
the data are collected and analyzed for this project, we plan on sharing this information
with the research community through seminars, conferences, presentations, and journal
articles. If you are interested in receiving more information regarding the results of this
study, or would like a summary of the results, please email Josh Jung, and when the study
is completed, anticipated by December, 2015, to send you the information.
The information you provided will be kept conﬁdential by not associating your name
with the responses. The data will be stored with all identifying or potentially identifying
information removed. Electronic data will be stored 10 years on a password protected
computer in DC 2584 then erased. No one other than the researchers will have access to
the data.
This project was reviewed by, and received ethics clearance through a University of Wa-
terloo Research Ethics Committee. Should you have any comments or concerns resulting
from your participation in this study, please contact *********, the Director, Oﬃce of
Research Ethics, at *-***-***-****, Ext. ***** or ****@****.
We really appreciate your participation, and hope that this has been an interesting expe-
rience for you.
Please enter your username and choose a consent option below.
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Network Experiment Full Results
Network Invariance - Full Tables
Full tables for the network invariance analysis of Section 4.2.1 are given here. For each
table, cooperation rates by round are compared across our three network types. The
caption of each table contains the agent type and reward matrix used. Rows are shaded
for p-values > 0.05, indicating that the distributions for the three network type are not
statistically discernible.
62
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.59 48.76 48.79 2.98 0.225
R1 51.45 49.53 49.67 3.10 0.213
R2 49.70 50.24 48.49 2.16 0.339
R3 50.24 49.11 49.76 0.86 0.650
R4 51.12 49.44 48.61 4.44 0.109
R5 50.03 50.36 48.08 4.11 0.128
R6 49.47 48.91 50.36 1.44 0.486
R7 49.76 49.35 49.35 0.15 0.926
R8 49.32 49.14 48.55 0.44 0.803
R9 49.88 49.73 48.76 1.01 0.604
R10 50.65 49.26 48.91 2.30 0.316
R11 49.50 48.82 47.90 1.74 0.419
R12 49.14 48.85 47.22 2.90 0.234
R13 50.95 50.53 48.85 3.35 0.188
R14 48.61 48.64 49.23 0.33 0.847
R15 50.21 49.91 49.76 0.14 0.933
R16 50.30 49.11 50.41 1.40 0.496
R17 49.26 49.53 49.56 7.18× 10−2 0.965
R18 50.15 49.56 48.55 1.76 0.414
R19 50.71 49.23 49.94 1.48 0.477
R20 51.78 49.17 47.60 12.01 0.002
R21 50.44 49.82 48.67 2.19 0.334
R22 49.47 49.02 48.46 0.69 0.709
R23 50.18 48.88 48.73 1.72 0.423
R24 49.64 48.76 48.17 1.50 0.472
R25 49.67 50.00 49.35 0.29 0.867
R26 50.83 49.38 47.75 6.41 0.041
R27 50.56 49.56 48.76 2.21 0.331
R28 49.91 49.05 48.61 1.18 0.553
R29 50.36 48.91 47.25 6.54 0.038
R30 49.67 49.79 48.64 1.09 0.580
R31 50.86 50.18 49.26 1.74 0.419
R32 50.74 50.33 50.18 0.23 0.892
R33 49.20 49.26 49.32 9.47× 10−3 0.995
R34 49.76 48.52 49.50 1.16 0.561
R35 49.08 48.67 48.31 0.40 0.818
R36 48.93 49.17 48.46 0.35 0.838
R37 49.73 49.56 50.09 0.20 0.905
R38 50.00 48.76 49.94 1.33 0.515
R39 49.85 49.62 49.20 0.29 0.864
R40 49.73 50.27 47.04 8.09 0.018
R41 51.27 49.64 49.73 2.26 0.322
R42 49.32 48.40 49.14 0.64 0.726
R43 50.74 49.85 48.64 3.01 0.222
R44 50.15 49.32 48.20 2.60 0.273
R45 50.12 49.88 49.23 0.57 0.752
R46 48.02 50.12 49.38 3.07 0.215
R47 50.06 48.31 49.67 2.28 0.321
R48 49.88 49.62 49.82 5.29× 10−2 0.974
R49 48.43 49.32 49.76 1.24 0.537
R50 49.73 48.64 48.73 1.00 0.607
R51 49.94 48.37 49.38 1.71 0.426
R52 50.00 49.14 47.69 3.68 0.159
R53 49.64 49.56 49.44 2.92× 10−2 0.986
R54 51.69 48.88 49.97 5.43 0.066
R55 50.95 49.11 48.37 4.75 0.093
R56 49.08 49.29 48.02 1.26 0.532
R57 50.65 50.03 48.76 2.52 0.284
R58 51.04 48.96 48.96 3.87 0.145
R59 50.80 49.11 48.93 2.86 0.239
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 32.81 33.05 33.46 0.33 0.847
R1 33.67 33.76 33.64 1.15× 10−2 0.994
R2 31.12 32.51 32.87 2.64 0.267
R3 30.50 30.00 31.54 1.95 0.377
R4 30.30 30.15 30.24 1.78× 10−2 0.991
R5 30.12 29.20 29.53 0.70 0.704
R6 30.24 29.44 29.50 0.64 0.726
R7 29.41 29.73 29.11 0.31 0.855
R8 29.64 29.53 30.53 0.97 0.615
R9 30.18 30.12 30.62 0.24 0.886
R10 30.15 29.67 30.30 0.34 0.844
R11 30.71 30.65 31.30 0.41 0.815
R12 30.65 29.11 29.73 1.93 0.380
R13 29.20 29.38 30.33 1.18 0.554
R14 29.53 28.99 29.97 0.78 0.678
R15 29.47 28.99 29.64 0.37 0.831
R16 30.09 30.98 29.56 1.65 0.439
R17 29.82 29.64 30.83 1.31 0.520
R18 30.12 30.12 30.50 0.16 0.924
R19 29.88 29.88 29.91 9.41× 10−4 1.000
R20 28.25 28.20 29.79 2.70 0.259
R21 28.64 29.82 29.76 1.45 0.484
R22 29.82 30.21 30.18 0.15 0.929
R23 29.59 28.73 31.09 4.63 0.099
R24 29.56 29.67 29.50 2.65× 10−2 0.987
R25 29.41 29.59 30.36 0.82 0.665
R26 29.53 28.88 29.88 0.85 0.654
R27 29.91 29.50 29.73 0.14 0.932
R28 30.47 30.24 29.70 0.50 0.779
R29 29.64 29.38 29.47 5.97× 10−2 0.971
R30 28.82 30.21 29.67 1.60 0.449
R31 28.91 29.47 30.71 2.76 0.252
R32 28.85 29.29 29.73 0.64 0.725
R33 30.18 29.62 30.44 0.58 0.750
R34 29.02 29.91 30.50 1.79 0.408
R35 29.94 30.38 30.62 0.38 0.826
R36 28.99 29.88 31.18 3.90 0.142
R37 29.05 29.41 29.91 0.60 0.739
R38 29.35 29.53 31.42 4.22 0.121
R39 28.25 30.03 29.53 2.74 0.254
R40 30.36 28.31 29.32 3.40 0.183
R41 30.06 30.86 30.27 0.55 0.760
R42 30.09 28.79 29.56 1.39 0.498
R43 29.82 30.12 28.40 2.75 0.253
R44 30.33 28.40 29.50 3.03 0.219
R45 30.41 29.20 30.62 1.90 0.387
R46 30.21 29.85 29.23 0.79 0.674
R47 29.05 29.26 28.64 0.33 0.848
R48 29.20 28.73 30.21 1.86 0.395
R49 30.30 29.14 29.62 1.09 0.580
R50 28.88 28.96 30.12 1.56 0.458
R51 28.70 27.63 29.38 2.57 0.277
R52 29.47 27.31 28.85 4.11 0.128
R53 30.24 27.87 29.02 4.60 0.101
R54 28.05 28.93 29.32 1.41 0.495
R55 29.41 28.25 28.85 1.10 0.578
R56 28.43 28.14 28.79 0.35 0.838
R57 29.23 28.17 28.79 0.95 0.623
R58 27.43 27.31 28.14 0.68 0.713
R59 28.22 28.02 28.99 0.88 0.645
Table 5.1: Left: BACTD0, Matrix 1; Right: BACTD1, Matrix 1
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 25.68 26.01 26.18 0.23 0.892
R1 27.10 26.83 26.24 0.67 0.717
R2 26.57 26.80 26.04 0.54 0.763
R3 26.09 26.75 25.74 0.91 0.635
R4 25.44 25.77 25.53 0.10 0.951
R5 25.44 24.76 25.62 0.74 0.692
R6 25.83 24.50 24.50 2.13 0.346
R7 23.64 25.15 24.17 2.15 0.342
R8 24.26 25.18 25.36 1.25 0.535
R9 24.35 25.36 24.82 0.92 0.632
R10 23.93 25.30 24.08 2.03 0.362
R11 25.18 24.91 25.24 0.11 0.947
R12 25.36 23.91 24.73 1.93 0.382
R13 24.91 25.83 24.23 2.32 0.314
R14 23.88 24.91 24.47 0.99 0.610
R15 25.12 24.20 24.23 0.99 0.610
R16 24.38 24.82 23.37 2.04 0.361
R17 25.33 24.91 23.96 1.77 0.412
R18 24.67 24.64 24.47 4.58× 10−2 0.977
R19 24.38 25.53 24.50 1.46 0.483
R20 25.12 24.76 24.56 0.29 0.864
R21 24.05 24.82 23.28 2.19 0.335
R22 24.44 24.88 24.14 0.51 0.776
R23 23.99 24.47 25.30 1.58 0.454
R24 25.27 24.62 22.96 5.23 0.073
R25 24.38 23.40 23.58 1.01 0.605
R26 24.76 24.38 24.29 0.23 0.891
R27 24.26 24.91 24.38 0.44 0.803
R28 24.64 24.20 22.69 3.92 0.141
R29 24.32 24.91 24.32 0.43 0.808
R30 25.36 25.68 23.85 3.47 0.176
R31 23.93 24.32 25.03 1.13 0.569
R32 23.96 25.15 23.58 2.45 0.294
R33 24.50 24.73 23.61 1.30 0.523
R34 24.62 25.27 24.14 1.16 0.560
R35 24.38 23.93 24.26 0.19 0.907
R36 24.50 25.06 24.20 0.69 0.708
R37 24.29 25.18 23.96 1.44 0.487
R38 24.08 25.00 23.64 1.77 0.413
R39 24.88 24.76 23.37 2.60 0.273
R40 24.26 24.35 24.62 0.12 0.939
R41 23.64 24.17 24.02 0.28 0.869
R42 25.74 24.47 23.67 3.97 0.138
R43 24.59 24.97 24.41 0.30 0.861
R44 24.41 25.59 23.91 2.72 0.256
R45 25.80 25.36 24.38 1.90 0.387
R46 23.73 24.64 25.18 1.97 0.374
R47 23.61 24.67 24.47 1.18 0.555
R48 25.18 24.73 25.30 0.32 0.854
R49 23.76 25.59 24.32 3.21 0.201
R50 25.21 24.82 23.93 1.55 0.460
R51 24.47 25.41 24.47 1.08 0.583
R52 24.53 26.07 23.55 5.83 0.054
R53 25.80 25.09 23.70 4.14 0.126
R54 23.05 23.05 24.26 1.84 0.399
R55 24.94 24.79 23.67 1.78 0.411
R56 24.35 25.09 23.55 2.17 0.337
R57 24.14 24.53 25.95 3.26 0.196
R58 23.61 24.67 24.29 1.07 0.585
R59 24.91 24.53 25.30 0.53 0.765
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 69.41 68.61 70.15 1.88 0.390
R1 68.79 69.38 69.64 0.61 0.736
R2 69.62 69.67 69.94 9.63× 10−2 0.953
R3 69.20 68.76 69.76 0.81 0.668
R4 69.14 68.99 68.82 8.39× 10−2 0.959
R5 69.73 69.23 69.32 0.23 0.891
R6 68.91 69.79 69.79 0.84 0.658
R7 68.31 68.40 68.52 3.38× 10−2 0.983
R8 69.79 68.93 69.79 0.78 0.677
R9 69.70 68.40 69.56 1.61 0.448
R10 69.11 68.28 69.82 1.88 0.391
R11 69.44 68.20 68.05 1.83 0.400
R12 69.38 69.47 69.23 4.55× 10−2 0.978
R13 68.08 70.80 70.33 6.74 0.034
R14 68.14 69.97 69.67 3.07 0.215
R15 68.76 70.36 69.32 2.10 0.351
R16 70.12 68.88 69.26 1.29 0.525
R17 69.53 68.40 69.85 1.83 0.400
R18 68.79 68.91 68.61 6.98× 10−2 0.966
R19 70.33 68.99 69.14 1.70 0.427
R20 68.88 68.96 71.15 5.35 0.069
R21 71.21 69.44 68.82 4.98 0.083
R22 70.18 69.79 69.14 0.88 0.645
R23 69.08 67.72 71.09 9.17 0.010
R24 68.88 69.97 69.35 0.96 0.619
R25 69.85 70.12 70.00 5.73× 10−2 0.972
R26 70.03 69.73 69.26 0.48 0.786
R27 69.53 69.82 69.94 0.15 0.930
R28 70.50 70.71 69.97 0.47 0.790
R29 69.02 70.06 69.64 0.87 0.648
R30 68.93 68.40 68.40 0.30 0.862
R31 69.94 70.21 69.44 0.49 0.783
R32 70.74 69.17 70.00 1.98 0.372
R33 68.93 70.03 70.68 2.50 0.287
R34 69.29 69.73 70.41 1.03 0.598
R35 68.67 68.55 70.56 4.06 0.131
R36 68.67 69.26 68.55 0.46 0.796
R37 69.97 69.08 69.70 0.66 0.718
R38 68.67 69.05 70.27 2.22 0.330
R39 69.47 70.41 68.96 1.73 0.420
R40 70.83 68.70 69.88 3.65 0.161
R41 69.23 68.17 68.91 0.94 0.626
R42 70.03 69.23 69.97 0.63 0.728
R43 69.94 68.88 69.17 0.96 0.618
R44 70.24 68.82 68.82 2.14 0.343
R45 69.97 69.59 69.32 0.34 0.843
R46 68.55 69.82 69.91 1.84 0.398
R47 69.56 68.46 69.26 1.01 0.602
R48 69.08 69.64 69.76 0.42 0.810
R49 70.00 69.97 70.92 0.94 0.625
R50 69.64 67.51 68.88 3.65 0.161
R51 68.96 69.73 70.53 1.97 0.373
R52 68.99 70.24 68.52 2.50 0.287
R53 69.70 70.06 70.06 0.13 0.935
R54 71.39 68.96 70.41 4.81 0.090
R55 69.20 70.09 69.67 0.63 0.730
R56 68.43 69.82 68.76 1.68 0.433
R57 69.11 69.56 69.35 0.16 0.925
R58 70.41 68.61 69.76 2.66 0.264
R59 69.26 70.53 68.99 2.17 0.339
Table 5.2: Left: BACTD10, Matrix 1; Right: BACTS0, Matrix 1
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 41.86 40.92 40.24 1.87 0.393
R1 43.20 41.54 42.75 2.04 0.361
R2 40.92 40.38 42.81 4.53 0.104
R3 40.59 39.29 39.23 1.67 0.434
R4 39.53 38.05 40.65 4.83 0.089
R5 39.79 36.92 39.67 7.53 0.023
R6 39.14 37.93 41.48 9.20 0.010
R7 40.06 38.20 39.82 2.92 0.232
R8 40.09 37.01 39.26 7.23 0.027
R9 39.53 38.25 38.08 1.78 0.411
R10 39.97 38.61 40.24 2.16 0.340
R11 39.73 37.19 38.52 4.63 0.099
R12 39.05 37.93 40.24 3.78 0.151
R13 38.25 38.05 40.15 3.81 0.149
R14 39.38 38.70 38.96 0.33 0.846
R15 38.40 39.50 38.82 0.87 0.648
R16 40.38 38.91 41.12 3.60 0.166
R17 39.14 38.58 40.09 1.65 0.439
R18 40.15 36.98 38.85 7.23 0.027
R19 40.09 37.22 42.13 17.20 <0.001
R20 39.88 38.20 39.82 2.60 0.273
R21 39.05 39.20 39.79 0.43 0.805
R22 40.06 37.13 39.20 6.47 0.039
R23 40.95 39.85 39.97 1.01 0.602
R24 40.38 38.31 39.20 3.06 0.217
R25 38.49 39.50 38.82 0.75 0.688
R26 38.64 40.24 38.40 2.82 0.244
R27 39.32 38.20 39.11 1.02 0.601
R28 40.68 37.78 38.91 6.06 0.048
R29 38.61 38.22 39.64 1.53 0.464
R30 38.55 39.44 38.17 1.21 0.546
R31 39.56 37.81 40.68 5.93 0.052
R32 40.71 37.10 40.83 12.75 0.002
R33 39.64 37.99 37.60 3.36 0.187
R34 40.30 38.46 39.02 2.50 0.286
R35 41.69 37.90 38.96 10.77 0.005
R36 39.62 38.73 39.35 0.59 0.745
R37 38.31 38.20 40.74 5.84 0.054
R38 39.11 37.84 39.67 2.52 0.284
R39 40.21 38.05 39.14 3.31 0.191
R40 39.56 37.40 39.94 5.36 0.069
R41 38.25 38.64 38.76 0.20 0.906
R42 35.36 38.49 37.16 7.19 0.027
R43 36.92 37.31 36.24 0.85 0.655
R44 35.98 37.84 38.88 6.23 0.044
R45 37.93 37.57 36.60 1.37 0.503
R46 37.63 37.40 36.04 2.16 0.340
R47 36.78 38.31 38.49 2.56 0.278
R48 36.80 37.96 39.02 3.54 0.171
R49 35.56 38.34 37.19 5.67 0.059
R50 37.49 38.37 37.22 1.05 0.592
R51 37.57 39.70 36.33 8.35 0.015
R52 37.28 37.49 36.75 0.42 0.810
R53 36.57 36.83 38.37 2.74 0.254
R54 38.08 36.98 37.25 0.94 0.625
R55 37.13 38.49 38.02 1.37 0.504
R56 38.64 36.78 38.73 3.49 0.174
R57 37.37 37.04 39.26 4.12 0.128
R58 35.62 36.63 38.46 6.01 0.049
R59 36.89 36.21 37.51 1.23 0.540
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 33.20 34.91 34.97 3.06 0.217
R1 34.17 34.02 34.64 0.32 0.854
R2 32.93 33.17 33.82 0.64 0.725
R3 33.40 32.87 32.90 0.27 0.872
R4 33.93 32.34 32.87 2.02 0.364
R5 32.84 32.37 32.57 0.17 0.917
R6 31.57 31.80 31.15 0.34 0.844
R7 33.08 31.42 31.04 3.65 0.161
R8 32.25 32.10 31.09 1.23 0.540
R9 29.38 31.45 32.54 8.18 0.017
R10 29.53 32.13 30.24 5.75 0.057
R11 31.42 32.04 30.65 1.52 0.467
R12 30.89 31.89 30.62 1.42 0.492
R13 30.92 31.09 31.89 0.85 0.654
R14 31.83 31.45 30.53 1.41 0.494
R15 32.87 32.13 32.04 0.64 0.727
R16 31.86 31.21 31.21 0.44 0.802
R17 29.56 30.77 32.16 5.38 0.068
R18 31.78 29.79 30.71 3.12 0.210
R19 30.33 33.25 30.30 9.03 0.011
R20 30.98 31.15 31.01 2.86× 10−2 0.986
R21 30.53 31.66 32.57 3.27 0.195
R22 31.48 30.80 30.65 0.62 0.735
R23 29.91 31.01 31.48 2.06 0.358
R24 33.55 32.19 30.77 5.99 0.050
R25 32.54 32.25 31.01 2.08 0.354
R26 30.92 32.40 31.42 1.77 0.413
R27 29.94 33.20 31.95 8.44 0.015
R28 30.21 31.21 31.72 1.87 0.393
R29 31.36 30.74 32.28 1.88 0.391
R30 31.75 30.44 32.04 2.27 0.321
R31 31.18 32.16 32.31 1.16 0.559
R32 32.78 30.98 31.07 3.23 0.199
R33 31.48 30.44 31.01 0.85 0.654
R34 31.69 31.36 32.34 0.77 0.681
R35 31.89 32.96 30.74 3.84 0.147
R36 30.53 30.38 31.39 0.93 0.627
R37 31.42 32.57 31.39 1.42 0.492
R38 30.83 32.54 29.97 5.41 0.067
R39 31.24 31.01 30.71 0.23 0.894
R40 31.92 32.78 31.69 1.03 0.598
R41 31.89 32.54 30.83 2.34 0.310
R42 31.69 31.78 33.08 1.87 0.392
R43 30.71 32.40 31.48 2.23 0.328
R44 31.75 31.24 30.30 1.71 0.425
R45 32.16 29.97 31.51 3.99 0.136
R46 30.74 30.86 31.12 0.12 0.940
R47 32.10 31.45 32.81 1.44 0.488
R48 31.75 32.78 29.62 8.21 0.017
R49 29.73 31.07 31.86 3.67 0.159
R50 31.12 30.77 31.72 0.72 0.698
R51 31.21 32.75 32.75 2.45 0.294
R52 31.12 31.69 31.86 0.47 0.792
R53 32.01 31.18 31.78 0.57 0.752
R54 30.74 32.40 31.04 2.44 0.295
R55 31.80 31.54 31.80 7.38× 10−2 0.964
R56 31.12 31.39 31.92 0.52 0.772
R57 33.61 33.28 30.38 9.78 0.008
R58 31.24 32.43 31.18 1.53 0.465
R59 31.33 32.96 32.01 2.07 0.355
Table 5.3: Left: BACTS1, Matrix 1; Right: BACTS10, Matrix 1
65
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 49.47 49.97 49.41 0.26 0.879
R1 49.67 48.96 50.09 0.87 0.646
R2 48.91 49.35 50.33 1.43 0.490
R3 49.20 50.56 48.96 2.01 0.366
R4 48.28 49.94 50.00 2.57 0.277
R5 50.24 50.12 49.94 6.00× 10−2 0.970
R6 49.11 49.53 48.70 0.46 0.793
R7 49.50 49.62 50.56 0.92 0.631
R8 49.50 50.50 50.09 0.69 0.708
R9 49.35 49.59 50.12 0.42 0.811
R10 49.88 50.41 49.38 0.73 0.696
R11 49.05 49.62 50.86 2.31 0.316
R12 48.58 48.58 49.14 0.28 0.867
R13 50.15 48.99 49.79 0.94 0.624
R14 49.82 48.61 50.68 2.93 0.231
R15 48.67 49.44 50.44 2.14 0.342
R16 49.88 48.99 49.41 0.53 0.766
R17 49.08 51.12 51.18 3.87 0.145
R18 50.15 48.93 49.64 1.00 0.605
R19 50.71 49.08 49.59 1.88 0.391
R20 50.15 50.09 50.68 0.29 0.866
R21 49.26 49.11 50.74 2.19 0.335
R22 50.24 49.05 50.77 2.09 0.352
R23 49.64 49.23 48.88 0.40 0.818
R24 49.05 50.15 50.06 1.00 0.607
R25 49.79 49.11 50.77 1.88 0.392
R26 50.03 48.55 49.94 1.86 0.394
R27 48.08 49.08 48.91 0.78 0.677
R28 49.14 48.91 50.59 2.25 0.324
R29 50.53 49.79 50.77 0.70 0.704
R30 48.37 49.67 50.62 3.45 0.178
R31 48.70 49.79 51.15 4.09 0.129
R32 48.96 50.12 49.05 1.11 0.573
R33 49.79 49.23 49.88 0.34 0.845
R34 49.88 49.05 50.30 1.08 0.582
R35 48.08 48.05 50.33 4.62 0.099
R36 50.18 49.26 51.09 2.27 0.321
R37 48.31 50.12 50.71 4.21 0.122
R38 50.09 50.03 48.76 1.53 0.465
R39 49.53 48.61 49.20 0.58 0.746
R40 49.26 50.06 49.76 0.44 0.802
R41 49.70 48.34 49.91 1.96 0.375
R42 49.82 48.76 50.98 3.33 0.189
R43 50.41 49.73 49.91 0.34 0.845
R44 48.96 49.76 49.44 0.44 0.804
R45 49.05 48.49 49.82 1.21 0.547
R46 49.38 49.35 51.69 4.86 0.088
R47 49.26 50.00 49.97 0.47 0.789
R48 50.89 49.56 50.95 1.67 0.433
R49 49.35 48.79 51.09 3.92 0.141
R50 48.46 48.91 49.62 0.92 0.632
R51 49.88 49.53 49.73 8.60× 10−2 0.958
R52 49.59 49.76 51.66 3.56 0.168
R53 49.91 50.50 49.64 0.52 0.770
R54 49.97 50.09 49.62 0.16 0.921
R55 48.34 50.59 50.62 4.62 0.099
R56 48.82 49.02 51.18 4.65 0.098
R57 49.14 48.82 51.39 5.31 0.070
R58 48.22 50.38 49.76 3.34 0.188
R59 49.50 49.64 49.73 3.87× 10−2 0.981
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 43.25 42.75 45.38 5.36 0.069
R1 45.00 43.88 46.04 3.19 0.203
R2 45.09 43.67 46.15 4.25 0.120
R3 43.85 43.73 45.09 1.56 0.459
R4 43.31 44.14 44.41 0.89 0.639
R5 44.20 42.04 43.43 3.30 0.192
R6 42.90 42.13 45.15 6.76 0.034
R7 42.75 43.17 44.70 2.91 0.234
R8 44.20 43.58 44.47 0.57 0.752
R9 43.67 43.82 44.76 0.97 0.617
R10 43.79 42.96 44.79 2.32 0.314
R11 43.28 42.81 43.61 0.44 0.801
R12 42.10 43.11 43.99 2.47 0.290
R13 43.52 42.96 44.08 0.87 0.648
R14 43.25 44.08 42.99 0.90 0.639
R15 43.93 41.45 43.96 5.75 0.056
R16 43.67 42.63 42.69 0.93 0.627
R17 43.79 45.33 43.76 2.20 0.332
R18 43.17 43.64 45.89 5.79 0.055
R19 44.17 43.52 43.70 0.31 0.856
R20 44.91 42.57 44.62 4.45 0.108
R21 44.67 44.26 44.05 0.27 0.872
R22 43.49 43.20 44.26 0.83 0.660
R23 44.35 42.22 43.85 3.41 0.181
R24 43.55 43.08 44.11 0.74 0.691
R25 43.43 43.22 44.91 2.32 0.313
R26 45.18 42.69 43.55 4.37 0.112
R27 43.55 43.76 44.14 0.25 0.884
R28 44.17 43.96 43.61 0.22 0.895
R29 44.59 42.75 44.50 2.94 0.230
R30 44.59 43.11 44.26 1.66 0.436
R31 43.08 43.58 44.05 0.66 0.721
R32 42.99 43.46 44.41 1.44 0.488
R33 44.08 42.72 45.15 4.06 0.131
R34 44.05 42.96 44.70 2.14 0.344
R35 44.02 42.43 43.08 1.78 0.411
R36 42.87 42.69 45.09 4.90 0.086
R37 43.40 43.76 44.53 0.91 0.636
R38 44.05 43.76 43.91 6.01× 10−2 0.970
R39 44.11 43.22 44.11 0.72 0.697
R40 43.58 44.35 44.50 0.67 0.717
R41 42.90 42.96 43.88 0.82 0.662
R42 43.14 44.29 43.91 0.95 0.622
R43 43.73 43.79 45.44 2.60 0.273
R44 43.34 42.93 43.99 0.79 0.673
R45 44.38 41.72 43.58 5.15 0.076
R46 42.75 43.31 43.52 0.44 0.804
R47 44.11 42.31 43.88 2.65 0.266
R48 42.90 44.26 42.93 1.66 0.436
R49 43.40 41.60 43.99 4.30 0.116
R50 42.99 43.58 43.96 0.67 0.717
R51 43.14 44.02 45.03 2.46 0.292
R52 43.61 43.43 42.49 1.01 0.604
R53 42.60 43.28 43.49 0.59 0.743
R54 43.79 43.22 43.49 0.22 0.897
R55 43.70 42.72 44.02 1.26 0.532
R56 43.49 42.19 43.49 1.56 0.459
R57 43.17 42.96 43.17 3.94× 10−2 0.980
R58 42.90 41.75 43.76 2.82 0.245
R59 42.46 42.99 43.99 1.68 0.431
Table 5.4: Left: BACTD0, Matrix 2; Right: BACTD1, Matrix 2
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 34.35 34.88 33.20 2.24 0.327
R1 35.83 39.08 36.18 9.21 0.010
R2 32.96 35.95 33.46 7.67 0.022
R3 32.75 34.08 34.50 2.52 0.284
R4 34.70 34.08 33.08 2.03 0.362
R5 35.24 35.65 35.21 0.18 0.913
R6 34.70 37.07 35.59 4.20 0.122
R7 35.95 37.04 35.98 1.14 0.567
R8 35.09 36.33 36.15 1.33 0.514
R9 36.54 36.86 36.42 0.15 0.926
R10 35.50 37.16 36.48 2.03 0.363
R11 36.86 36.15 36.30 0.41 0.815
R12 35.56 38.17 36.80 4.93 0.085
R13 35.59 36.89 34.44 4.45 0.108
R14 36.09 36.45 35.86 0.26 0.878
R15 35.77 36.51 37.22 1.53 0.465
R16 36.63 36.21 36.45 0.13 0.939
R17 34.94 36.07 34.91 1.28 0.528
R18 35.50 37.63 36.01 3.61 0.164
R19 36.95 37.07 35.68 1.74 0.420
R20 35.41 37.04 36.51 2.01 0.365
R21 36.69 36.63 35.77 0.77 0.680
R22 34.76 36.54 37.04 4.21 0.122
R23 35.56 36.66 36.01 0.89 0.641
R24 35.65 35.33 36.04 0.37 0.830
R25 36.27 36.27 36.48 4.18× 10−2 0.979
R26 35.53 36.95 36.39 1.50 0.473
R27 36.51 37.04 36.01 0.78 0.676
R28 35.44 37.22 36.30 2.30 0.316
R29 35.03 38.17 36.57 7.17 0.028
R30 35.50 38.34 37.66 6.38 0.041
R31 36.24 37.54 36.04 1.95 0.378
R32 36.33 37.49 35.77 2.23 0.328
R33 35.92 37.72 37.28 2.57 0.277
R34 35.50 37.37 36.04 2.69 0.260
R35 35.50 37.43 36.83 2.83 0.243
R36 37.10 36.92 36.18 0.69 0.709
R37 36.09 35.41 36.69 1.19 0.552
R38 35.36 38.73 36.21 8.91 0.012
R39 35.92 37.49 35.56 3.05 0.217
R40 36.75 38.52 36.51 3.49 0.175
R41 34.91 36.75 35.68 2.49 0.287
R42 36.57 36.78 35.68 0.99 0.610
R43 35.00 37.46 36.98 4.96 0.084
R44 34.88 36.69 35.71 2.40 0.301
R45 36.12 36.51 36.07 0.17 0.919
R46 36.51 37.60 36.04 1.88 0.391
R47 36.21 36.72 35.74 0.70 0.706
R48 35.53 36.66 35.80 1.01 0.603
R49 34.94 35.86 35.56 0.65 0.723
R50 35.03 37.90 36.57 6.02 0.049
R51 36.18 36.63 35.44 1.05 0.592
R52 36.36 36.83 35.30 1.82 0.402
R53 35.77 37.54 36.09 2.60 0.272
R54 36.30 35.47 35.95 0.51 0.776
R55 35.36 37.66 36.89 4.03 0.134
R56 35.98 36.18 37.75 2.74 0.254
R57 36.09 36.04 35.41 0.42 0.811
R58 34.44 37.01 37.07 6.64 0.036
R59 36.12 37.22 35.59 2.01 0.366
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 69.50 68.61 71.21 5.63 0.060
R1 69.73 70.44 69.64 0.62 0.734
R2 68.96 71.01 70.00 3.35 0.187
R3 70.36 69.41 70.00 0.73 0.693
R4 69.14 68.76 68.91 0.12 0.942
R5 69.79 68.96 68.58 1.22 0.544
R6 69.62 70.36 69.79 0.48 0.787
R7 69.88 69.32 68.61 1.29 0.525
R8 70.33 68.82 68.25 3.64 0.162
R9 69.14 69.85 70.68 1.91 0.386
R10 70.09 69.76 70.33 0.26 0.880
R11 69.23 69.53 68.82 0.40 0.817
R12 69.53 69.88 68.73 1.11 0.574
R13 69.38 69.97 69.62 0.28 0.868
R14 70.18 68.17 70.95 6.59 0.037
R15 71.30 69.79 69.59 2.85 0.241
R16 68.64 68.85 69.32 0.38 0.825
R17 69.56 70.65 69.82 1.05 0.591
R18 69.67 69.26 68.88 0.51 0.776
R19 69.50 69.47 68.43 1.16 0.559
R20 69.85 68.61 69.38 1.25 0.536
R21 69.02 69.32 69.73 0.40 0.817
R22 69.91 69.02 71.57 5.40 0.067
R23 68.99 68.79 69.29 0.20 0.904
R24 70.74 69.82 69.35 1.61 0.447
R25 70.33 69.02 69.41 1.43 0.489
R26 70.30 69.44 69.41 0.82 0.665
R27 69.38 69.38 69.64 7.54× 10−2 0.963
R28 69.73 68.67 69.44 0.96 0.619
R29 67.96 68.73 70.56 5.68 0.058
R30 69.97 70.74 69.59 1.11 0.573
R31 70.18 69.05 69.85 1.07 0.586
R32 68.55 67.93 67.96 0.38 0.826
R33 68.46 69.64 68.58 1.34 0.511
R34 69.79 69.29 68.79 0.80 0.669
R35 69.76 69.79 69.67 1.21× 10−2 0.994
R36 68.88 68.05 70.00 3.04 0.219
R37 69.59 68.88 71.01 3.78 0.151
R38 68.91 68.79 70.21 1.98 0.372
R39 69.53 68.20 70.65 4.81 0.090
R40 67.93 68.20 69.67 2.78 0.249
R41 69.70 69.02 68.67 0.88 0.645
R42 69.59 69.85 69.14 0.41 0.815
R43 67.93 69.62 70.03 3.91 0.141
R44 69.59 71.39 69.35 4.04 0.133
R45 69.32 68.70 70.56 2.88 0.237
R46 69.82 69.67 68.70 1.19 0.553
R47 69.53 69.88 69.53 0.13 0.935
R48 69.56 69.62 69.23 0.14 0.934
R49 68.43 69.82 69.62 1.78 0.410
R50 69.85 70.38 70.03 0.24 0.888
R51 69.94 68.73 69.70 1.31 0.518
R52 69.44 69.47 70.15 0.52 0.772
R53 70.03 67.93 68.52 3.71 0.157
R54 69.56 69.47 69.08 0.20 0.904
R55 70.21 70.00 68.61 2.41 0.300
R56 69.82 69.35 71.01 2.35 0.308
R57 69.11 68.34 69.73 1.53 0.464
R58 69.17 68.99 70.09 1.10 0.577
R59 69.64 69.29 69.41 0.10 0.949
Table 5.5: Left: BACTD10, Matrix 2; Right: BACTS0, Matrix 2
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 58.46 57.54 55.47 6.46 0.039
R1 58.76 58.96 59.38 0.28 0.869
R2 57.34 58.02 58.20 0.57 0.753
R3 56.83 57.34 58.52 2.08 0.354
R4 56.33 57.28 57.16 0.73 0.693
R5 56.33 55.98 57.10 0.91 0.635
R6 56.95 58.55 55.71 5.60 0.061
R7 56.07 56.57 57.46 1.37 0.505
R8 57.04 56.60 57.34 0.38 0.826
R9 56.30 56.69 57.81 1.70 0.428
R10 58.22 57.10 58.17 1.11 0.574
R11 57.22 58.76 58.37 1.78 0.411
R12 57.37 56.30 58.05 2.14 0.343
R13 56.04 57.81 57.37 2.35 0.308
R14 56.98 57.10 58.88 3.12 0.210
R15 56.69 57.78 57.13 0.84 0.658
R16 58.99 56.12 58.88 7.30 0.026
R17 57.37 56.63 58.20 1.70 0.427
R18 56.21 57.78 57.84 2.35 0.309
R19 56.45 56.15 58.70 5.35 0.069
R20 57.46 56.83 59.23 4.29 0.117
R21 59.26 59.11 58.08 1.16 0.560
R22 56.12 56.78 59.35 8.06 0.018
R23 58.52 57.60 56.27 3.53 0.171
R24 56.86 58.67 56.66 3.39 0.184
R25 57.49 56.45 56.18 1.30 0.521
R26 56.95 57.07 59.08 3.98 0.137
R27 56.92 57.34 57.31 0.15 0.929
R28 58.70 57.78 57.96 0.66 0.720
R29 57.04 55.86 58.40 4.47 0.107
R30 56.78 57.75 57.04 0.70 0.703
R31 57.69 57.25 56.48 1.04 0.595
R32 58.67 56.21 55.06 9.37 0.009
R33 57.49 55.83 56.66 1.89 0.389
R34 57.49 57.99 57.43 0.26 0.876
R35 57.66 57.46 58.31 0.56 0.757
R36 56.57 54.97 57.90 5.91 0.052
R37 56.51 55.83 56.86 0.76 0.684
R38 57.81 55.53 56.95 3.64 0.162
R39 57.13 55.74 57.28 1.98 0.371
R40 57.60 55.21 58.93 9.85 0.007
R41 57.84 55.50 57.04 3.89 0.143
R42 56.66 57.10 57.87 1.04 0.594
R43 56.69 57.81 57.72 1.08 0.583
R44 56.75 55.47 59.05 9.10 0.011
R45 56.27 56.66 58.34 3.35 0.187
R46 57.28 56.30 58.14 2.33 0.312
R47 56.09 56.95 58.96 6.00 0.050
R48 57.10 56.27 57.72 1.46 0.482
R49 57.31 55.18 58.34 7.18 0.028
R50 57.13 56.07 58.37 3.68 0.158
R51 57.43 55.89 58.34 4.25 0.119
R52 57.81 54.85 56.51 6.04 0.049
R53 57.63 55.74 57.16 2.67 0.263
R54 57.51 57.13 57.51 0.14 0.934
R55 56.12 55.98 56.09 1.68× 10−2 0.992
R56 55.24 53.82 56.36 4.44 0.108
R57 55.95 54.70 56.42 2.15 0.341
R58 56.69 55.74 56.42 0.65 0.721
R59 57.16 54.23 55.53 5.90 0.052
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 39.85 39.91 40.80 0.79 0.674
R1 42.57 44.11 43.76 1.79 0.409
R2 39.94 41.12 41.21 1.41 0.493
R3 39.73 41.18 40.27 1.51 0.470
R4 40.62 40.71 40.89 5.15× 10−2 0.975
R5 41.57 40.62 42.25 1.86 0.394
R6 40.98 42.13 43.88 5.90 0.052
R7 42.28 40.15 41.18 3.17 0.205
R8 41.04 43.55 41.18 5.52 0.063
R9 41.86 41.48 42.34 0.51 0.774
R10 40.83 42.43 43.37 4.59 0.101
R11 42.10 41.98 41.57 0.22 0.897
R12 40.80 40.80 42.78 3.64 0.162
R13 40.71 41.39 41.54 0.54 0.761
R14 41.95 41.80 41.54 0.12 0.941
R15 41.54 41.63 42.22 0.38 0.827
R16 41.98 41.69 42.46 0.42 0.812
R17 41.12 43.08 41.24 3.33 0.190
R18 40.56 42.31 42.43 3.03 0.220
R19 41.30 42.43 42.49 1.23 0.539
R20 41.66 41.69 42.66 0.91 0.635
R21 41.07 41.89 42.51 1.47 0.479
R22 39.73 43.20 41.42 8.35 0.015
R23 40.27 42.43 41.57 3.30 0.192
R24 40.12 41.75 41.80 2.56 0.278
R25 40.95 41.51 41.69 0.42 0.812
R26 41.12 41.21 42.60 1.91 0.384
R27 40.38 41.63 41.92 1.86 0.395
R28 41.45 41.09 43.64 5.26 0.072
R29 41.57 42.31 41.18 0.91 0.635
R30 41.51 42.43 43.22 2.04 0.360
R31 40.59 42.40 41.33 2.29 0.318
R32 40.47 41.75 42.19 2.21 0.331
R33 40.06 42.75 42.16 5.58 0.062
R34 41.09 41.72 43.08 2.85 0.240
R35 40.41 40.30 42.22 3.24 0.198
R36 42.49 41.75 42.25 0.40 0.821
R37 41.24 43.31 42.87 3.29 0.193
R38 40.33 41.69 40.44 1.59 0.452
R39 42.25 40.53 41.30 2.06 0.357
R40 41.51 42.16 41.30 0.56 0.757
R41 41.60 40.95 40.80 0.50 0.777
R42 42.81 42.49 41.21 1.98 0.372
R43 41.15 42.51 43.22 3.07 0.215
R44 40.95 40.95 42.28 1.64 0.439
R45 41.63 41.66 40.92 0.49 0.783
R46 42.07 41.66 42.22 0.24 0.889
R47 42.34 42.31 42.16 2.51× 10−2 0.988
R48 41.60 42.01 44.08 4.90 0.086
R49 41.89 41.36 40.77 0.88 0.643
R50 40.92 42.87 41.63 2.71 0.258
R51 38.79 41.80 43.82 17.88 <0.001
R52 39.97 42.60 41.27 4.83 0.089
R53 39.35 41.33 42.75 8.16 0.017
R54 41.92 40.80 41.98 1.24 0.538
R55 39.88 41.18 41.04 1.42 0.491
R56 40.56 42.25 42.19 2.55 0.279
R57 38.55 42.81 38.61 16.75 <0.001
R58 40.44 41.98 40.33 2.39 0.303
R59 40.24 40.50 40.24 6.64× 10−2 0.967
Table 5.6: Left: BACTS1, Matrix 2; Right: BACTS10, Matrix 2
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 49.73 49.14 50.36 0.99 0.608
R1 50.80 50.18 48.11 5.37 0.068
R2 50.30 49.02 49.20 1.28 0.526
R3 50.95 48.96 49.50 2.85 0.241
R4 50.44 49.23 49.08 1.51 0.471
R5 50.15 49.56 48.37 2.21 0.331
R6 50.77 49.88 49.38 1.34 0.512
R7 49.62 50.68 48.43 3.42 0.181
R8 50.71 50.44 48.46 4.08 0.130
R9 49.47 48.55 48.79 0.61 0.736
R10 48.08 49.64 48.40 1.85 0.396
R11 49.88 49.64 48.05 2.69 0.260
R12 51.57 49.59 47.93 8.98 0.011
R13 50.21 49.79 50.06 0.12 0.942
R14 50.06 50.06 49.59 0.20 0.904
R15 51.48 48.93 49.94 4.44 0.109
R16 50.36 49.82 50.36 0.26 0.880
R17 49.82 50.92 50.00 0.93 0.627
R18 50.15 49.20 48.43 2.00 0.368
R19 49.17 51.04 49.11 3.23 0.198
R20 49.35 49.73 48.73 0.70 0.706
R21 50.68 49.38 50.21 1.17 0.556
R22 49.67 49.50 49.08 0.25 0.883
R23 50.86 49.79 48.76 2.98 0.225
R24 49.08 50.03 49.02 0.86 0.650
R25 48.31 48.79 49.70 1.35 0.509
R26 50.15 49.23 48.82 1.26 0.534
R27 50.56 50.47 47.63 7.51 0.023
R28 49.62 49.62 50.36 0.49 0.781
R29 51.72 50.44 48.64 6.46 0.039
R30 49.32 48.28 49.70 1.46 0.482
R31 50.24 50.06 48.73 1.84 0.399
R32 50.98 50.50 48.67 4.02 0.134
R33 48.85 50.80 49.41 2.73 0.255
R34 49.73 49.02 48.22 1.54 0.463
R35 50.09 50.18 48.40 2.71 0.258
R36 49.70 49.26 48.28 1.43 0.490
R37 49.44 50.95 49.53 1.94 0.379
R38 49.73 49.14 50.27 0.86 0.652
R39 48.28 50.71 49.32 4.01 0.135
R40 49.97 51.30 49.76 1.89 0.390
R41 49.67 50.71 48.73 2.66 0.265
R42 51.75 49.20 49.47 5.29 0.071
R43 49.64 49.73 48.17 2.10 0.350
R44 50.56 50.24 49.79 0.40 0.817
R45 49.70 49.17 48.11 1.79 0.409
R46 50.50 49.85 49.29 1.00 0.608
R47 49.44 48.55 48.85 0.55 0.759
R48 49.79 50.03 49.32 0.35 0.838
R49 49.11 49.79 48.73 0.79 0.675
R50 49.88 49.70 50.00 6.00× 10−2 0.970
R51 49.62 50.50 50.15 0.54 0.764
R52 51.04 50.38 48.31 5.46 0.065
R53 49.70 49.85 49.26 0.26 0.880
R54 50.30 50.21 49.82 0.17 0.918
R55 48.43 49.70 49.53 1.28 0.526
R56 49.26 49.53 49.26 6.39× 10−2 0.969
R57 49.64 48.64 47.19 4.13 0.127
R58 50.03 50.21 48.14 3.56 0.168
R59 49.41 49.82 48.91 0.57 0.752
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 47.04 48.08 48.52 1.56 0.458
R1 50.30 49.94 49.05 1.11 0.575
R2 49.11 47.46 48.14 1.88 0.391
R3 47.54 47.78 47.28 0.17 0.918
R4 46.39 45.71 47.40 1.96 0.376
R5 46.30 46.30 46.45 1.98× 10−2 0.990
R6 46.95 47.10 46.15 0.70 0.703
R7 45.50 45.95 45.95 0.18 0.914
R8 46.18 45.83 46.57 0.37 0.830
R9 45.53 44.59 46.21 1.82 0.402
R10 46.27 44.62 46.07 2.22 0.329
R11 44.73 45.83 44.88 0.96 0.618
R12 45.12 47.16 45.21 3.62 0.163
R13 45.18 46.45 46.36 1.37 0.503
R14 45.59 45.59 45.62 7.95× 10−4 1.000
R15 45.92 46.27 45.30 0.67 0.717
R16 45.86 46.07 45.80 5.32× 10−2 0.974
R17 47.07 47.75 46.24 1.55 0.461
R18 45.77 45.98 46.24 0.15 0.926
R19 43.73 46.75 46.15 6.98 0.031
R20 44.82 45.71 45.56 0.62 0.735
R21 46.66 46.27 45.00 2.05 0.359
R22 44.85 45.71 46.18 1.24 0.538
R23 44.76 46.30 45.06 1.82 0.403
R24 45.21 45.74 45.71 0.24 0.885
R25 45.03 47.28 44.50 5.93 0.051
R26 44.17 45.36 44.44 1.05 0.590
R27 46.51 44.79 46.33 2.43 0.297
R28 45.86 47.34 43.88 8.22 0.016
R29 44.20 46.66 45.77 4.22 0.121
R30 44.79 45.74 44.70 0.90 0.638
R31 45.56 45.77 46.18 0.27 0.873
R32 46.63 46.24 45.36 1.16 0.560
R33 45.36 47.01 46.60 2.02 0.364
R34 45.21 46.45 44.94 1.77 0.413
R35 45.95 45.33 45.41 0.31 0.857
R36 44.94 45.44 45.71 0.42 0.812
R37 45.18 45.03 45.41 0.10 0.950
R38 47.10 45.38 46.01 2.05 0.358
R39 45.38 45.89 45.65 0.17 0.917
R40 45.77 45.56 44.47 1.34 0.513
R41 45.80 45.27 45.38 0.21 0.899
R42 45.59 44.53 45.89 1.40 0.497
R43 45.65 45.06 45.53 0.27 0.875
R44 44.97 44.67 45.24 0.22 0.898
R45 45.77 45.53 45.09 0.33 0.850
R46 44.67 44.11 45.50 1.34 0.512
R47 44.91 44.64 45.30 0.29 0.864
R48 44.56 45.98 45.06 1.41 0.493
R49 46.45 45.50 46.15 0.64 0.727
R50 45.12 46.45 45.77 1.21 0.547
R51 46.86 44.64 44.88 4.05 0.132
R52 45.44 46.48 45.38 1.03 0.597
R53 46.54 45.62 46.01 0.58 0.749
R54 46.30 45.68 45.33 0.67 0.717
R55 46.21 46.36 45.80 0.23 0.891
R56 45.86 44.67 45.38 0.97 0.616
R57 44.70 45.53 46.63 2.54 0.282
R58 44.56 44.14 45.41 1.15 0.562
R59 44.79 44.44 46.48 3.24 0.198
Table 5.7: Left: BACTD0, Matrix 3; Right: BACTD1, Matrix 3
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 44.88 44.44 43.88 0.70 0.706
R1 48.43 47.66 49.17 1.54 0.463
R2 45.89 45.56 45.53 0.11 0.949
R3 42.84 42.04 42.87 0.61 0.737
R4 40.95 41.42 41.36 0.19 0.911
R5 40.06 39.14 40.98 2.37 0.306
R6 40.47 38.93 39.88 1.70 0.427
R7 39.64 40.59 39.70 0.79 0.673
R8 38.52 37.46 38.70 1.29 0.523
R9 39.67 38.55 38.40 1.38 0.503
R10 39.14 37.13 38.11 2.90 0.235
R11 38.25 37.63 39.53 2.66 0.265
R12 39.26 38.55 38.02 1.11 0.575
R13 37.99 39.05 38.64 0.82 0.663
R14 37.87 39.38 39.20 1.94 0.379
R15 38.61 39.97 38.55 1.83 0.400
R16 39.59 38.76 38.22 1.34 0.512
R17 38.31 38.43 39.20 0.66 0.718
R18 38.43 38.64 39.08 0.31 0.854
R19 38.14 38.37 38.05 8.10× 10−2 0.960
R20 38.34 38.88 39.32 0.68 0.712
R21 38.93 39.23 38.58 0.30 0.860
R22 39.53 39.67 38.99 0.36 0.834
R23 37.81 37.01 38.70 2.05 0.360
R24 38.79 39.53 38.46 0.85 0.655
R25 37.69 39.50 37.63 3.21 0.201
R26 37.93 38.52 39.20 1.16 0.561
R27 38.17 38.67 39.14 0.68 0.712
R28 38.17 37.51 37.34 0.55 0.761
R29 38.93 38.88 38.40 0.24 0.886
R30 37.69 38.37 39.08 1.38 0.501
R31 37.96 37.01 39.17 3.36 0.186
R32 38.20 39.23 39.85 1.99 0.370
R33 38.28 38.43 38.61 7.58× 10−2 0.963
R34 38.11 37.84 38.61 0.44 0.804
R35 39.11 37.54 39.05 2.26 0.323
R36 38.64 39.26 38.49 0.47 0.789
R37 39.67 37.72 38.79 2.72 0.256
R38 38.64 37.60 38.08 0.77 0.680
R39 39.62 38.28 38.99 1.26 0.532
R40 38.22 37.10 39.82 5.34 0.069
R41 36.83 37.49 39.11 3.95 0.139
R42 38.76 38.28 39.14 0.53 0.769
R43 39.62 36.48 38.67 7.42 0.024
R44 38.08 37.25 38.28 0.86 0.649
R45 39.02 37.96 39.14 1.21 0.546
R46 38.85 37.93 38.14 0.66 0.718
R47 38.43 36.78 37.75 2.00 0.368
R48 37.07 36.92 39.08 4.18 0.124
R49 38.14 37.37 38.02 0.49 0.781
R50 39.20 37.81 38.76 1.44 0.487
R51 39.23 36.04 37.43 7.39 0.025
R52 38.02 37.84 37.90 2.35× 10−2 0.988
R53 37.93 38.08 38.88 0.74 0.690
R54 37.93 36.75 39.70 6.35 0.042
R55 37.54 37.66 39.32 2.82 0.245
R56 37.28 36.83 39.38 5.30 0.071
R57 39.32 36.45 37.51 6.05 0.049
R58 36.95 37.87 38.64 2.05 0.359
R59 37.99 36.98 38.11 1.10 0.577
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 69.32 70.33 70.62 1.50 0.473
R1 70.65 68.88 70.33 2.86 0.239
R2 70.89 69.08 68.64 4.54 0.103
R3 69.91 68.73 69.62 1.21 0.547
R4 68.79 69.64 69.08 0.60 0.740
R5 68.58 69.70 69.14 1.00 0.606
R6 69.73 69.53 69.67 3.64× 10−2 0.982
R7 70.30 67.46 69.11 6.42 0.040
R8 67.96 68.79 68.22 0.56 0.756
R9 69.32 68.61 69.14 0.43 0.806
R10 69.41 69.26 69.26 2.32× 10−2 0.988
R11 70.98 69.38 68.99 3.55 0.169
R12 68.64 69.94 68.34 2.29 0.319
R13 69.26 69.23 71.42 5.10 0.078
R14 69.56 70.47 69.88 0.70 0.706
R15 70.33 70.89 69.94 0.74 0.692
R16 68.91 70.09 68.96 1.42 0.492
R17 69.82 70.24 68.22 3.58 0.167
R18 70.12 70.21 68.64 2.47 0.290
R19 68.85 69.62 67.81 2.58 0.275
R20 70.15 70.12 69.73 0.17 0.918
R21 70.56 70.38 70.56 3.41× 10−2 0.983
R22 69.91 68.99 69.41 0.67 0.715
R23 70.09 68.93 70.47 2.05 0.358
R24 69.26 70.03 69.44 0.52 0.772
R25 69.08 71.15 68.76 5.43 0.066
R26 70.98 70.06 70.77 0.75 0.686
R27 69.73 66.60 68.82 8.10 0.017
R28 70.50 68.88 70.47 2.78 0.249
R29 70.62 70.59 68.93 2.99 0.224
R30 69.88 69.50 70.80 1.44 0.486
R31 70.36 68.28 69.11 3.45 0.178
R32 69.94 69.08 69.17 0.71 0.701
R33 69.79 69.67 69.76 1.21× 10−2 0.994
R34 69.67 69.05 70.41 1.49 0.475
R35 69.97 69.97 69.44 0.30 0.860
R36 68.76 70.92 69.26 4.10 0.129
R37 69.02 69.94 69.94 0.89 0.639
R38 69.82 70.15 68.64 2.01 0.366
R39 69.38 69.73 70.36 0.78 0.676
R40 69.91 68.99 67.84 3.40 0.183
R41 69.94 68.88 69.20 0.95 0.622
R42 70.41 69.76 69.59 0.61 0.736
R43 70.38 69.50 68.88 1.84 0.399
R44 69.41 69.35 70.47 1.29 0.526
R45 71.30 69.76 69.88 2.38 0.304
R46 68.58 70.65 68.55 4.63 0.099
R47 69.88 69.97 70.33 0.18 0.915
R48 69.88 68.76 69.38 1.01 0.604
R49 70.68 69.88 69.73 0.84 0.658
R50 69.08 69.17 69.88 0.61 0.737
R51 68.76 70.00 69.32 1.23 0.540
R52 68.55 69.85 69.76 1.68 0.432
R53 68.40 69.70 69.44 1.50 0.473
R54 68.99 68.02 69.88 2.74 0.253
R55 70.12 68.11 67.25 6.82 0.033
R56 69.76 69.59 70.44 0.66 0.719
R57 70.77 68.96 68.73 3.99 0.136
R58 68.76 69.88 69.14 1.04 0.595
R59 69.82 68.43 69.64 1.82 0.403
Table 5.8: Left: BACTD10, Matrix 3; Right: BACTS0, Matrix 3
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 66.54 66.45 65.30 1.45 0.485
R1 67.13 67.93 65.77 3.64 0.162
R2 64.23 66.24 64.70 3.30 0.192
R3 63.96 64.76 64.29 0.48 0.788
R4 63.46 65.62 64.41 3.46 0.177
R5 63.79 62.96 63.93 0.81 0.668
R6 63.67 62.99 62.31 1.34 0.511
R7 62.31 62.57 63.14 0.52 0.772
R8 63.17 63.28 62.78 0.20 0.905
R9 61.89 62.40 62.75 0.54 0.765
R10 62.84 63.76 63.20 0.62 0.733
R11 63.11 62.31 62.10 0.81 0.665
R12 62.69 62.01 62.28 0.34 0.844
R13 62.19 64.14 62.28 3.53 0.171
R14 62.34 62.31 63.22 0.79 0.675
R15 63.20 62.25 62.04 1.09 0.579
R16 62.51 63.88 63.58 1.49 0.475
R17 62.66 63.40 61.63 2.29 0.318
R18 61.98 62.13 62.28 6.29× 10−2 0.969
R19 63.58 62.72 62.57 0.86 0.652
R20 63.52 61.89 62.63 1.92 0.383
R21 62.28 62.04 62.46 0.12 0.940
R22 62.99 63.96 62.46 1.70 0.427
R23 62.78 63.11 61.09 3.35 0.187
R24 62.22 62.93 61.80 0.93 0.628
R25 62.54 63.46 61.39 3.10 0.212
R26 62.90 62.34 62.10 0.49 0.784
R27 64.56 61.63 63.52 6.41 0.041
R28 63.14 62.16 61.57 1.81 0.405
R29 64.38 63.28 61.72 5.20 0.074
R30 62.28 63.46 60.68 5.59 0.061
R31 63.28 63.58 62.69 0.59 0.743
R32 63.05 61.98 62.46 0.82 0.663
R33 62.90 64.88 64.11 2.93 0.231
R34 61.27 62.57 63.46 3.49 0.174
R35 61.60 65.03 62.72 8.91 0.012
R36 62.13 62.87 63.31 1.03 0.596
R37 62.28 64.11 63.34 2.47 0.291
R38 62.28 62.69 62.93 0.31 0.855
R39 63.22 62.22 62.81 0.74 0.691
R40 62.72 63.08 63.25 0.21 0.899
R41 62.54 62.90 62.04 0.54 0.765
R42 61.63 63.99 61.86 4.91 0.086
R43 62.31 62.04 63.22 1.11 0.573
R44 62.04 62.63 61.12 1.66 0.437
R45 62.22 64.41 62.49 4.15 0.126
R46 63.08 61.30 62.81 2.64 0.268
R47 63.05 63.96 62.40 1.80 0.406
R48 61.92 62.10 62.07 2.60× 10−2 0.987
R49 60.50 62.31 62.81 4.21 0.122
R50 62.60 63.52 61.57 2.75 0.252
R51 62.51 62.04 62.19 0.17 0.919
R52 63.17 62.01 61.36 2.40 0.301
R53 63.49 63.11 60.92 5.55 0.062
R54 62.01 63.67 61.98 2.69 0.260
R55 61.54 62.37 61.09 1.19 0.551
R56 60.53 61.27 62.07 1.69 0.430
R57 63.58 61.63 59.82 10.11 0.006
R58 62.87 63.08 58.91 15.74 <0.001
R59 60.21 62.72 60.12 6.23 0.044
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 55.41 56.83 56.78 1.77 0.412
R1 57.51 57.84 58.20 0.32 0.852
R2 55.41 55.12 54.59 0.48 0.786
R3 51.69 50.62 49.94 2.09 0.351
R4 50.53 51.04 50.65 0.19 0.911
R5 50.06 50.56 49.64 0.57 0.752
R6 49.47 49.56 49.97 0.19 0.907
R7 49.79 52.84 50.03 7.78 0.020
R8 50.12 51.69 49.26 4.09 0.129
R9 51.54 50.44 50.38 1.14 0.565
R10 47.75 48.88 49.62 2.38 0.304
R11 49.73 49.73 48.52 1.33 0.515
R12 48.64 49.73 49.67 1.03 0.599
R13 50.24 49.29 49.29 0.81 0.668
R14 50.30 47.49 47.31 7.60 0.022
R15 48.73 50.33 48.82 2.18 0.336
R16 51.36 50.62 48.17 7.57 0.023
R17 50.03 48.46 49.20 1.66 0.435
R18 51.57 50.27 48.58 6.07 0.048
R19 50.44 48.76 50.00 2.07 0.356
R20 50.92 48.88 47.51 7.93 0.019
R21 50.53 47.57 48.05 6.83 0.033
R22 51.48 48.79 48.99 6.07 0.048
R23 50.65 46.04 49.35 15.33 <0.001
R24 49.76 46.78 49.97 8.65 0.013
R25 50.53 47.99 49.08 4.41 0.110
R26 50.50 47.93 50.09 5.17 0.076
R27 50.38 46.45 48.88 10.67 0.005
R28 51.83 47.13 48.14 16.60 <0.001
R29 50.30 47.19 48.73 6.53 0.038
R30 49.64 47.99 50.15 3.45 0.178
R31 50.00 46.66 49.67 9.20 0.010
R32 49.73 47.37 48.91 3.90 0.142
R33 49.05 46.66 49.02 5.12 0.077
R34 50.44 48.28 49.17 3.19 0.203
R35 49.20 46.63 48.96 5.48 0.064
R36 49.85 47.66 49.50 3.74 0.154
R37 50.18 47.96 49.59 3.57 0.168
R38 47.87 48.08 49.62 2.46 0.292
R39 48.52 48.05 48.11 0.18 0.914
R40 50.27 48.49 49.29 2.14 0.343
R41 48.34 47.51 49.44 2.52 0.284
R42 50.62 48.49 48.91 3.45 0.178
R43 49.38 49.29 48.40 0.79 0.674
R44 50.15 48.46 49.20 1.93 0.380
R45 50.68 50.77 48.70 3.71 0.157
R46 48.28 49.35 47.75 1.79 0.408
R47 47.34 48.25 48.67 1.26 0.533
R48 49.50 48.88 47.43 3.06 0.217
R49 48.67 47.90 48.46 0.43 0.807
R50 48.25 49.32 49.50 1.22 0.543
R51 47.37 49.14 48.93 2.55 0.279
R52 48.73 48.70 48.37 0.11 0.949
R53 49.26 49.11 49.41 5.92× 10−2 0.971
R54 49.62 48.52 49.97 1.54 0.462
R55 46.07 46.27 50.18 14.54 <0.001
R56 47.25 46.80 50.68 12.18 0.002
R57 48.58 47.90 49.56 1.88 0.391
R58 49.59 49.02 49.35 0.22 0.898
R59 48.91 46.92 48.55 3.03 0.220
Table 5.9: Left: BACTS1, Matrix 3; Right: BACTS10, Matrix 3
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 49.67 48.28 49.76 1.86 0.394
R1 0.21 8.96 3.43 3.84× 102 <0.001
R2 0.00 1.04 0.00 77.15 <0.001
R3 0.00 0.62 0.00 46.23 <0.001
R4 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R5 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R6 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R7 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R8 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R9 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R10 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R11 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R12 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R13 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R14 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R15 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R16 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R17 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R18 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R19 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R20 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R21 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R22 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R23 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R24 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R25 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R26 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R27 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R28 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R29 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R30 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R31 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R32 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R33 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R34 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R35 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R36 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R37 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R38 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R39 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R40 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R41 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R42 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R43 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R44 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R45 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R46 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R47 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R48 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R49 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R50 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R51 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R52 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R53 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R54 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R55 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R56 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R57 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R58 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R59 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.59 49.82 49.97 0.45 0.798
R1 5.38 14.94 8.85 1.80× 102 <0.001
R2 0.50 2.63 0.71 68.88 <0.001
R3 0.03 0.92 0.06 50.77 <0.001
R4 0.00 0.83 0.00 61.68 <0.001
R5 0.00 0.86 0.00 63.89 <0.001
R6 0.00 0.98 0.00 72.72 <0.001
R7 0.00 0.89 0.00 66.09 <0.001
R8 0.00 0.95 0.00 70.51 <0.001
R9 0.00 0.98 0.00 72.72 <0.001
R10 0.00 1.18 0.00 88.21 <0.001
R11 0.00 1.18 0.00 88.21 <0.001
R12 0.00 1.12 0.00 83.78 <0.001
R13 0.00 0.98 0.00 72.72 <0.001
R14 0.00 1.04 0.00 77.15 <0.001
R15 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R16 0.00 1.12 0.00 83.78 <0.001
R17 0.00 1.12 0.00 83.78 <0.001
R18 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R19 0.00 1.04 0.00 77.15 <0.001
R20 0.00 1.18 0.00 88.21 <0.001
R21 0.00 1.07 0.00 79.36 <0.001
R22 0.00 1.09 0.00 81.57 <0.001
R23 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R24 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R25 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R26 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R27 0.00 1.12 0.00 83.78 <0.001
R28 0.00 1.12 0.00 83.78 <0.001
R29 0.00 1.18 0.00 88.21 <0.001
R30 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R31 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R32 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R33 0.00 1.07 0.00 79.36 <0.001
R34 0.00 1.09 0.00 81.57 <0.001
R35 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R36 0.00 1.12 0.00 83.78 <0.001
R37 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R38 0.00 1.09 0.00 81.57 <0.001
R39 0.00 1.18 0.00 88.21 <0.001
R40 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R41 0.00 0.98 0.00 72.72 <0.001
R42 0.00 1.09 0.00 81.57 <0.001
R43 0.00 1.18 0.00 88.21 <0.001
R44 0.00 1.21 0.00 90.42 <0.001
R45 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R46 0.00 1.12 0.00 83.78 <0.001
R47 0.00 1.09 0.00 81.57 <0.001
R48 0.00 1.09 0.00 81.57 <0.001
R49 0.00 1.12 0.00 83.78 <0.001
R50 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R51 0.00 1.18 0.00 88.21 <0.001
R52 0.00 1.04 0.00 77.15 <0.001
R53 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R54 0.00 1.12 0.00 83.78 <0.001
R55 0.00 1.15 0.00 85.99 <0.001
R56 0.00 1.09 0.00 81.57 <0.001
R57 0.00 1.09 0.00 81.57 <0.001
R58 0.00 1.18 0.00 88.21 <0.001
R59 0.00 1.07 0.00 79.36 <0.001
Table 5.10: Left: IM0, Matrix 1; Right: IM10, Matrix 1
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 49.29 48.55 49.76 1.01 0.603
R1 10.21 17.87 11.66 94.47 <0.001
R2 1.92 5.12 2.37 62.98 <0.001
R3 0.38 1.86 0.44 49.42 <0.001
R4 0.12 0.68 0.03 30.33 <0.001
R5 0.03 0.62 0.03 34.25 <0.001
R6 0.03 0.59 0.00 38.18 <0.001
R7 0.00 0.62 0.00 46.23 <0.001
R8 0.00 0.68 0.00 50.64 <0.001
R9 0.00 0.59 0.00 44.02 <0.001
R10 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R11 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R12 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R13 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R14 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R15 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R16 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R17 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R18 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R19 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R20 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R21 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R22 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R23 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R24 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R25 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R26 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R27 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R28 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R29 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R30 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R31 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R32 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R33 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R34 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R35 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R36 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R37 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R38 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R39 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R40 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R41 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R42 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R43 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R44 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R45 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R46 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R47 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R48 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R49 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R50 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R51 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R52 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R53 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R54 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R55 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R56 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R57 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R58 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R59 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.36 48.96 48.64 2.25 0.325
R1 15.30 23.64 17.07 84.14 <0.001
R2 4.14 9.88 4.97 1.04× 102 <0.001
R3 1.30 4.76 1.78 88.00 <0.001
R4 0.36 2.51 0.86 69.17 <0.001
R5 0.21 1.15 0.83 25.35 <0.001
R6 0.00 0.71 0.71 39.04 <0.001
R7 0.00 0.59 0.62 33.36 <0.001
R8 0.00 0.56 0.59 31.73 <0.001
R9 0.00 0.62 0.12 33.02 <0.001
R10 0.00 0.62 0.03 40.29 <0.001
R11 0.00 0.59 0.03 38.18 <0.001
R12 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R13 0.00 0.47 0.00 35.21 <0.001
R14 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R15 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R16 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R17 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R18 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R19 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R20 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R21 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R22 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R23 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R24 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R25 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R26 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R27 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R28 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R29 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R30 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R31 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R32 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R33 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R34 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R35 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R36 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R37 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R38 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R39 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R40 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R41 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R42 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R43 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R44 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R45 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R46 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R47 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R48 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R49 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R50 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R51 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R52 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R53 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R54 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R55 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R56 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R57 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R58 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R59 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
Table 5.11: Left: IM20, Matrix 1; Right: IM30, Matrix 1
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 51.04 50.44 49.79 1.04 0.593
R1 21.33 27.93 24.41 39.78 <0.001
R2 9.62 12.81 9.59 23.74 <0.001
R3 3.99 6.12 3.52 28.89 <0.001
R4 1.45 2.31 1.18 13.92 <0.001
R5 0.53 1.30 0.62 13.89 <0.001
R6 0.18 0.98 0.27 25.78 <0.001
R7 0.06 0.62 0.06 27.47 <0.001
R8 0.03 0.50 0.03 26.24 <0.001
R9 0.03 0.27 0.03 10.98 0.004
R10 0.06 0.27 0.00 13.75 0.001
R11 0.06 0.24 0.00 11.97 0.003
R12 0.03 0.24 0.00 13.51 0.001
R13 0.03 0.24 0.00 13.51 0.001
R14 0.03 0.24 0.00 13.51 0.001
R15 0.03 0.24 0.00 13.51 0.001
R16 0.06 0.24 0.00 11.97 0.003
R17 0.06 0.24 0.00 11.97 0.003
R18 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R19 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R20 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R21 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R22 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R23 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R24 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R25 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R26 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R27 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R28 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R29 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R30 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R31 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R32 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R33 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R34 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R35 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R36 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R37 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R38 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R39 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R40 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R41 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R42 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R43 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R44 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R45 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R46 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R47 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R48 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R49 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R50 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R51 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R52 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R53 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R54 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R55 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R56 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R57 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R58 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R59 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 51.36 49.67 48.91 4.27 0.118
R1 25.15 30.83 26.09 31.18 <0.001
R2 12.69 17.10 12.96 33.01 <0.001
R3 6.27 8.82 5.98 24.46 <0.001
R4 2.75 4.76 3.11 22.00 <0.001
R5 1.39 2.84 1.48 22.59 <0.001
R6 0.77 1.66 0.80 15.19 <0.001
R7 0.36 0.83 0.44 7.57 0.023
R8 0.24 0.62 0.15 12.19 0.002
R9 0.18 0.36 0.03 11.02 0.004
R10 0.15 0.27 0.03 7.37 0.025
R11 0.12 0.24 0.03 6.24 0.044
R12 0.09 0.24 0.03 6.60 0.037
R13 0.03 0.24 0.03 9.20 0.010
R14 0.03 0.24 0.03 9.20 0.010
R15 0.03 0.24 0.03 9.20 0.010
R16 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R17 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R18 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R19 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R20 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R21 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R22 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R23 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R24 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R25 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R26 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R27 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R28 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R29 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R30 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R31 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R32 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R33 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R34 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R35 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R36 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R37 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R38 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R39 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R40 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R41 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R42 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R43 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R44 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R45 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R46 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R47 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R48 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R49 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R50 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R51 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R52 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R53 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R54 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R55 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R56 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R57 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R58 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
R59 0.00 0.24 0.03 13.51 0.001
Table 5.12: Left: IM40, Matrix 1; Right: IM50, Matrix 1
74
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 51.54 48.85 49.97 4.95 0.084
R1 32.46 35.36 32.43 8.56 0.014
R2 19.56 23.70 18.34 32.23 <0.001
R3 11.39 14.14 11.09 17.47 <0.001
R4 6.51 8.82 5.68 26.82 <0.001
R5 3.96 5.53 3.46 18.59 <0.001
R6 1.92 3.22 1.86 16.71 <0.001
R7 1.12 2.22 1.18 16.31 <0.001
R8 0.71 0.98 0.74 1.74 0.418
R9 0.36 0.65 0.44 3.17 0.205
R10 0.24 0.47 0.24 3.78 0.151
R11 0.12 0.27 0.06 5.14 0.077
R12 0.03 0.27 0.00 15.49 <0.001
R13 0.03 0.15 0.00 7.78 0.020
R14 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R15 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R16 0.00 0.21 0.00 15.39 <0.001
R17 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R18 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R19 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R20 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R21 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R22 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R23 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R24 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R25 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R26 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R27 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R28 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R29 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R30 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R31 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R32 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R33 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R34 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R35 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R36 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R37 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R38 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R39 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R40 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R41 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R42 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R43 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R44 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R45 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R46 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R47 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R48 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R49 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R50 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R51 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R52 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R53 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R54 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R55 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R56 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R57 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R58 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
R59 0.00 0.12 0.00 8.79 0.012
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.12 48.43 49.50 1.97 0.374
R1 35.06 36.80 35.86 2.24 0.326
R2 25.50 27.60 25.06 6.45 0.040
R3 18.25 20.00 18.17 4.70 0.095
R4 12.93 13.49 11.72 5.05 0.080
R5 9.08 9.47 8.64 1.41 0.494
R6 6.07 6.39 6.54 0.67 0.715
R7 4.17 4.29 4.02 0.30 0.860
R8 3.14 2.75 3.11 1.08 0.583
R9 2.13 1.78 1.80 1.38 0.501
R10 1.33 1.30 1.80 3.58 0.167
R11 1.01 0.95 1.21 1.24 0.537
R12 0.56 0.62 0.92 3.39 0.183
R13 0.36 0.62 0.53 2.59 0.274
R14 0.18 0.44 0.44 5.09 0.079
R15 0.06 0.56 0.33 15.96 <0.001
R16 0.09 0.38 0.18 7.13 0.028
R17 0.03 0.41 0.21 13.49 0.001
R18 0.03 0.36 0.15 11.25 0.004
R19 0.00 0.33 0.09 16.23 <0.001
R20 0.00 0.33 0.12 15.58 <0.001
R21 0.00 0.33 0.12 15.58 <0.001
R22 0.00 0.33 0.09 16.23 <0.001
R23 0.00 0.33 0.06 17.42 <0.001
R24 0.00 0.33 0.06 17.42 <0.001
R25 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R26 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R27 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R28 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R29 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R30 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R31 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R32 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R33 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R34 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R35 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R36 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R37 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R38 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R39 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R40 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R41 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R42 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R43 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R44 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R45 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R46 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R47 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R48 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R49 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R50 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R51 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R52 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R53 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R54 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R55 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R56 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R57 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R58 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
R59 0.00 0.33 0.03 19.50 <0.001
Table 5.13: Left: IM60, Matrix 1; Right: IM70, Matrix 1
75
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 47.57 49.53 51.09 8.42 0.015
R1 37.90 40.86 42.22 13.73 0.001
R2 30.65 32.31 34.88 13.95 <0.001
R3 23.28 25.71 28.34 22.63 <0.001
R4 19.94 20.89 23.17 11.00 0.004
R5 16.42 15.77 18.85 12.45 0.002
R6 12.96 11.98 15.33 17.00 <0.001
R7 10.41 10.50 12.46 8.96 0.011
R8 8.02 8.46 9.85 7.63 0.022
R9 6.86 6.60 7.54 2.46 0.293
R10 5.09 5.00 6.01 4.06 0.131
R11 4.38 3.96 5.03 4.55 0.103
R12 3.61 3.11 3.31 1.33 0.514
R13 2.63 2.19 2.46 1.44 0.488
R14 1.95 2.01 2.46 2.39 0.303
R15 1.63 1.42 1.78 1.37 0.504
R16 1.01 1.27 1.27 1.40 0.496
R17 0.56 1.09 1.12 8.02 0.018
R18 0.50 0.89 1.24 11.03 0.004
R19 0.47 0.83 0.77 3.79 0.150
R20 0.27 0.62 0.65 6.78 0.034
R21 0.15 0.53 0.47 8.83 0.012
R22 0.12 0.44 0.27 6.82 0.033
R23 0.09 0.36 0.15 6.45 0.040
R24 0.03 0.36 0.09 12.68 0.002
R25 0.03 0.36 0.12 11.77 0.003
R26 0.00 0.30 0.12 14.02 <0.001
R27 0.00 0.30 0.09 14.53 <0.001
R28 0.00 0.30 0.12 14.02 <0.001
R29 0.00 0.30 0.18 14.00 <0.001
R30 0.00 0.30 0.09 14.53 <0.001
R31 0.00 0.30 0.06 15.57 <0.001
R32 0.00 0.30 0.09 14.53 <0.001
R33 0.00 0.30 0.06 15.57 <0.001
R34 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R35 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R36 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R37 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R38 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R39 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R40 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R41 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R42 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R43 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R44 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R45 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R46 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R47 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R48 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R49 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R50 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R51 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R52 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R53 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R54 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R55 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R56 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R57 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R58 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
R59 0.00 0.30 0.03 17.49 <0.001
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.50 49.50 51.60 2.99 0.225
R1 45.24 46.01 45.89 0.47 0.792
R2 41.18 43.02 42.25 2.35 0.308
R3 35.80 39.32 38.34 9.52 0.009
R4 31.45 36.54 34.44 19.71 <0.001
R5 26.80 34.73 32.04 51.68 <0.001
R6 23.76 30.92 29.26 47.83 <0.001
R7 21.42 26.72 24.70 26.47 <0.001
R8 19.23 23.02 21.36 14.64 <0.001
R9 17.60 21.45 18.73 16.86 <0.001
R10 16.15 19.08 16.04 14.02 <0.001
R11 14.08 17.69 15.09 17.60 <0.001
R12 12.72 15.83 13.17 15.68 <0.001
R13 11.83 13.31 12.25 3.59 0.167
R14 10.62 11.42 11.24 1.21 0.545
R15 9.38 10.27 9.82 1.50 0.472
R16 8.58 9.17 9.14 0.93 0.629
R17 7.63 8.28 8.61 2.24 0.326
R18 6.45 8.02 8.73 13.13 0.001
R19 5.92 7.07 7.54 7.55 0.023
R20 5.80 6.45 7.07 4.55 0.103
R21 5.74 5.59 6.63 3.71 0.156
R22 4.79 5.47 6.27 7.11 0.029
R23 3.93 4.59 5.80 13.15 0.001
R24 3.34 4.41 4.88 10.69 0.005
R25 2.87 4.53 4.62 17.96 <0.001
R26 2.78 3.49 4.14 9.43 0.009
R27 2.37 3.20 3.61 9.39 0.009
R28 2.81 2.96 3.11 0.52 0.773
R29 2.99 2.60 3.20 2.17 0.338
R30 2.78 2.69 2.87 0.20 0.906
R31 2.49 2.13 2.40 1.02 0.600
R32 2.07 1.98 1.75 1.02 0.600
R33 1.98 1.80 1.51 2.26 0.323
R34 2.13 1.54 1.39 6.07 0.048
R35 1.89 1.30 1.21 6.16 0.046
R36 1.72 1.09 0.98 8.22 0.016
R37 1.57 1.09 0.74 10.47 0.005
R38 1.33 0.95 0.53 12.07 0.002
R39 1.39 0.86 0.44 17.58 <0.001
R40 1.18 0.98 0.41 13.97 <0.001
R41 1.07 1.09 0.36 16.49 <0.001
R42 0.95 0.80 0.27 14.98 <0.001
R43 0.65 0.83 0.24 12.37 0.002
R44 0.41 0.71 0.18 11.66 0.003
R45 0.24 0.68 0.03 26.08 <0.001
R46 0.27 0.56 0.03 19.90 <0.001
R47 0.18 0.47 0.03 16.56 <0.001
R48 0.24 0.47 0.03 16.01 <0.001
R49 0.12 0.47 0.00 23.97 <0.001
R50 0.03 0.38 0.00 23.59 <0.001
R51 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R52 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R53 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R54 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R55 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R56 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R57 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R58 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
R59 0.00 0.24 0.00 17.59 <0.001
Table 5.14: Left: IM80, Matrix 1; Right: IM90, Matrix 1
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 51.01 49.53 50.65 1.61 0.446
R1 50.38 49.76 50.77 0.70 0.706
R2 49.44 49.41 51.42 3.60 0.166
R3 49.62 49.56 50.62 0.97 0.616
R4 49.23 47.34 50.83 8.26 0.016
R5 49.08 47.51 50.80 7.30 0.026
R6 49.20 47.46 49.73 3.84 0.146
R7 49.67 48.46 50.86 3.88 0.143
R8 48.79 47.28 51.12 10.16 0.006
R9 48.58 46.72 51.63 16.63 <0.001
R10 48.52 46.69 51.21 14.03 <0.001
R11 48.64 46.04 52.07 24.80 <0.001
R12 47.69 46.98 52.37 23.15 <0.001
R13 46.86 46.60 53.08 36.38 <0.001
R14 45.80 46.80 53.82 51.64 <0.001
R15 44.44 46.80 54.67 77.80 <0.001
R16 44.59 47.90 55.50 84.88 <0.001
R17 43.31 47.40 55.38 1.02× 102 <0.001
R18 43.93 47.07 54.73 83.62 <0.001
R19 44.26 46.36 53.96 70.62 <0.001
R20 42.72 45.44 54.26 98.68 <0.001
R21 42.28 43.79 53.79 1.06× 102 <0.001
R22 42.87 43.40 52.49 79.33 <0.001
R23 43.46 42.51 53.52 1.01× 102 <0.001
R24 43.17 43.02 53.40 96.22 <0.001
R25 42.60 42.93 53.88 1.12× 102 <0.001
R26 42.28 43.91 52.96 89.95 <0.001
R27 42.90 43.14 52.31 78.20 <0.001
R28 42.75 42.99 52.60 85.85 <0.001
R29 43.02 42.84 51.95 73.80 <0.001
R30 42.90 43.05 51.51 66.04 <0.001
R31 43.40 43.28 51.42 59.10 <0.001
R32 43.17 44.50 50.98 47.44 <0.001
R33 43.82 44.73 49.59 26.12 <0.001
R34 44.17 43.88 50.30 35.69 <0.001
R35 44.88 42.81 50.15 38.93 <0.001
R36 44.05 42.16 50.18 47.83 <0.001
R37 44.70 41.75 50.21 50.25 <0.001
R38 44.14 43.34 50.36 40.05 <0.001
R39 42.90 41.95 50.30 56.88 <0.001
R40 42.78 42.54 50.92 61.86 <0.001
R41 42.81 43.22 49.97 43.99 <0.001
R42 43.05 44.17 50.27 41.03 <0.001
R43 43.52 44.50 50.71 41.31 <0.001
R44 43.55 44.11 48.88 23.30 <0.001
R45 43.76 44.44 49.14 23.39 <0.001
R46 43.85 44.32 48.96 21.76 <0.001
R47 45.00 43.52 49.32 24.69 <0.001
R48 44.35 43.61 50.03 33.54 <0.001
R49 43.22 44.41 48.58 21.56 <0.001
R50 43.70 44.62 47.51 10.82 0.004
R51 43.49 44.32 47.37 11.36 0.003
R52 44.76 44.32 48.08 11.47 0.003
R53 44.20 43.67 47.93 14.68 <0.001
R54 44.17 44.44 47.46 9.07 0.011
R55 43.70 44.32 49.47 27.27 <0.001
R56 44.20 44.08 49.26 23.76 <0.001
R57 44.26 44.17 48.14 13.95 <0.001
R58 43.64 43.49 49.05 27.35 <0.001
R59 44.11 42.69 48.46 24.64 <0.001
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 51.95 48.99 50.56 5.93 0.052
R1 3.25 25.44 15.95 7.61× 102 <0.001
R2 3.17 21.42 13.05 5.79× 102 <0.001
R3 6.18 21.98 13.76 3.67× 102 <0.001
R4 11.09 24.23 14.08 2.26× 102 <0.001
R5 17.28 28.14 15.83 1.82× 102 <0.001
R6 24.97 29.64 17.75 1.35× 102 <0.001
R7 23.14 31.60 19.23 1.44× 102 <0.001
R8 26.09 33.91 21.45 1.35× 102 <0.001
R9 23.88 34.88 23.20 1.43× 102 <0.001
R10 27.46 36.78 24.53 1.31× 102 <0.001
R11 24.14 36.92 25.41 1.60× 102 <0.001
R12 27.43 37.43 26.27 1.18× 102 <0.001
R13 25.24 39.26 26.60 1.88× 102 <0.001
R14 27.69 40.00 27.31 1.60× 102 <0.001
R15 24.50 41.09 27.99 2.37× 102 <0.001
R16 27.60 41.69 28.28 1.91× 102 <0.001
R17 24.14 42.04 28.76 2.67× 102 <0.001
R18 27.69 41.98 29.56 1.82× 102 <0.001
R19 24.47 42.93 29.79 2.76× 102 <0.001
R20 27.63 42.99 29.62 2.09× 102 <0.001
R21 24.35 43.43 28.85 3.04× 102 <0.001
R22 27.72 43.40 27.90 2.43× 102 <0.001
R23 24.59 43.28 26.80 3.20× 102 <0.001
R24 27.72 42.72 25.86 2.60× 102 <0.001
R25 24.26 43.22 26.51 3.30× 102 <0.001
R26 27.43 43.08 28.17 2.34× 102 <0.001
R27 24.64 43.22 28.31 2.96× 102 <0.001
R28 27.34 43.11 28.58 2.31× 102 <0.001
R29 24.20 43.25 27.81 3.14× 102 <0.001
R30 27.46 43.25 28.05 2.41× 102 <0.001
R31 24.14 43.52 28.20 3.20× 102 <0.001
R32 27.40 43.28 28.58 2.35× 102 <0.001
R33 24.53 43.61 28.40 3.10× 102 <0.001
R34 27.28 43.64 28.52 2.49× 102 <0.001
R35 24.44 43.73 28.40 3.16× 102 <0.001
R36 27.43 43.46 28.46 2.41× 102 <0.001
R37 24.23 43.93 28.58 3.27× 102 <0.001
R38 27.43 43.58 28.58 2.43× 102 <0.001
R39 24.50 43.79 28.82 3.12× 102 <0.001
R40 27.43 43.52 28.58 2.41× 102 <0.001
R41 24.38 43.82 28.85 3.16× 102 <0.001
R42 27.28 43.58 28.55 2.46× 102 <0.001
R43 24.47 43.93 28.85 3.17× 102 <0.001
R44 27.28 43.49 28.70 2.42× 102 <0.001
R45 24.47 43.82 28.91 3.13× 102 <0.001
R46 27.31 43.70 28.70 2.47× 102 <0.001
R47 24.50 43.85 28.91 3.13× 102 <0.001
R48 27.25 43.46 28.70 2.41× 102 <0.001
R49 24.26 43.93 28.91 3.22× 102 <0.001
R50 27.60 43.61 28.70 2.39× 102 <0.001
R51 24.50 43.82 28.91 3.12× 102 <0.001
R52 27.34 43.58 28.70 2.43× 102 <0.001
R53 24.56 43.85 28.91 3.11× 102 <0.001
R54 27.31 43.58 28.70 2.44× 102 <0.001
R55 24.53 43.93 28.91 3.15× 102 <0.001
R56 27.34 43.49 28.70 2.41× 102 <0.001
R57 24.56 43.82 28.91 3.10× 102 <0.001
R58 27.31 43.70 28.70 2.47× 102 <0.001
R59 24.53 43.85 28.91 3.12× 102 <0.001
Table 5.15: Left: IM100, Matrix 1; Right: IM0, Matrix 2
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.44 49.29 49.59 0.97 0.615
R1 7.37 22.34 19.17 3.42× 102 <0.001
R2 2.04 15.12 14.11 4.83× 102 <0.001
R3 1.98 15.09 12.93 4.64× 102 <0.001
R4 2.93 17.16 15.74 4.82× 102 <0.001
R5 3.99 18.82 17.25 4.60× 102 <0.001
R6 5.41 19.97 16.45 3.67× 102 <0.001
R7 6.39 21.48 18.02 3.65× 102 <0.001
R8 6.04 23.96 19.14 4.79× 102 <0.001
R9 5.44 24.26 21.01 5.65× 102 <0.001
R10 5.09 26.63 22.78 7.06× 102 <0.001
R11 4.85 28.93 23.11 8.17× 102 <0.001
R12 4.76 30.44 22.25 8.73× 102 <0.001
R13 4.47 30.15 19.35 8.64× 102 <0.001
R14 3.79 31.33 18.02 9.90× 102 <0.001
R15 3.82 30.68 18.28 9.55× 102 <0.001
R16 3.22 28.88 17.72 9.34× 102 <0.001
R17 3.20 28.17 17.57 9.03× 102 <0.001
R18 4.23 27.01 15.83 7.31× 102 <0.001
R19 4.11 25.98 14.67 6.94× 102 <0.001
R20 4.59 25.12 14.38 6.12× 102 <0.001
R21 3.85 24.97 13.43 6.75× 102 <0.001
R22 4.11 23.05 12.84 5.63× 102 <0.001
R23 5.27 22.04 11.54 4.39× 102 <0.001
R24 4.05 20.21 10.86 4.51× 102 <0.001
R25 4.64 20.18 10.38 4.10× 102 <0.001
R26 4.76 18.91 10.53 3.48× 102 <0.001
R27 5.30 20.15 10.50 3.66× 102 <0.001
R28 5.06 19.59 9.44 3.69× 102 <0.001
R29 4.35 19.20 9.26 3.99× 102 <0.001
R30 4.91 19.47 9.44 3.73× 102 <0.001
R31 4.53 19.50 9.50 3.98× 102 <0.001
R32 5.95 19.20 9.79 3.00× 102 <0.001
R33 4.26 19.82 9.62 4.29× 102 <0.001
R34 5.38 19.64 8.28 3.74× 102 <0.001
R35 5.21 18.34 7.31 3.47× 102 <0.001
R36 4.32 18.25 5.77 4.36× 102 <0.001
R37 4.38 19.82 5.44 5.29× 102 <0.001
R38 4.38 19.94 4.47 5.84× 102 <0.001
R39 5.12 21.78 3.14 7.46× 102 <0.001
R40 4.67 22.22 2.22 8.83× 102 <0.001
R41 3.82 23.08 2.66 9.49× 102 <0.001
R42 3.70 22.66 3.11 8.90× 102 <0.001
R43 4.41 22.46 4.14 7.53× 102 <0.001
R44 3.85 22.10 4.56 7.42× 102 <0.001
R45 3.43 23.55 4.50 8.70× 102 <0.001
R46 2.72 22.57 4.26 8.81× 102 <0.001
R47 2.54 22.63 4.14 9.09× 102 <0.001
R48 2.63 21.86 4.23 8.44× 102 <0.001
R49 1.78 21.69 4.62 9.00× 102 <0.001
R50 1.69 23.28 4.70 1.01× 103 <0.001
R51 1.92 23.31 4.56 9.96× 102 <0.001
R52 2.46 23.40 4.91 9.25× 102 <0.001
R53 2.96 23.64 5.09 8.82× 102 <0.001
R54 3.67 23.11 5.56 7.64× 102 <0.001
R55 4.91 23.99 5.27 7.48× 102 <0.001
R56 4.08 23.85 5.50 7.82× 102 <0.001
R57 4.62 24.82 5.24 8.20× 102 <0.001
R58 4.70 25.03 5.83 7.94× 102 <0.001
R59 4.50 23.37 6.24 6.88× 102 <0.001
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.41 49.41 50.83 1.44 0.486
R1 12.25 26.54 20.68 2.27× 102 <0.001
R2 3.58 16.98 12.31 3.64× 102 <0.001
R3 2.69 13.76 9.82 3.05× 102 <0.001
R4 2.31 14.56 10.62 3.76× 102 <0.001
R5 2.43 14.94 10.18 3.74× 102 <0.001
R6 2.78 16.39 10.83 4.00× 102 <0.001
R7 2.69 18.31 10.44 4.87× 102 <0.001
R8 2.31 20.68 11.27 6.35× 102 <0.001
R9 1.98 19.88 10.71 6.36× 102 <0.001
R10 1.86 20.89 10.50 7.01× 102 <0.001
R11 2.43 19.02 9.73 5.48× 102 <0.001
R12 3.17 20.41 8.76 5.56× 102 <0.001
R13 3.31 21.09 8.46 5.83× 102 <0.001
R14 2.46 21.75 8.25 7.05× 102 <0.001
R15 2.28 21.18 6.75 7.28× 102 <0.001
R16 1.39 21.09 5.71 8.63× 102 <0.001
R17 1.57 21.09 5.09 8.64× 102 <0.001
R18 1.57 20.24 5.47 7.94× 102 <0.001
R19 1.09 21.12 5.00 9.35× 102 <0.001
R20 0.98 19.88 5.12 8.66× 102 <0.001
R21 1.18 20.36 5.71 8.44× 102 <0.001
R22 1.69 20.12 5.77 7.62× 102 <0.001
R23 1.60 21.12 6.36 8.15× 102 <0.001
R24 1.21 22.81 5.74 9.99× 102 <0.001
R25 0.83 22.72 5.53 1.06× 103 <0.001
R26 0.77 22.60 5.50 1.07× 103 <0.001
R27 0.89 22.34 5.47 1.03× 103 <0.001
R28 0.95 22.57 5.27 1.04× 103 <0.001
R29 0.83 21.60 4.67 1.02× 103 <0.001
R30 1.09 20.18 4.20 9.08× 102 <0.001
R31 1.33 21.07 3.40 9.84× 102 <0.001
R32 1.54 21.27 3.85 9.44× 102 <0.001
R33 1.48 21.57 3.73 9.79× 102 <0.001
R34 1.69 21.18 3.67 9.31× 102 <0.001
R35 1.42 20.27 4.14 8.73× 102 <0.001
R36 1.24 20.15 4.14 8.89× 102 <0.001
R37 1.15 19.26 4.23 8.37× 102 <0.001
R38 0.95 19.05 3.22 9.07× 102 <0.001
R39 1.07 19.91 3.49 9.34× 102 <0.001
R40 1.51 18.93 3.49 8.10× 102 <0.001
R41 1.86 18.67 3.17 7.73× 102 <0.001
R42 2.19 17.72 2.04 7.65× 102 <0.001
R43 2.40 17.22 1.83 7.34× 102 <0.001
R44 2.25 16.36 1.92 6.80× 102 <0.001
R45 1.54 16.98 2.31 7.54× 102 <0.001
R46 1.42 16.95 2.13 7.79× 102 <0.001
R47 1.54 16.80 1.95 7.71× 102 <0.001
R48 1.51 15.65 1.75 7.13× 102 <0.001
R49 1.72 16.27 1.63 7.47× 102 <0.001
R50 1.89 16.51 1.24 7.88× 102 <0.001
R51 1.95 16.78 1.60 7.63× 102 <0.001
R52 1.83 17.69 1.95 8.03× 102 <0.001
R53 1.98 19.41 1.75 9.30× 102 <0.001
R54 1.33 17.69 1.66 8.84× 102 <0.001
R55 0.95 16.18 1.39 8.49× 102 <0.001
R56 0.71 16.48 1.48 8.95× 102 <0.001
R57 0.86 16.24 0.95 9.17× 102 <0.001
R58 1.24 14.79 0.71 7.96× 102 <0.001
R59 1.72 13.67 0.33 7.35× 102 <0.001
Table 5.16: Left: IM10, Matrix 2; Right: IM20, Matrix 2
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.06 50.68 49.56 0.86 0.651
R1 16.86 32.72 27.22 2.38× 102 <0.001
R2 5.59 23.05 17.19 4.60× 102 <0.001
R3 1.80 17.37 15.68 6.18× 102 <0.001
R4 0.62 15.68 15.56 7.51× 102 <0.001
R5 0.15 15.41 14.56 8.25× 102 <0.001
R6 0.06 16.09 15.59 9.06× 102 <0.001
R7 0.03 16.12 15.86 9.26× 102 <0.001
R8 0.03 16.18 15.38 9.14× 102 <0.001
R9 0.00 13.88 12.37 7.65× 102 <0.001
R10 0.00 14.08 11.30 7.47× 102 <0.001
R11 0.00 12.96 10.53 6.87× 102 <0.001
R12 0.00 13.55 9.50 6.91× 102 <0.001
R13 0.00 13.28 9.17 6.75× 102 <0.001
R14 0.00 13.52 9.20 6.85× 102 <0.001
R15 0.00 13.64 9.14 6.90× 102 <0.001
R16 0.00 14.17 8.58 7.08× 102 <0.001
R17 0.00 14.23 8.31 7.08× 102 <0.001
R18 0.00 13.46 7.69 6.67× 102 <0.001
R19 0.00 12.31 6.95 6.06× 102 <0.001
R20 0.00 12.87 7.13 6.35× 102 <0.001
R21 0.00 11.69 7.63 5.84× 102 <0.001
R22 0.00 9.85 7.93 5.14× 102 <0.001
R23 0.00 10.30 7.66 5.26× 102 <0.001
R24 0.00 9.76 5.95 4.79× 102 <0.001
R25 0.00 10.50 6.04 5.14× 102 <0.001
R26 0.00 11.42 5.53 5.59× 102 <0.001
R27 0.00 11.89 5.44 5.84× 102 <0.001
R28 0.00 10.98 5.41 5.36× 102 <0.001
R29 0.00 10.24 5.36 4.99× 102 <0.001
R30 0.00 10.59 5.89 5.18× 102 <0.001
R31 0.00 10.27 5.59 5.01× 102 <0.001
R32 0.00 11.45 5.62 5.60× 102 <0.001
R33 0.00 11.39 5.68 5.57× 102 <0.001
R34 0.00 9.79 5.56 4.78× 102 <0.001
R35 0.00 9.64 6.27 4.78× 102 <0.001
R36 0.00 8.22 6.54 4.25× 102 <0.001
R37 0.00 8.05 5.74 4.03× 102 <0.001
R38 0.00 8.02 4.44 3.88× 102 <0.001
R39 0.00 7.93 4.38 3.84× 102 <0.001
R40 0.00 7.96 4.23 3.84× 102 <0.001
R41 0.00 8.64 4.82 4.19× 102 <0.001
R42 0.00 8.64 4.38 4.18× 102 <0.001
R43 0.00 8.73 4.23 4.23× 102 <0.001
R44 0.00 8.22 3.05 4.05× 102 <0.001
R45 0.00 7.31 3.34 3.52× 102 <0.001
R46 0.00 6.45 3.52 3.10× 102 <0.001
R47 0.00 6.04 2.66 2.90× 102 <0.001
R48 0.00 5.53 2.28 2.67× 102 <0.001
R49 0.00 6.18 3.14 2.96× 102 <0.001
R50 0.00 6.21 2.25 3.04× 102 <0.001
R51 0.00 6.01 1.54 3.09× 102 <0.001
R52 0.00 6.01 1.30 3.18× 102 <0.001
R53 0.00 5.38 1.57 2.71× 102 <0.001
R54 0.00 5.44 1.45 2.78× 102 <0.001
R55 0.00 5.89 1.48 3.04× 102 <0.001
R56 0.00 5.83 1.24 3.09× 102 <0.001
R57 0.00 4.94 1.86 2.40× 102 <0.001
R58 0.00 3.70 1.92 1.76× 102 <0.001
R59 0.00 3.96 1.89 1.89× 102 <0.001
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 48.31 51.18 49.91 5.59 0.061
R1 21.60 35.71 30.62 1.70× 102 <0.001
R2 9.67 25.12 18.34 2.90× 102 <0.001
R3 3.76 20.09 12.04 4.66× 102 <0.001
R4 1.36 18.43 9.41 6.48× 102 <0.001
R5 0.62 15.21 6.09 6.15× 102 <0.001
R6 0.33 12.66 3.82 5.66× 102 <0.001
R7 0.12 10.59 2.43 5.28× 102 <0.001
R8 0.00 8.96 0.98 5.40× 102 <0.001
R9 0.00 8.49 0.38 5.68× 102 <0.001
R10 0.00 7.40 0.33 4.95× 102 <0.001
R11 0.00 6.66 0.24 4.52× 102 <0.001
R12 0.00 6.45 0.36 4.20× 102 <0.001
R13 0.00 6.60 0.53 4.11× 102 <0.001
R14 0.00 6.75 1.12 3.75× 102 <0.001
R15 0.00 5.74 1.21 3.05× 102 <0.001
R16 0.00 6.21 1.18 3.37× 102 <0.001
R17 0.00 6.09 0.86 3.48× 102 <0.001
R18 0.00 5.89 0.68 3.47× 102 <0.001
R19 0.00 5.24 0.71 3.00× 102 <0.001
R20 0.00 5.12 0.98 2.76× 102 <0.001
R21 0.00 4.08 0.74 2.22× 102 <0.001
R22 0.00 3.46 0.30 2.12× 102 <0.001
R23 0.00 2.66 0.38 1.50× 102 <0.001
R24 0.00 2.04 0.18 1.24× 102 <0.001
R25 0.00 1.72 0.06 1.15× 102 <0.001
R26 0.00 1.57 0.03 1.09× 102 <0.001
R27 0.00 1.36 0.00 1.01× 102 <0.001
R28 0.00 0.92 0.00 68.30 <0.001
R29 0.00 0.86 0.00 63.89 <0.001
R30 0.00 0.44 0.00 33.00 <0.001
R31 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R32 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R33 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R34 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R35 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R36 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R37 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R38 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R39 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R40 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R41 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R42 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R43 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R44 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R45 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R46 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R47 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R48 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R49 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R50 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R51 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R52 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R53 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R54 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R55 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R56 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R57 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R58 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R59 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
Table 5.17: Left: IM30, Matrix 2; Right: IM40, Matrix 2
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.83 49.29 50.71 1.98 0.371
R1 25.95 35.27 33.46 77.77 <0.001
R2 14.53 27.16 23.02 1.72× 102 <0.001
R3 7.54 22.63 16.57 3.16× 102 <0.001
R4 4.56 18.52 14.17 3.58× 102 <0.001
R5 2.34 13.88 11.39 3.60× 102 <0.001
R6 1.27 11.69 8.93 3.65× 102 <0.001
R7 0.71 9.50 7.81 3.46× 102 <0.001
R8 0.33 8.20 5.33 3.22× 102 <0.001
R9 0.09 7.25 5.06 3.31× 102 <0.001
R10 0.00 7.07 4.08 3.42× 102 <0.001
R11 0.00 5.36 3.22 2.58× 102 <0.001
R12 0.00 4.94 2.54 2.36× 102 <0.001
R13 0.00 4.85 2.40 2.31× 102 <0.001
R14 0.00 3.31 1.69 1.57× 102 <0.001
R15 0.00 2.22 1.86 1.14× 102 <0.001
R16 0.00 1.54 1.66 88.31 <0.001
R17 0.00 1.07 1.51 73.56 <0.001
R18 0.00 1.04 0.95 54.69 <0.001
R19 0.00 0.86 0.77 44.92 <0.001
R20 0.00 0.74 1.01 49.41 <0.001
R21 0.00 0.83 0.83 45.57 <0.001
R22 0.00 1.01 0.86 51.69 <0.001
R23 0.00 0.95 0.89 50.53 <0.001
R24 0.00 0.86 0.71 43.59 <0.001
R25 0.00 0.77 0.95 47.83 <0.001
R26 0.00 0.68 0.95 46.24 <0.001
R27 0.00 0.68 1.54 72.74 <0.001
R28 0.00 0.44 1.36 66.31 <0.001
R29 0.00 0.33 1.04 50.66 <0.001
R30 0.00 0.30 0.62 29.19 <0.001
R31 0.00 0.27 0.18 12.78 0.002
R32 0.00 0.27 0.09 12.88 0.002
R33 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R34 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R35 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R36 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R37 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R38 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R39 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R40 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R41 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R42 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R43 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R44 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R45 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R46 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R47 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R48 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R49 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R50 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R51 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R52 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R53 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R54 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R55 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R56 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R57 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R58 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
R59 0.00 0.27 0.03 15.49 <0.001
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.62 49.62 48.58 2.82 0.244
R1 31.45 40.15 34.82 56.68 <0.001
R2 20.21 30.41 25.53 93.69 <0.001
R3 11.33 23.96 19.85 1.96× 102 <0.001
R4 6.69 19.62 15.36 2.66× 102 <0.001
R5 4.56 15.09 12.63 2.40× 102 <0.001
R6 2.69 12.90 9.64 2.75× 102 <0.001
R7 1.80 9.79 8.37 2.39× 102 <0.001
R8 1.45 7.25 6.21 1.65× 102 <0.001
R9 0.86 5.09 4.44 1.30× 102 <0.001
R10 0.41 3.43 4.11 1.32× 102 <0.001
R11 0.24 2.49 3.67 1.28× 102 <0.001
R12 0.15 1.95 2.37 87.77 <0.001
R13 0.15 1.78 1.75 66.18 <0.001
R14 0.21 1.75 1.07 47.43 <0.001
R15 0.24 1.42 0.71 32.35 <0.001
R16 0.24 1.51 0.62 37.13 <0.001
R17 0.09 1.39 0.83 47.14 <0.001
R18 0.12 1.69 0.68 56.85 <0.001
R19 0.03 1.63 0.47 72.35 <0.001
R20 0.00 1.18 0.41 57.09 <0.001
R21 0.00 0.92 0.44 43.13 <0.001
R22 0.00 0.80 0.36 37.66 <0.001
R23 0.00 0.56 0.21 26.89 <0.001
R24 0.00 0.53 0.06 31.00 <0.001
R25 0.00 0.50 0.00 37.41 <0.001
R26 0.00 0.53 0.00 39.61 <0.001
R27 0.00 0.53 0.00 39.61 <0.001
R28 0.00 0.41 0.00 30.80 <0.001
R29 0.00 0.38 0.00 28.60 <0.001
R30 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R31 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R32 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R33 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R34 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R35 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R36 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R37 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R38 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R39 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R40 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R41 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R42 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R43 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R44 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R45 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R46 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R47 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R48 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R49 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R50 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R51 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R52 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R53 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R54 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R55 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R56 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R57 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R58 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R59 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
Table 5.18: Left: IM50, Matrix 2; Right: IM60, Matrix 2
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 49.14 49.64 50.71 1.73 0.420
R1 36.04 41.12 40.27 21.16 <0.001
R2 26.15 32.57 32.37 43.19 <0.001
R3 18.05 25.95 24.79 71.61 <0.001
R4 12.72 21.80 18.93 1.03× 102 <0.001
R5 8.88 17.43 15.00 1.16× 102 <0.001
R6 6.89 12.78 12.78 86.74 <0.001
R7 4.29 10.30 10.95 1.30× 102 <0.001
R8 3.05 8.43 9.53 1.42× 102 <0.001
R9 2.31 7.46 7.10 1.21× 102 <0.001
R10 1.51 6.36 5.12 1.20× 102 <0.001
R11 1.48 5.44 3.99 86.15 <0.001
R12 1.04 4.73 2.69 89.47 <0.001
R13 0.74 4.26 2.49 94.78 <0.001
R14 0.33 3.70 1.86 1.14× 102 <0.001
R15 0.12 2.99 1.51 1.13× 102 <0.001
R16 0.06 2.66 0.53 1.26× 102 <0.001
R17 0.03 1.95 0.33 98.26 <0.001
R18 0.00 1.66 0.06 1.11× 102 <0.001
R19 0.00 1.30 0.03 89.66 <0.001
R20 0.00 1.18 0.00 88.21 <0.001
R21 0.00 0.74 0.00 55.05 <0.001
R22 0.00 0.62 0.00 46.23 <0.001
R23 0.00 0.53 0.00 39.61 <0.001
R24 0.00 0.53 0.00 39.61 <0.001
R25 0.00 0.44 0.00 33.00 <0.001
R26 0.00 0.50 0.00 37.41 <0.001
R27 0.00 0.38 0.00 28.60 <0.001
R28 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R29 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R30 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R31 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R32 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R33 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R34 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R35 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R36 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R37 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R38 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R39 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R40 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R41 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R42 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R43 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R44 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R45 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R46 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R47 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R48 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R49 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R50 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R51 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R52 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R53 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R54 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R55 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R56 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R57 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R58 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R59 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 49.94 50.33 49.59 0.37 0.831
R1 40.80 44.38 42.63 8.86 0.012
R2 33.61 41.30 36.60 43.46 <0.001
R3 28.14 37.04 32.37 61.20 <0.001
R4 23.58 32.63 28.70 69.17 <0.001
R5 19.32 28.55 24.20 79.57 <0.001
R6 16.24 25.59 20.62 90.03 <0.001
R7 13.20 22.51 18.37 1.01× 102 <0.001
R8 10.83 20.27 15.03 1.17× 102 <0.001
R9 8.79 18.64 13.58 1.41× 102 <0.001
R10 7.04 16.89 11.18 1.61× 102 <0.001
R11 6.66 14.88 10.18 1.23× 102 <0.001
R12 4.70 13.64 7.57 1.76× 102 <0.001
R13 4.26 11.27 6.72 1.24× 102 <0.001
R14 2.99 9.56 6.30 1.30× 102 <0.001
R15 2.69 7.57 5.15 85.97 <0.001
R16 2.07 6.60 4.94 89.50 <0.001
R17 1.83 6.01 4.26 82.77 <0.001
R18 1.24 4.97 3.28 83.61 <0.001
R19 1.15 4.47 2.75 72.44 <0.001
R20 0.80 3.37 2.60 61.56 <0.001
R21 0.65 2.96 2.10 55.94 <0.001
R22 0.53 2.46 1.51 45.98 <0.001
R23 0.47 1.95 1.18 33.12 <0.001
R24 0.36 1.80 1.04 36.36 <0.001
R25 0.38 1.24 1.18 19.42 <0.001
R26 0.30 1.21 0.71 20.42 <0.001
R27 0.38 1.07 0.65 11.49 0.003
R28 0.24 0.89 0.53 13.67 0.001
R29 0.06 0.83 0.56 27.63 <0.001
R30 0.00 0.53 0.53 29.26 <0.001
R31 0.00 0.50 0.62 31.31 <0.001
R32 0.00 0.36 0.56 26.79 <0.001
R33 0.00 0.24 0.47 22.22 <0.001
R34 0.00 0.21 0.27 13.24 0.001
R35 0.00 0.24 0.09 11.29 0.004
R36 0.00 0.18 0.03 9.65 0.008
R37 0.00 0.18 0.12 8.52 0.014
R38 0.00 0.18 0.06 8.59 0.014
R39 0.00 0.18 0.06 8.59 0.014
R40 0.00 0.18 0.03 9.65 0.008
R41 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R42 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R43 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R44 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R45 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R46 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R47 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R48 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R49 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R50 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R51 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R52 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R53 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R54 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R55 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R56 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R57 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R58 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
R59 0.00 0.18 0.00 13.19 0.001
Table 5.19: Left: IM70, Matrix 2; Right: IM80, Matrix 2
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 52.10 51.48 50.30 2.27 0.321
R1 46.30 49.29 46.48 7.62 0.022
R2 42.49 46.78 42.87 15.43 <0.001
R3 38.96 43.40 40.12 14.81 <0.001
R4 37.31 40.80 36.54 14.71 <0.001
R5 34.08 38.40 34.02 18.51 <0.001
R6 31.83 36.33 31.36 22.79 <0.001
R7 29.05 35.21 28.99 39.80 <0.001
R8 28.17 33.37 27.19 35.51 <0.001
R9 27.01 30.98 24.70 33.92 <0.001
R10 24.32 28.76 22.07 41.39 <0.001
R11 22.13 27.25 20.92 41.96 <0.001
R12 20.50 25.03 18.79 41.26 <0.001
R13 18.76 22.10 16.21 38.18 <0.001
R14 16.86 20.86 14.76 44.47 <0.001
R15 16.60 19.64 13.99 38.81 <0.001
R16 15.65 17.01 13.91 12.56 0.002
R17 14.17 16.63 13.25 16.22 <0.001
R18 12.51 15.15 12.49 13.40 0.001
R19 11.18 14.23 11.24 18.74 <0.001
R20 9.62 12.87 9.73 23.42 <0.001
R21 8.70 12.01 9.26 23.10 <0.001
R22 8.02 11.66 9.02 27.10 <0.001
R23 6.78 11.36 8.67 43.97 <0.001
R24 6.54 10.36 8.58 32.14 <0.001
R25 5.98 9.50 7.87 29.64 <0.001
R26 6.24 8.79 7.28 16.00 <0.001
R27 5.50 7.13 7.51 12.66 0.002
R28 5.44 6.33 7.66 13.83 <0.001
R29 4.76 5.27 7.75 30.01 <0.001
R30 4.76 4.76 7.04 21.62 <0.001
R31 4.38 4.88 5.44 4.12 0.128
R32 4.41 4.32 5.77 9.45 0.009
R33 3.22 3.88 5.18 16.77 <0.001
R34 2.93 3.31 4.62 14.73 <0.001
R35 3.22 3.46 4.82 13.20 0.001
R36 3.55 2.54 5.09 30.81 <0.001
R37 2.99 2.01 4.02 23.82 <0.001
R38 2.57 1.98 3.76 20.15 <0.001
R39 2.43 1.83 3.67 22.59 <0.001
R40 2.10 1.33 3.28 29.93 <0.001
R41 1.92 1.27 3.05 26.58 <0.001
R42 1.51 1.12 3.05 35.96 <0.001
R43 1.51 1.01 2.99 38.53 <0.001
R44 1.21 1.39 2.78 26.71 <0.001
R45 1.39 1.39 3.05 30.48 <0.001
R46 1.12 1.24 2.75 31.13 <0.001
R47 0.71 1.21 2.69 45.98 <0.001
R48 0.53 0.80 2.54 59.53 <0.001
R49 0.56 0.71 2.40 54.07 <0.001
R50 0.68 0.80 2.34 42.78 <0.001
R51 0.68 0.80 2.13 34.37 <0.001
R52 0.59 0.80 1.69 21.42 <0.001
R53 0.56 0.50 1.66 29.48 <0.001
R54 0.56 0.50 2.13 50.60 <0.001
R55 0.36 0.53 2.16 62.34 <0.001
R56 0.30 0.41 1.66 45.83 <0.001
R57 0.30 0.30 1.33 35.10 <0.001
R58 0.33 0.30 1.48 41.02 <0.001
R59 0.33 0.27 1.63 50.68 <0.001
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 49.44 50.83 51.54 3.09 0.214
R1 49.20 52.07 52.60 9.06 0.011
R2 50.21 50.80 52.28 3.08 0.214
R3 51.51 51.89 52.46 0.61 0.736
R4 50.89 51.57 53.52 5.06 0.080
R5 52.13 50.74 53.79 6.31 0.043
R6 51.66 50.92 53.43 4.53 0.104
R7 51.63 51.45 53.28 2.77 0.250
R8 51.60 51.51 53.28 2.71 0.258
R9 51.33 51.24 54.17 7.53 0.023
R10 50.12 50.83 55.56 23.76 <0.001
R11 50.68 51.09 55.47 19.14 <0.001
R12 50.74 51.24 55.18 16.02 <0.001
R13 51.18 51.80 54.35 7.63 0.022
R14 51.63 51.78 54.44 6.79 0.034
R15 52.13 51.21 53.91 5.08 0.079
R16 51.27 51.36 53.91 6.06 0.048
R17 50.50 50.21 54.70 17.15 <0.001
R18 49.85 49.91 54.26 17.31 <0.001
R19 49.29 48.79 55.47 37.57 <0.001
R20 47.51 48.43 56.18 61.46 <0.001
R21 48.08 48.79 56.54 59.74 <0.001
R22 47.13 47.51 57.25 89.17 <0.001
R23 46.98 47.04 57.93 1.08× 102 <0.001
R24 46.72 47.72 58.55 1.17× 102 <0.001
R25 46.01 48.43 57.78 1.05× 102 <0.001
R26 46.80 48.40 56.18 68.22 <0.001
R27 47.10 48.73 55.18 49.41 <0.001
R28 46.24 48.55 54.05 43.58 <0.001
R29 45.47 48.76 52.43 32.75 <0.001
R30 45.83 49.50 52.07 26.64 <0.001
R31 45.21 50.77 52.63 40.41 <0.001
R32 45.12 50.06 52.84 41.42 <0.001
R33 44.62 49.70 53.34 52.05 <0.001
R34 45.77 48.46 52.99 36.02 <0.001
R35 45.50 48.08 51.39 23.59 <0.001
R36 45.59 48.61 50.50 16.62 <0.001
R37 46.48 47.87 50.27 9.94 0.007
R38 47.87 48.46 49.08 1.00 0.608
R39 47.69 48.79 48.82 1.11 0.574
R40 48.14 48.34 48.79 0.30 0.861
R41 48.43 48.64 48.76 7.34× 10−2 0.964
R42 47.51 48.22 49.59 3.00 0.223
R43 47.84 48.88 49.11 1.24 0.538
R44 47.75 48.93 47.10 2.34 0.310
R45 47.81 46.92 46.33 1.50 0.471
R46 48.99 48.05 45.77 7.45 0.024
R47 49.41 47.07 45.77 9.22 0.010
R48 49.20 45.92 46.18 9.02 0.011
R49 48.43 46.07 47.54 3.88 0.144
R50 48.91 47.93 47.75 1.05 0.593
R51 49.35 46.72 47.25 5.25 0.072
R52 49.20 47.19 46.24 6.19 0.045
R53 48.99 47.49 47.19 2.54 0.281
R54 49.14 47.04 46.48 5.34 0.069
R55 48.61 47.66 46.36 3.46 0.178
R56 48.82 49.32 47.31 2.97 0.227
R57 49.32 49.08 46.98 4.48 0.106
R58 49.29 48.43 47.13 3.20 0.202
R59 49.11 47.96 47.63 1.64 0.441
Table 5.20: Left: IM90, Matrix 2; Right: IM100, Matrix 2
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.86 50.06 50.38 0.44 0.804
R1 15.00 33.46 30.38 3.63× 102 <0.001
R2 22.72 31.78 26.07 71.73 <0.001
R3 39.41 37.19 28.02 1.10× 102 <0.001
R4 57.19 43.88 34.26 3.64× 102 <0.001
R5 72.57 49.64 41.80 7.17× 102 <0.001
R6 83.25 56.86 48.88 1.00× 103 <0.001
R7 85.68 60.98 53.79 9.23× 102 <0.001
R8 85.95 66.60 59.59 6.53× 102 <0.001
R9 85.98 70.21 64.17 4.68× 102 <0.001
R10 85.92 73.91 67.63 3.34× 102 <0.001
R11 86.24 75.15 71.45 2.43× 102 <0.001
R12 86.01 76.21 74.20 1.70× 102 <0.001
R13 86.24 76.30 77.22 1.34× 102 <0.001
R14 86.01 77.16 78.20 1.05× 102 <0.001
R15 86.24 77.63 79.47 94.20 <0.001
R16 86.01 78.11 80.18 77.33 <0.001
R17 86.24 78.28 81.60 74.56 <0.001
R18 86.01 78.82 82.28 60.64 <0.001
R19 86.24 78.76 83.05 66.48 <0.001
R20 86.01 79.14 83.76 57.88 <0.001
R21 86.24 79.02 84.23 65.89 <0.001
R22 86.01 78.88 84.26 65.05 <0.001
R23 86.24 78.93 84.50 69.09 <0.001
R24 86.01 78.79 84.50 68.24 <0.001
R25 86.24 78.70 84.76 75.57 <0.001
R26 86.01 79.14 84.67 62.86 <0.001
R27 86.24 78.91 84.91 72.62 <0.001
R28 86.01 79.02 84.62 64.63 <0.001
R29 86.24 79.20 84.88 66.67 <0.001
R30 86.01 79.41 84.64 57.86 <0.001
R31 86.24 79.29 84.82 64.58 <0.001
R32 86.01 79.50 84.67 56.50 <0.001
R33 86.24 79.23 84.85 65.90 <0.001
R34 86.01 79.29 84.64 59.97 <0.001
R35 86.24 79.50 84.88 61.18 <0.001
R36 86.01 79.70 84.64 52.75 <0.001
R37 86.24 78.96 84.82 70.78 <0.001
R38 86.01 79.29 84.67 60.17 <0.001
R39 86.24 79.47 84.85 61.52 <0.001
R40 86.01 79.64 84.64 53.76 <0.001
R41 86.24 79.41 84.88 62.80 <0.001
R42 86.01 79.41 84.64 57.86 <0.001
R43 86.24 79.47 84.82 61.32 <0.001
R44 86.01 79.59 84.67 54.96 <0.001
R45 86.24 79.35 84.85 63.69 <0.001
R46 86.01 79.32 84.64 59.44 <0.001
R47 86.24 79.56 84.88 60.11 <0.001
R48 86.01 79.67 84.64 53.25 <0.001
R49 86.24 79.29 84.82 64.58 <0.001
R50 86.01 79.32 84.67 59.64 <0.001
R51 86.24 79.53 84.85 60.44 <0.001
R52 86.01 79.59 84.64 54.77 <0.001
R53 86.24 79.38 84.88 63.35 <0.001
R54 86.01 79.41 84.64 57.86 <0.001
R55 86.24 79.47 84.82 61.32 <0.001
R56 86.01 79.59 84.67 54.96 <0.001
R57 86.24 79.35 84.85 63.69 <0.001
R58 86.01 79.32 84.64 59.44 <0.001
R59 86.24 79.56 84.88 60.11 <0.001
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.09 49.73 49.38 0.34 0.843
R1 19.94 34.91 30.77 2.04× 102 <0.001
R2 22.34 28.76 23.76 40.57 <0.001
R3 32.10 31.42 22.81 90.63 <0.001
R4 42.60 36.80 26.54 1.99× 102 <0.001
R5 55.15 43.58 31.07 4.04× 102 <0.001
R6 63.58 48.25 33.34 6.29× 102 <0.001
R7 70.18 51.04 37.07 7.66× 102 <0.001
R8 74.26 55.65 39.64 8.47× 102 <0.001
R9 75.36 58.37 40.80 8.49× 102 <0.001
R10 77.84 63.52 43.67 8.57× 102 <0.001
R11 78.52 66.60 47.37 7.33× 102 <0.001
R12 78.91 71.80 50.83 6.47× 102 <0.001
R13 79.64 73.34 51.30 6.79× 102 <0.001
R14 80.38 76.60 53.08 6.88× 102 <0.001
R15 83.14 78.31 53.88 8.01× 102 <0.001
R16 82.87 79.32 55.27 7.42× 102 <0.001
R17 83.25 81.92 55.03 8.46× 102 <0.001
R18 83.25 81.92 55.83 8.03× 102 <0.001
R19 83.11 81.89 57.51 7.08× 102 <0.001
R20 82.75 82.57 58.58 6.64× 102 <0.001
R21 84.73 83.85 58.25 7.95× 102 <0.001
R22 85.56 83.34 59.67 7.37× 102 <0.001
R23 85.56 84.67 58.93 8.20× 102 <0.001
R24 84.29 85.15 58.55 8.11× 102 <0.001
R25 85.24 86.36 59.02 8.70× 102 <0.001
R26 86.04 87.99 59.62 9.41× 102 <0.001
R27 86.18 88.37 60.41 9.19× 102 <0.001
R28 86.36 90.00 59.56 1.07× 103 <0.001
R29 86.07 89.94 60.74 9.81× 102 <0.001
R30 86.27 90.30 61.27 9.78× 102 <0.001
R31 86.12 90.21 61.66 9.45× 102 <0.001
R32 86.66 90.15 60.18 1.05× 103 <0.001
R33 86.78 90.59 58.79 1.17× 103 <0.001
R34 85.86 90.86 57.87 1.21× 103 <0.001
R35 85.33 90.83 58.34 1.16× 103 <0.001
R36 86.36 91.51 57.25 1.32× 103 <0.001
R37 85.38 91.63 59.94 1.12× 103 <0.001
R38 85.95 92.19 60.80 1.12× 103 <0.001
R39 86.66 91.92 61.60 1.08× 103 <0.001
R40 86.21 92.01 60.65 1.13× 103 <0.001
R41 86.69 92.78 60.98 1.18× 103 <0.001
R42 85.53 92.60 61.12 1.12× 103 <0.001
R43 85.80 92.93 61.95 1.10× 103 <0.001
R44 85.65 92.96 60.74 1.18× 103 <0.001
R45 86.33 93.17 60.74 1.22× 103 <0.001
R46 86.39 93.55 62.25 1.15× 103 <0.001
R47 87.10 93.20 62.78 1.11× 103 <0.001
R48 86.15 93.43 63.25 1.07× 103 <0.001
R49 86.92 93.40 62.93 1.11× 103 <0.001
R50 86.39 93.46 63.17 1.09× 103 <0.001
R51 87.57 93.37 63.28 1.11× 103 <0.001
R52 85.27 93.58 63.11 1.07× 103 <0.001
R53 86.75 93.05 63.85 1.02× 103 <0.001
R54 86.27 93.25 63.76 1.03× 103 <0.001
R55 86.57 93.20 65.03 9.60× 102 <0.001
R56 86.98 93.52 65.12 9.90× 102 <0.001
R57 86.66 93.28 65.86 9.20× 102 <0.001
R58 86.72 93.25 66.04 9.09× 102 <0.001
R59 87.22 93.46 65.47 9.71× 102 <0.001
Table 5.21: Left: IM0, Matrix 3; Right: IM10, Matrix 3
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 49.35 48.73 50.62 2.52 0.284
R1 22.25 35.62 30.09 1.49× 102 <0.001
R2 18.34 30.18 22.54 1.34× 102 <0.001
R3 21.75 31.21 19.91 1.32× 102 <0.001
R4 27.22 34.38 21.30 1.45× 102 <0.001
R5 33.43 39.70 22.01 2.57× 102 <0.001
R6 39.29 43.99 26.24 2.52× 102 <0.001
R7 46.18 48.64 28.85 3.33× 102 <0.001
R8 52.19 51.30 31.72 3.73× 102 <0.001
R9 56.80 52.04 34.94 3.62× 102 <0.001
R10 61.24 53.34 37.96 3.83× 102 <0.001
R11 64.76 55.27 39.97 4.29× 102 <0.001
R12 65.77 56.86 40.95 4.34× 102 <0.001
R13 66.12 59.47 42.99 3.91× 102 <0.001
R14 68.58 60.30 42.28 5.01× 102 <0.001
R15 67.04 61.27 43.96 3.99× 102 <0.001
R16 69.02 62.37 44.02 4.67× 102 <0.001
R17 68.73 63.58 43.28 5.03× 102 <0.001
R18 69.38 66.04 42.10 6.17× 102 <0.001
R19 67.31 68.28 42.25 6.06× 102 <0.001
R20 70.59 70.41 44.17 6.54× 102 <0.001
R21 70.83 71.07 44.26 6.74× 102 <0.001
R22 69.73 73.99 46.27 6.41× 102 <0.001
R23 70.36 74.85 45.24 7.34× 102 <0.001
R24 73.11 76.36 46.78 7.73× 102 <0.001
R25 73.43 76.75 49.47 6.60× 102 <0.001
R26 74.53 77.63 50.71 6.56× 102 <0.001
R27 74.53 77.96 51.36 6.36× 102 <0.001
R28 73.96 78.14 50.56 6.68× 102 <0.001
R29 74.35 78.22 50.80 6.68× 102 <0.001
R30 75.92 78.93 50.03 7.70× 102 <0.001
R31 74.94 80.71 49.85 8.29× 102 <0.001
R32 73.67 81.27 49.64 8.40× 102 <0.001
R33 75.71 82.51 49.70 9.38× 102 <0.001
R34 75.03 82.81 50.06 9.19× 102 <0.001
R35 73.91 83.02 49.38 9.47× 102 <0.001
R36 75.53 83.43 49.41 9.99× 102 <0.001
R37 74.20 83.55 48.70 1.02× 103 <0.001
R38 73.34 83.31 48.96 9.77× 102 <0.001
R39 75.21 83.37 47.22 1.12× 103 <0.001
R40 74.97 83.31 46.33 1.16× 103 <0.001
R41 76.24 83.88 46.95 1.19× 103 <0.001
R42 76.45 83.49 47.37 1.14× 103 <0.001
R43 74.67 84.38 48.11 1.11× 103 <0.001
R44 76.51 84.53 49.67 1.06× 103 <0.001
R45 75.47 84.79 49.79 1.05× 103 <0.001
R46 74.91 84.88 49.62 1.06× 103 <0.001
R47 76.33 85.33 49.53 1.12× 103 <0.001
R48 76.80 85.80 50.12 1.12× 103 <0.001
R49 76.66 86.30 50.89 1.10× 103 <0.001
R50 76.78 86.51 51.36 1.09× 103 <0.001
R51 76.57 87.16 51.69 1.11× 103 <0.001
R52 76.60 86.51 50.41 1.14× 103 <0.001
R53 77.49 86.86 49.62 1.23× 103 <0.001
R54 77.43 86.92 48.99 1.27× 103 <0.001
R55 77.84 87.37 49.73 1.27× 103 <0.001
R56 78.22 87.72 49.41 1.32× 103 <0.001
R57 77.25 87.51 49.32 1.29× 103 <0.001
R58 77.16 87.49 49.50 1.28× 103 <0.001
R59 77.57 87.51 50.03 1.25× 103 <0.001
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 48.55 50.33 50.30 2.79 0.247
R1 23.85 39.32 35.86 2.07× 102 <0.001
R2 17.90 36.15 27.96 2.91× 102 <0.001
R3 18.34 36.24 26.15 2.78× 102 <0.001
R4 20.65 38.28 26.30 2.67× 102 <0.001
R5 24.20 41.80 24.20 3.24× 102 <0.001
R6 28.61 43.31 22.60 3.52× 102 <0.001
R7 33.76 43.05 23.22 3.04× 102 <0.001
R8 35.06 44.64 23.08 3.57× 102 <0.001
R9 38.58 47.57 21.45 5.36× 102 <0.001
R10 40.38 49.91 21.04 6.52× 102 <0.001
R11 41.78 52.19 21.01 7.51× 102 <0.001
R12 42.37 52.10 22.46 6.73× 102 <0.001
R13 46.01 53.99 24.05 6.94× 102 <0.001
R14 46.54 53.99 25.44 6.28× 102 <0.001
R15 48.02 53.22 24.32 6.85× 102 <0.001
R16 51.98 52.49 24.05 7.61× 102 <0.001
R17 53.28 54.35 24.35 8.27× 102 <0.001
R18 53.67 57.01 23.70 9.59× 102 <0.001
R19 56.48 58.70 23.17 1.13× 103 <0.001
R20 59.76 61.30 23.52 1.29× 103 <0.001
R21 61.54 63.17 22.66 1.48× 103 <0.001
R22 61.80 63.28 21.60 1.59× 103 <0.001
R23 62.43 65.15 23.17 1.55× 103 <0.001
R24 65.30 66.51 23.88 1.65× 103 <0.001
R25 64.38 66.54 24.70 1.55× 103 <0.001
R26 66.27 66.95 25.71 1.56× 103 <0.001
R27 65.98 68.22 25.74 1.60× 103 <0.001
R28 66.89 68.49 23.34 1.84× 103 <0.001
R29 66.51 68.28 22.31 1.91× 103 <0.001
R30 66.86 69.47 22.19 1.99× 103 <0.001
R31 67.57 71.42 22.54 2.09× 103 <0.001
R32 68.46 72.10 22.99 2.11× 103 <0.001
R33 68.34 70.86 22.75 2.07× 103 <0.001
R34 67.78 71.09 21.57 2.17× 103 <0.001
R35 68.76 71.72 19.85 2.42× 103 <0.001
R36 67.60 71.86 19.35 2.43× 103 <0.001
R37 66.83 73.08 18.28 2.58× 103 <0.001
R38 66.48 74.29 18.52 2.61× 103 <0.001
R39 65.71 74.91 18.52 2.63× 103 <0.001
R40 66.66 74.59 19.35 2.55× 103 <0.001
R41 68.31 74.08 19.29 2.59× 103 <0.001
R42 66.78 74.73 19.41 2.56× 103 <0.001
R43 67.07 74.23 18.85 2.60× 103 <0.001
R44 69.47 75.00 18.61 2.77× 103 <0.001
R45 68.93 74.08 18.46 2.71× 103 <0.001
R46 68.43 73.49 16.98 2.82× 103 <0.001
R47 69.23 72.84 17.04 2.81× 103 <0.001
R48 70.06 73.76 17.34 2.87× 103 <0.001
R49 70.06 74.50 16.57 3.00× 103 <0.001
R50 70.92 75.71 17.07 3.06× 103 <0.001
R51 68.61 77.16 17.63 2.99× 103 <0.001
R52 69.70 77.46 18.91 2.91× 103 <0.001
R53 70.15 78.05 19.91 2.86× 103 <0.001
R54 70.27 78.96 21.39 2.76× 103 <0.001
R55 71.36 80.00 21.75 2.84× 103 <0.001
R56 70.27 80.27 22.10 2.78× 103 <0.001
R57 71.07 81.15 22.28 2.86× 103 <0.001
R58 72.10 80.74 21.54 2.95× 103 <0.001
R59 72.19 81.01 21.04 3.03× 103 <0.001
Table 5.22: Left: IM20, Matrix 3; Right: IM30, Matrix 3
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.62 49.76 49.70 0.71 0.700
R1 31.27 41.89 34.32 87.44 <0.001
R2 24.53 35.03 23.14 1.40× 102 <0.001
R3 23.22 31.18 18.22 1.57× 102 <0.001
R4 21.80 30.38 15.12 2.29× 102 <0.001
R5 23.05 31.30 13.49 3.16× 102 <0.001
R6 24.38 33.05 12.07 4.43× 102 <0.001
R7 23.76 33.52 10.68 5.36× 102 <0.001
R8 23.61 34.20 10.36 5.81× 102 <0.001
R9 24.76 35.77 10.18 6.59× 102 <0.001
R10 27.16 37.46 10.38 7.26× 102 <0.001
R11 29.02 37.75 9.94 7.88× 102 <0.001
R12 31.01 37.75 8.99 8.94× 102 <0.001
R13 33.20 37.69 6.39 1.19× 103 <0.001
R14 34.73 39.23 6.30 1.30× 103 <0.001
R15 36.57 39.97 7.01 1.29× 103 <0.001
R16 35.71 40.30 7.72 1.21× 103 <0.001
R17 35.83 38.34 7.66 1.15× 103 <0.001
R18 36.42 38.88 7.60 1.19× 103 <0.001
R19 37.25 39.64 7.51 1.24× 103 <0.001
R20 36.80 39.02 7.69 1.19× 103 <0.001
R21 35.95 39.64 7.75 1.19× 103 <0.001
R22 37.49 38.43 8.08 1.15× 103 <0.001
R23 37.87 38.17 7.96 1.17× 103 <0.001
R24 37.69 39.17 8.08 1.18× 103 <0.001
R25 39.08 39.67 7.75 1.27× 103 <0.001
R26 38.79 39.41 8.11 1.22× 103 <0.001
R27 40.12 38.55 8.25 1.22× 103 <0.001
R28 40.71 37.51 7.13 1.33× 103 <0.001
R29 40.47 37.28 6.30 1.41× 103 <0.001
R30 42.57 35.89 5.33 1.58× 103 <0.001
R31 42.60 33.34 4.73 1.60× 103 <0.001
R32 43.67 33.40 4.91 1.63× 103 <0.001
R33 42.66 32.75 5.24 1.53× 103 <0.001
R34 42.84 32.10 5.56 1.48× 103 <0.001
R35 42.69 33.08 4.50 1.63× 103 <0.001
R36 44.23 32.90 4.20 1.75× 103 <0.001
R37 44.82 33.05 4.14 1.79× 103 <0.001
R38 42.22 33.91 4.02 1.70× 103 <0.001
R39 41.54 34.38 4.38 1.63× 103 <0.001
R40 41.07 34.79 4.20 1.64× 103 <0.001
R41 40.92 35.30 3.93 1.69× 103 <0.001
R42 42.43 35.50 2.99 1.91× 103 <0.001
R43 42.54 35.47 2.81 1.94× 103 <0.001
R44 43.64 36.18 3.40 1.92× 103 <0.001
R45 43.58 36.15 3.67 1.87× 103 <0.001
R46 43.82 36.51 4.05 1.83× 103 <0.001
R47 44.29 37.04 3.67 1.93× 103 <0.001
R48 46.39 36.07 2.96 2.13× 103 <0.001
R49 45.77 36.95 2.31 2.23× 103 <0.001
R50 46.15 36.33 1.36 2.43× 103 <0.001
R51 45.92 35.36 0.65 2.57× 103 <0.001
R52 44.35 34.79 0.24 2.59× 103 <0.001
R53 45.06 33.99 0.12 2.66× 103 <0.001
R54 45.30 33.76 0.00 2.72× 103 <0.001
R55 44.91 32.63 0.00 2.67× 103 <0.001
R56 42.81 32.34 0.00 2.54× 103 <0.001
R57 43.91 31.63 0.00 2.59× 103 <0.001
R58 43.49 30.68 0.00 2.55× 103 <0.001
R59 42.54 31.66 0.00 2.51× 103 <0.001
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.38 49.62 49.35 0.78 0.676
R1 33.08 43.96 38.55 84.81 <0.001
R2 25.77 40.86 31.45 1.78× 102 <0.001
R3 22.28 40.68 26.18 2.99× 102 <0.001
R4 20.44 40.18 20.83 4.21× 102 <0.001
R5 19.64 38.28 17.66 4.49× 102 <0.001
R6 19.17 38.37 14.35 5.83× 102 <0.001
R7 20.12 37.22 11.95 6.30× 102 <0.001
R8 20.12 36.86 9.97 7.30× 102 <0.001
R9 19.32 36.15 9.11 7.60× 102 <0.001
R10 19.79 36.21 7.34 8.92× 102 <0.001
R11 19.59 36.09 5.21 1.08× 103 <0.001
R12 19.97 34.38 4.73 1.04× 103 <0.001
R13 19.32 34.26 3.73 1.15× 103 <0.001
R14 19.08 32.90 2.10 1.30× 103 <0.001
R15 20.00 32.37 1.48 1.38× 103 <0.001
R16 19.05 32.19 1.09 1.44× 103 <0.001
R17 18.37 31.60 0.56 1.52× 103 <0.001
R18 17.81 30.83 0.27 1.55× 103 <0.001
R19 18.64 29.79 0.12 1.55× 103 <0.001
R20 18.85 28.02 0.03 1.49× 103 <0.001
R21 18.76 26.42 0.00 1.43× 103 <0.001
R22 17.99 26.83 0.00 1.43× 103 <0.001
R23 16.83 26.07 0.00 1.38× 103 <0.001
R24 15.65 26.33 0.00 1.38× 103 <0.001
R25 14.88 24.62 0.00 1.28× 103 <0.001
R26 14.44 23.58 0.00 1.23× 103 <0.001
R27 12.90 22.51 0.00 1.16× 103 <0.001
R28 11.89 21.21 0.00 1.08× 103 <0.001
R29 11.15 19.59 0.00 9.94× 102 <0.001
R30 10.86 17.96 0.00 9.10× 102 <0.001
R31 10.95 16.69 0.00 8.51× 102 <0.001
R32 10.33 16.60 0.00 8.40× 102 <0.001
R33 10.74 15.92 0.00 8.13× 102 <0.001
R34 9.88 14.88 0.00 7.55× 102 <0.001
R35 9.73 14.73 0.00 7.46× 102 <0.001
R36 9.64 13.85 0.00 7.06× 102 <0.001
R37 8.64 12.72 0.00 6.43× 102 <0.001
R38 8.05 13.17 0.00 6.55× 102 <0.001
R39 7.25 12.16 0.00 6.01× 102 <0.001
R40 6.89 12.28 0.00 6.05× 102 <0.001
R41 6.45 12.43 0.00 6.10× 102 <0.001
R42 6.51 12.87 0.00 6.33× 102 <0.001
R43 6.45 12.78 0.00 6.28× 102 <0.001
R44 6.48 11.60 0.00 5.69× 102 <0.001
R45 6.01 10.50 0.00 5.14× 102 <0.001
R46 5.68 9.85 0.00 4.81× 102 <0.001
R47 5.47 9.17 0.00 4.48× 102 <0.001
R48 4.91 7.66 0.00 3.76× 102 <0.001
R49 5.06 7.01 0.00 3.51× 102 <0.001
R50 4.67 6.92 0.00 3.41× 102 <0.001
R51 3.70 7.40 0.00 3.56× 102 <0.001
R52 3.52 7.69 0.00 3.72× 102 <0.001
R53 3.05 7.87 0.00 3.85× 102 <0.001
R54 2.90 7.04 0.00 3.41× 102 <0.001
R55 3.05 6.95 0.00 3.36× 102 <0.001
R56 3.20 6.04 0.00 2.89× 102 <0.001
R57 2.46 5.36 0.00 2.56× 102 <0.001
R58 2.40 5.74 0.00 2.77× 102 <0.001
R59 2.28 5.92 0.00 2.87× 102 <0.001
Table 5.23: Left: IM40, Matrix 3; Right: IM50, Matrix 3
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.44 49.88 48.40 3.01 0.222
R1 35.41 43.67 40.83 49.79 <0.001
R2 27.66 38.70 34.88 96.06 <0.001
R3 22.66 33.58 30.27 1.05× 102 <0.001
R4 18.25 30.06 24.47 1.30× 102 <0.001
R5 15.71 28.64 22.84 1.66× 102 <0.001
R6 13.34 25.77 19.26 1.68× 102 <0.001
R7 11.80 23.88 16.66 1.73× 102 <0.001
R8 9.76 21.27 13.99 1.78× 102 <0.001
R9 8.25 18.43 11.42 1.62× 102 <0.001
R10 7.66 17.81 8.37 2.05× 102 <0.001
R11 6.69 17.75 5.56 3.21× 102 <0.001
R12 6.21 16.15 4.02 3.36× 102 <0.001
R13 6.12 15.47 2.99 3.72× 102 <0.001
R14 5.50 13.93 2.75 3.28× 102 <0.001
R15 5.65 12.04 2.22 2.77× 102 <0.001
R16 5.77 10.86 1.98 2.44× 102 <0.001
R17 5.89 10.53 1.83 2.43× 102 <0.001
R18 5.33 10.27 1.24 2.88× 102 <0.001
R19 5.18 9.64 0.89 3.01× 102 <0.001
R20 5.00 9.76 0.44 3.70× 102 <0.001
R21 5.06 9.82 0.36 3.89× 102 <0.001
R22 4.94 10.03 0.12 4.50× 102 <0.001
R23 4.17 9.26 0.03 4.38× 102 <0.001
R24 3.73 8.91 0.00 4.34× 102 <0.001
R25 3.28 7.99 0.00 3.89× 102 <0.001
R26 2.90 7.46 0.00 3.64× 102 <0.001
R27 2.84 6.86 0.00 3.32× 102 <0.001
R28 3.05 5.92 0.00 2.83× 102 <0.001
R29 2.46 4.91 0.00 2.34× 102 <0.001
R30 2.22 4.70 0.00 2.24× 102 <0.001
R31 1.83 4.08 0.00 1.95× 102 <0.001
R32 1.63 3.49 0.00 1.66× 102 <0.001
R33 1.21 3.40 0.00 1.65× 102 <0.001
R34 0.98 3.20 0.00 1.58× 102 <0.001
R35 0.74 2.93 0.00 1.49× 102 <0.001
R36 0.59 2.72 0.00 1.42× 102 <0.001
R37 0.53 3.43 0.00 1.91× 102 <0.001
R38 0.53 3.58 0.00 2.01× 102 <0.001
R39 0.38 3.55 0.00 2.10× 102 <0.001
R40 0.15 3.28 0.00 2.16× 102 <0.001
R41 0.12 2.72 0.00 1.79× 102 <0.001
R42 0.03 2.54 0.00 1.82× 102 <0.001
R43 0.03 2.37 0.00 1.68× 102 <0.001
R44 0.03 2.01 0.00 1.42× 102 <0.001
R45 0.00 1.89 0.00 1.41× 102 <0.001
R46 0.00 1.66 0.00 1.24× 102 <0.001
R47 0.00 1.69 0.00 1.26× 102 <0.001
R48 0.00 1.54 0.00 1.15× 102 <0.001
R49 0.00 1.51 0.00 1.13× 102 <0.001
R50 0.00 1.60 0.00 1.19× 102 <0.001
R51 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.04× 102 <0.001
R52 0.00 1.07 0.00 79.36 <0.001
R53 0.00 0.86 0.00 63.89 <0.001
R54 0.00 0.89 0.00 66.09 <0.001
R55 0.00 0.59 0.00 44.02 <0.001
R56 0.00 0.50 0.00 37.41 <0.001
R57 0.00 0.38 0.00 28.60 <0.001
R58 0.00 0.30 0.00 21.99 <0.001
R59 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 48.79 48.67 50.56 3.04 0.218
R1 38.93 45.38 43.05 29.58 <0.001
R2 31.60 41.51 36.30 71.81 <0.001
R3 26.66 38.05 31.33 1.02× 102 <0.001
R4 21.33 37.22 26.36 2.18× 102 <0.001
R5 19.59 33.99 24.23 1.88× 102 <0.001
R6 16.69 31.27 22.28 2.03× 102 <0.001
R7 14.14 29.14 19.11 2.37× 102 <0.001
R8 11.48 27.75 17.16 3.00× 102 <0.001
R9 10.77 25.68 13.85 2.90× 102 <0.001
R10 9.08 25.59 10.71 4.14× 102 <0.001
R11 7.96 25.00 9.47 4.68× 102 <0.001
R12 6.42 22.51 7.78 4.72× 102 <0.001
R13 4.94 20.53 6.80 4.82× 102 <0.001
R14 4.50 18.40 5.86 4.31× 102 <0.001
R15 4.17 17.16 5.24 4.08× 102 <0.001
R16 3.28 14.82 3.99 3.87× 102 <0.001
R17 2.19 14.02 3.73 4.28× 102 <0.001
R18 1.30 12.57 2.90 4.59× 102 <0.001
R19 1.09 10.83 2.13 4.13× 102 <0.001
R20 1.01 9.64 1.89 3.63× 102 <0.001
R21 0.65 8.40 1.57 3.43× 102 <0.001
R22 0.44 7.40 1.48 3.11× 102 <0.001
R23 0.44 7.10 1.15 3.11× 102 <0.001
R24 0.33 6.07 0.86 2.80× 102 <0.001
R25 0.30 5.53 0.68 2.63× 102 <0.001
R26 0.18 5.15 0.30 2.92× 102 <0.001
R27 0.03 4.79 0.33 2.93× 102 <0.001
R28 0.00 3.96 0.33 2.44× 102 <0.001
R29 0.00 3.40 0.24 2.14× 102 <0.001
R30 0.00 3.25 0.21 2.06× 102 <0.001
R31 0.00 3.22 0.15 2.12× 102 <0.001
R32 0.00 3.28 0.06 2.31× 102 <0.001
R33 0.00 3.17 0.00 2.37× 102 <0.001
R34 0.00 3.20 0.00 2.40× 102 <0.001
R35 0.00 2.72 0.00 2.04× 102 <0.001
R36 0.00 2.51 0.00 1.88× 102 <0.001
R37 0.00 2.54 0.00 1.90× 102 <0.001
R38 0.00 2.16 0.00 1.61× 102 <0.001
R39 0.00 2.13 0.00 1.59× 102 <0.001
R40 0.00 1.75 0.00 1.30× 102 <0.001
R41 0.00 1.78 0.00 1.33× 102 <0.001
R42 0.00 1.45 0.00 1.08× 102 <0.001
R43 0.00 1.39 0.00 1.04× 102 <0.001
R44 0.00 1.36 0.00 1.01× 102 <0.001
R45 0.00 1.27 0.00 94.85 <0.001
R46 0.00 0.98 0.00 72.72 <0.001
R47 0.00 0.71 0.00 52.85 <0.001
R48 0.00 0.38 0.00 28.60 <0.001
R49 0.00 0.47 0.00 35.21 <0.001
R50 0.00 0.41 0.00 30.80 <0.001
R51 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R52 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R53 0.00 0.33 0.00 24.19 <0.001
R54 0.00 0.36 0.00 26.40 <0.001
R55 0.00 0.30 0.00 21.99 <0.001
R56 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R57 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R58 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R59 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
Table 5.24: Left: IM60, Matrix 3; Right: IM70, Matrix 3
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 49.67 49.47 49.53 3.08× 10−2 0.985
R1 42.28 49.82 44.88 40.00 <0.001
R2 37.43 46.98 39.35 70.98 <0.001
R3 34.91 43.76 34.02 82.80 <0.001
R4 31.89 40.59 31.42 78.77 <0.001
R5 28.28 38.76 28.31 1.12× 102 <0.001
R6 24.67 35.77 24.44 1.37× 102 <0.001
R7 22.13 32.31 22.04 1.21× 102 <0.001
R8 19.50 31.60 20.38 1.65× 102 <0.001
R9 16.75 30.50 16.89 2.42× 102 <0.001
R10 14.88 27.72 14.62 2.36× 102 <0.001
R11 13.20 25.47 13.31 2.25× 102 <0.001
R12 11.12 23.52 11.04 2.57× 102 <0.001
R13 9.14 21.42 8.88 2.87× 102 <0.001
R14 7.13 19.85 6.92 3.47× 102 <0.001
R15 5.83 17.31 5.62 3.26× 102 <0.001
R16 5.12 15.21 5.15 2.75× 102 <0.001
R17 4.82 13.34 3.70 2.62× 102 <0.001
R18 4.02 12.51 2.96 2.87× 102 <0.001
R19 3.37 10.65 2.54 2.42× 102 <0.001
R20 2.66 9.50 2.43 2.19× 102 <0.001
R21 2.19 9.35 2.25 2.43× 102 <0.001
R22 1.92 8.20 1.66 2.28× 102 <0.001
R23 1.33 7.31 1.18 2.43× 102 <0.001
R24 1.18 6.39 1.04 2.10× 102 <0.001
R25 1.04 5.30 0.86 1.70× 102 <0.001
R26 0.77 5.03 0.41 2.10× 102 <0.001
R27 0.62 4.53 0.53 1.78× 102 <0.001
R28 0.68 3.96 0.50 1.43× 102 <0.001
R29 0.77 3.49 0.27 1.34× 102 <0.001
R30 0.59 3.46 0.30 1.38× 102 <0.001
R31 0.68 2.96 0.36 98.49 <0.001
R32 0.62 3.49 0.36 1.32× 102 <0.001
R33 0.47 3.22 0.24 1.38× 102 <0.001
R34 0.44 2.90 0.21 1.23× 102 <0.001
R35 0.38 2.96 0.18 1.35× 102 <0.001
R36 0.38 2.43 0.18 1.02× 102 <0.001
R37 0.27 2.04 0.09 97.32 <0.001
R38 0.27 1.98 0.06 98.25 <0.001
R39 0.33 1.83 0.09 80.44 <0.001
R40 0.33 1.98 0.06 94.35 <0.001
R41 0.27 1.63 0.03 81.01 <0.001
R42 0.33 1.39 0.06 58.29 <0.001
R43 0.18 1.12 0.09 46.13 <0.001
R44 0.09 0.62 0.09 22.47 <0.001
R45 0.06 0.65 0.09 26.80 <0.001
R46 0.00 0.68 0.12 36.76 <0.001
R47 0.00 0.65 0.03 42.40 <0.001
R48 0.00 0.56 0.00 41.82 <0.001
R49 0.00 0.53 0.00 39.61 <0.001
R50 0.00 0.47 0.00 35.21 <0.001
R51 0.00 0.44 0.00 33.00 <0.001
R52 0.00 0.30 0.00 21.99 <0.001
R53 0.00 0.30 0.00 21.99 <0.001
R54 0.00 0.27 0.00 19.79 <0.001
R55 0.00 0.30 0.00 21.99 <0.001
R56 0.00 0.21 0.00 15.39 <0.001
R57 0.00 0.21 0.00 15.39 <0.001
R58 0.00 0.21 0.00 15.39 <0.001
R59 0.00 0.21 0.00 15.39 <0.001
Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 50.41 49.70 49.47 0.66 0.720
R1 46.60 47.31 47.75 0.92 0.632
R2 43.05 46.51 46.57 11.10 0.004
R3 42.16 44.76 41.83 7.10 0.029
R4 39.20 42.34 40.80 6.89 0.032
R5 37.01 40.68 37.75 10.72 0.005
R6 35.18 38.55 35.83 9.31 0.010
R7 33.85 37.69 34.50 12.48 0.002
R8 32.28 36.33 33.46 13.04 0.001
R9 31.60 35.86 31.01 21.34 <0.001
R10 29.11 33.85 28.99 24.15 <0.001
R11 28.52 32.49 27.22 24.33 <0.001
R12 26.24 32.28 26.75 36.83 <0.001
R13 25.30 31.60 24.94 47.12 <0.001
R14 23.85 30.95 23.37 62.10 <0.001
R15 22.43 30.92 21.48 95.52 <0.001
R16 21.86 30.18 20.38 1.01× 102 <0.001
R17 20.77 28.82 18.82 1.06× 102 <0.001
R18 20.18 27.43 18.02 94.31 <0.001
R19 19.88 26.78 16.15 1.17× 102 <0.001
R20 18.46 25.33 14.62 1.26× 102 <0.001
R21 17.10 24.79 13.43 1.49× 102 <0.001
R22 15.98 23.02 12.78 1.28× 102 <0.001
R23 15.59 21.92 12.51 1.10× 102 <0.001
R24 15.53 20.62 11.09 1.17× 102 <0.001
R25 14.08 20.24 10.92 1.17× 102 <0.001
R26 12.84 19.44 10.15 1.25× 102 <0.001
R27 12.07 19.02 9.32 1.42× 102 <0.001
R28 11.39 18.64 9.94 1.23× 102 <0.001
R29 11.15 17.78 9.47 1.13× 102 <0.001
R30 10.74 17.31 7.84 1.48× 102 <0.001
R31 9.35 16.92 7.40 1.65× 102 <0.001
R32 8.85 16.15 6.89 1.63× 102 <0.001
R33 8.28 15.74 6.75 1.63× 102 <0.001
R34 7.87 15.06 5.89 1.74× 102 <0.001
R35 6.78 15.12 5.89 1.97× 102 <0.001
R36 6.30 14.23 4.88 2.10× 102 <0.001
R37 5.65 13.49 4.79 1.99× 102 <0.001
R38 6.07 12.66 4.56 1.68× 102 <0.001
R39 5.83 12.54 4.20 1.82× 102 <0.001
R40 5.50 11.95 3.52 1.95× 102 <0.001
R41 5.30 11.75 3.05 2.15× 102 <0.001
R42 4.50 11.54 2.96 2.27× 102 <0.001
R43 4.44 10.98 2.43 2.34× 102 <0.001
R44 3.93 10.74 2.28 2.45× 102 <0.001
R45 3.17 10.38 2.49 2.39× 102 <0.001
R46 2.87 10.18 1.92 2.74× 102 <0.001
R47 2.25 9.44 1.39 2.99× 102 <0.001
R48 2.07 8.99 1.33 2.87× 102 <0.001
R49 2.10 9.08 1.33 2.91× 102 <0.001
R50 2.22 8.88 1.42 2.67× 102 <0.001
R51 1.89 8.73 1.39 2.76× 102 <0.001
R52 1.69 8.96 1.42 2.99× 102 <0.001
R53 1.75 8.67 1.66 2.63× 102 <0.001
R54 1.51 8.40 1.39 2.80× 102 <0.001
R55 1.57 7.25 1.51 2.05× 102 <0.001
R56 1.27 6.60 1.21 2.05× 102 <0.001
R57 0.89 6.57 1.04 2.41× 102 <0.001
R58 0.62 6.39 0.95 2.60× 102 <0.001
R59 0.59 6.07 0.95 2.43× 102 <0.001
Table 5.25: Left: IM80, Matrix 3; Right: IM90, Matrix 3
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Round Grid ER5 ER8 G-test G-test
C % C % C % stat. p-val.
R0 49.85 49.38 48.58 1.12 0.572
R1 50.03 48.40 48.46 2.30 0.316
R2 50.65 47.40 46.98 10.93 0.004
R3 50.30 47.04 47.37 8.70 0.013
R4 49.73 47.04 47.51 5.59 0.061
R5 48.49 47.69 47.57 0.67 0.714
R6 49.38 46.72 48.46 4.96 0.084
R7 49.62 47.13 47.75 4.53 0.104
R8 49.64 46.27 47.25 8.16 0.017
R9 50.30 45.21 48.64 18.26 <0.001
R10 50.27 44.73 50.00 26.39 <0.001
R11 49.82 44.41 50.18 28.35 <0.001
R12 50.86 44.56 50.27 32.83 <0.001
R13 50.92 43.73 49.23 38.36 <0.001
R14 50.80 42.13 48.58 55.16 <0.001
R15 51.18 41.54 47.99 65.72 <0.001
R16 51.27 41.80 47.78 62.37 <0.001
R17 50.65 41.39 47.37 60.07 <0.001
R18 50.44 42.63 48.49 44.93 <0.001
R19 49.23 42.60 48.25 34.85 <0.001
R20 48.61 41.78 47.96 38.83 <0.001
R21 49.79 42.43 48.76 43.28 <0.001
R22 48.46 40.92 49.56 60.40 <0.001
R23 47.60 39.35 48.43 69.23 <0.001
R24 48.17 38.05 48.61 98.21 <0.001
R25 48.58 38.58 47.78 84.90 <0.001
R26 47.96 39.05 47.87 71.92 <0.001
R27 47.69 38.88 46.45 62.73 <0.001
R28 46.54 38.02 45.95 62.66 <0.001
R29 46.39 37.75 44.79 58.63 <0.001
R30 45.47 36.18 42.96 64.68 <0.001
R31 45.74 36.95 42.13 54.46 <0.001
R32 44.82 36.12 41.63 54.39 <0.001
R33 44.50 36.01 41.04 51.31 <0.001
R34 43.79 35.71 38.43 47.74 <0.001
R35 44.85 36.54 37.57 57.67 <0.001
R36 42.78 35.33 36.98 43.61 <0.001
R37 42.87 36.66 38.40 29.01 <0.001
R38 42.49 37.96 37.19 23.13 <0.001
R39 43.08 38.11 37.07 29.06 <0.001
R40 41.24 37.99 36.36 17.60 <0.001
R41 40.59 37.07 36.30 14.96 <0.001
R42 39.62 38.17 37.04 4.76 0.092
R43 39.82 37.46 36.54 8.23 0.016
R44 39.70 36.30 37.07 9.14 0.010
R45 40.36 35.21 37.25 19.34 <0.001
R46 39.41 36.21 36.92 8.10 0.017
R47 40.00 36.57 37.57 8.91 0.012
R48 40.27 36.45 38.64 10.49 0.005
R49 41.09 35.95 40.30 21.90 <0.001
R50 41.48 36.21 38.40 19.93 <0.001
R51 40.65 36.83 37.99 10.92 0.004
R52 41.39 36.72 38.73 15.62 <0.001
R53 40.71 36.33 39.32 14.29 <0.001
R54 40.21 37.25 41.33 12.61 0.002
R55 41.66 36.42 41.69 26.06 <0.001
R56 42.60 36.18 41.92 35.18 <0.001
R57 42.66 37.07 41.80 25.56 <0.001
R58 42.40 36.95 41.98 25.91 <0.001
R59 43.08 37.43 41.36 23.60 <0.001
Table 5.26: IM100, Matrix 3
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Anti-Correlation of Earnings and Cooperation - Full Tables
Full tables for the anti-correlation analysis of Section 4.2.3 are given here. For tables
comparing scores of cooperators to scores of defectors among diﬀerent agent types, shaded
rows indicate that the average score for defection is higher than that of cooperation, and
that the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.05). For tables calculating the Pearson
Correlation, shaded rows indicate that the correlation between cooperation rate and score
is negative and statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.05). Captions give the network type and
reward matrix associated with each table.
Agent Avg. C Avg. D ANOVA ANOVA
Score Score stat. p-val.
BACTD0 5.14 10.16 7.04× 104 <0.001
BACTD1 3.00 8.17 8.68× 104 <0.001
BACTD10 2.58 7.71 7.90× 104 <0.001
BACTS0 7.13 12.23 5.85× 104 <0.001
BACTS1 3.93 9.05 8.33× 104 <0.001
BACTS10 3.28 8.40 8.22× 104 <0.001
IM0 3.61 5.23 1.42× 103 <0.001
IM10 3.93 5.26 1.26× 103 <0.001
IM20 3.23 5.23 2.21× 103 <0.001
IM30 3.33 5.25 2.37× 103 <0.001
IM40 3.22 5.26 2.86× 103 <0.001
IM50 3.08 5.28 3.32× 103 <0.001
IM60 3.18 5.31 3.74× 103 <0.001
IM70 2.73 5.36 6.69× 103 <0.001
IM80 2.80 5.45 8.43× 103 <0.001
IM90 3.03 5.84 1.45× 104 <0.001
IM100 5.76 8.82 2.29× 104 <0.001
Agent Avg. C Avg. D ANOVA ANOVA
Score Score stat. p-val.
BACTD0 8.28 16.80 1.34× 105 <0.001
BACTD1 5.16 13.57 1.34× 105 <0.001
BACTD10 4.11 12.64 1.32× 105 <0.001
BACTS0 11.81 20.30 9.81× 104 <0.001
BACTS1 6.63 15.12 1.39× 105 <0.001
BACTS10 5.37 13.85 1.41× 105 <0.001
IM0 7.77 8.57 1.25× 102 <0.001
IM10 7.18 8.58 4.21× 102 <0.001
IM20 6.78 8.59 7.82× 102 <0.001
IM30 6.38 8.62 1.36× 103 <0.001
IM40 6.18 8.65 1.85× 103 <0.001
IM50 5.53 8.68 3.52× 103 <0.001
IM60 5.54 8.73 4.05× 103 <0.001
IM70 5.04 8.83 7.32× 103 <0.001
IM80 5.08 9.05 1.10× 104 <0.001
IM90 4.92 9.61 2.17× 104 <0.001
IM100 9.82 15.95 5.16× 104 <0.001
Table 5.27: Left: ER5, Matrix 1; Right: ER8, Matrix 1
Agent Avg. C Avg. D ANOVA ANOVA
Score Score stat. p-val.
BACTD0 8.01 16.01 4.07× 105 <0.001
BACTD1 4.74 12.76 4.07× 105 <0.001
BACTD10 4.00 11.93 3.98× 105 <0.001
BACTS0 11.11 19.11 4.10× 105 <0.001
BACTS1 6.26 14.21 3.96× 105 <0.001
BACTS10 5.05 13.05 4.07× 105 <0.001
IM0 7.82 8.07 1.49× 102 <0.001
IM10 7.44 8.08 1.04× 103 <0.001
IM20 6.61 8.10 5.57× 103 <0.001
IM30 6.25 8.12 8.84× 103 <0.001
IM40 5.78 8.15 1.45× 104 <0.001
IM50 5.64 8.18 1.66× 104 <0.001
IM60 5.40 8.23 2.09× 104 <0.001
IM70 5.17 8.32 2.65× 104 <0.001
IM80 4.94 8.45 3.38× 104 <0.001
IM90 5.22 8.93 3.92× 104 <0.001
IM100 9.22 13.53 5.65× 104 <0.001
Agent Avg. C Avg. D ANOVA ANOVA
Score Score stat. p-val.
BACTD0 2.51 3.58 1.56× 104 <0.001
BACTD1 2.24 3.10 1.10× 104 <0.001
BACTD10 1.82 2.67 1.15× 104 <0.001
BACTS0 3.56 4.99 1.99× 104 <0.001
BACTS1 2.91 4.07 1.64× 104 <0.001
BACTS10 2.16 3.00 1.09× 104 <0.001
IM0 3.75 1.35 5.63× 104 <0.001
IM10 3.04 0.89 5.14× 104 <0.001
IM20 2.68 0.83 3.94× 104 <0.001
IM30 2.16 0.53 3.06× 104 <0.001
IM40 1.80 0.23 2.89× 104 <0.001
IM50 1.59 0.20 2.26× 104 <0.001
IM60 1.59 0.19 2.22× 104 <0.001
IM70 1.43 0.22 1.67× 104 <0.001
IM80 1.60 0.38 1.61× 104 <0.001
IM90 1.71 0.67 1.13× 104 <0.001
IM100 2.90 3.02 1.37× 102 <0.001
Table 5.28: Left: Grid, Matrix 1; Right: ER5, Matrix 2
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Agent Avg. C Avg. D ANOVA ANOVA
Score Score stat. p-val.
BACTD0 4.25 5.97 2.44× 104 <0.001
BACTD1 3.72 5.27 2.21× 104 <0.001
BACTD10 3.00 4.30 1.65× 104 <0.001
BACTS0 5.90 8.27 3.30× 104 <0.001
BACTS1 4.89 6.84 2.80× 104 <0.001
BACTS10 3.56 4.98 1.86× 104 <0.001
IM0 5.69 1.52 8.20× 104 <0.001
IM10 4.62 0.70 7.32× 104 <0.001
IM20 3.56 0.44 4.84× 104 <0.001
IM30 3.22 0.62 3.50× 104 <0.001
IM40 2.71 0.19 3.11× 104 <0.001
IM50 2.51 0.30 2.55× 104 <0.001
IM60 2.55 0.29 2.55× 104 <0.001
IM70 2.49 0.35 2.26× 104 <0.001
IM80 2.37 0.54 1.72× 104 <0.001
IM90 2.32 1.14 7.76× 103 <0.001
IM100 4.91 5.33 9.38× 102 <0.001
Agent Avg. C Avg. D ANOVA ANOVA
Score Score stat. p-val.
BACTD0 3.96 5.53 4.24× 104 <0.001
BACTD1 3.44 4.94 3.80× 104 <0.001
BACTD10 2.79 4.04 2.56× 104 <0.001
BACTS0 5.57 7.77 9.55× 104 <0.001
BACTS1 4.57 6.40 5.98× 104 <0.001
BACTS10 3.28 4.59 2.74× 104 <0.001
IM0 6.88 0.52 5.58× 105 <0.001
IM10 5.13 0.21 2.00× 105 <0.001
IM20 4.32 0.14 1.24× 105 <0.001
IM30 3.06 8.79× 10−2 4.97× 104 <0.001
IM40 2.83 0.10 4.33× 104 <0.001
IM50 2.79 0.13 4.14× 104 <0.001
IM60 2.71 0.17 3.82× 104 <0.001
IM70 2.55 0.23 3.21× 104 <0.001
IM80 2.57 0.38 2.96× 104 <0.001
IM90 2.81 0.90 2.35× 104 <0.001
IM100 4.87 4.15 4.29× 103 <0.001
Table 5.29: Left: ER8, Matrix 2; Right: Grid, Matrix 2
Agent Avg. C Avg. D ANOVA ANOVA
Score Score stat. p-val.
BACTD0 25.71 30.54 4.25× 103 <0.001
BACTD1 23.67 28.64 4.78× 103 <0.001
BACTD10 19.61 24.97 6.27× 103 <0.001
BACTS0 35.69 40.82 3.09× 103 <0.001
BACTS1 32.52 37.48 3.40× 103 <0.001
BACTS10 25.33 30.20 4.35× 103 <0.001
IM0 45.19 22.51 4.05× 104 <0.001
IM10 47.41 21.81 4.20× 104 <0.001
IM20 46.11 19.14 6.14× 104 <0.001
IM30 42.35 21.69 4.28× 104 <0.001
IM40 35.92 14.03 6.59× 104 <0.001
IM50 26.89 11.96 3.49× 104 <0.001
IM60 19.80 8.51 2.08× 104 <0.001
IM70 19.58 8.87 1.87× 104 <0.001
IM80 20.41 9.06 2.06× 104 <0.001
IM90 22.97 12.69 1.58× 104 <0.001
IM100 25.12 22.57 9.57× 102 <0.001
Agent Avg. C Avg. D ANOVA ANOVA
Score Score stat. p-val.
BACTD0 41.27 50.24 9.23× 103 <0.001
BACTD1 38.46 47.37 9.36× 103 <0.001
BACTD10 33.37 41.89 9.51× 103 <0.001
BACTS0 58.96 67.36 4.98× 103 <0.001
BACTS1 53.01 61.48 6.23× 103 <0.001
BACTS10 42.06 50.48 8.02× 103 <0.001
IM0 76.79 34.74 6.88× 104 <0.001
IM10 72.61 23.53 1.44× 105 <0.001
IM20 69.73 20.59 1.61× 105 <0.001
IM30 53.63 17.47 9.24× 104 <0.001
IM40 42.44 11.79 6.69× 104 <0.001
IM50 30.20 10.90 2.79× 104 <0.001
IM60 31.20 11.25 2.95× 104 <0.001
IM70 28.93 11.93 2.23× 104 <0.001
IM80 26.02 12.66 1.42× 104 <0.001
IM90 26.57 17.84 6.47× 103 <0.001
IM100 45.19 39.03 2.82× 103 <0.001
Table 5.30: Left: ER5, Matrix 3; Right: ER8, Matrix 3
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Agent Avg. C Avg. D ANOVA ANOVA
Score Score stat. p-val.
BACTD0 39.89 48.04 1.69× 104 <0.001
BACTD1 36.53 44.65 1.69× 104 <0.001
BACTD10 31.26 39.20 1.58× 104 <0.001
BACTS0 55.77 63.75 1.62× 104 <0.001
BACTS1 50.30 58.12 1.54× 104 <0.001
BACTS10 40.07 47.89 1.52× 104 <0.001
IM0 73.11 38.85 1.29× 105 <0.001
IM10 75.50 25.27 4.00× 105 <0.001
IM20 71.06 26.42 2.77× 105 <0.001
IM30 64.23 29.73 1.47× 105 <0.001
IM40 57.99 21.70 1.61× 105 <0.001
IM50 44.07 13.39 1.09× 105 <0.001
IM60 35.53 10.52 6.76× 104 <0.001
IM70 29.35 10.56 3.86× 104 <0.001
IM80 29.52 11.65 3.48× 104 <0.001
IM90 30.57 16.72 2.19× 104 <0.001
IM100 46.32 36.36 1.23× 104 <0.001
Table 5.31: Grid, Matrix 3
Agent Avg. Avg. Pearson Pearson
C % Score coef. p-val.
BACTD0 49.34 7.68 -0.38 <0.001
BACTD1 29.50 6.65 -0.43 <0.001
BACTD10 24.95 6.43 -0.42 <0.001
BACTS0 69.32 8.70 -0.07 <0.001
BACTS1 38.20 7.10 -0.11 <0.001
BACTS10 31.85 6.77 -0.10 <0.001
IM0 1.51 5.21 -0.11 <0.001
IM10 2.17 5.23 -0.08 <0.001
IM20 1.51 5.20 -0.14 <0.001
IM30 1.78 5.21 -0.12 <0.001
IM40 1.92 5.22 -0.13 <0.001
IM50 2.16 5.23 -0.12 <0.001
IM60 2.50 5.26 -0.09 <0.001
IM70 3.17 5.28 -0.14 <0.001
IM80 4.29 5.34 -0.14 <0.001
IM90 9.00 5.59 -0.09 <0.001
IM100 44.93 7.44 -0.02 0.376
Agent Avg. Avg. Pearson Pearson
C % Score coef. p-val.
BACTD0 48.93 12.63 -0.51 <0.001
BACTD1 30.03 11.04 -0.51 <0.001
BACTD10 24.39 10.56 -0.53 <0.001
BACTS0 69.58 14.39 -0.10 <0.001
BACTS1 39.11 11.80 -0.13 <0.001
BACTS10 31.61 11.17 -0.14 <0.001
IM0 0.89 8.56 -0.09 <0.001
IM10 0.99 8.57 -0.09 <0.001
IM20 1.07 8.57 -0.07 <0.001
IM30 1.27 8.59 -0.03 0.076
IM40 1.49 8.61 -0.03 0.051
IM50 1.69 8.63 -0.07 <0.001
IM60 2.09 8.66 -0.06 <0.001
IM70 2.86 8.73 -0.06 <0.001
IM80 4.54 8.87 -0.08 <0.001
IM90 8.58 9.21 -0.07 <0.001
IM100 51.01 12.82 -0.03 0.136
Table 5.32: Left: ER5, Matrix 1; Right: ER8, Matrix 1
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Agent Avg. Avg. Pearson Pearson
C % Score coef. p-val.
BACTD0 50.05 12.00 -0.82 <0.001
BACTD1 29.69 10.38 -0.83 <0.001
BACTD10 24.68 9.97 -0.82 <0.001
BACTS0 69.45 13.56 -0.82 <0.001
BACTS1 38.94 11.12 -0.80 <0.001
BACTS10 31.56 10.52 -0.82 <0.001
IM0 0.83 8.07 -0.82 <0.001
IM10 0.94 8.08 -0.78 <0.001
IM20 1.03 8.08 -0.75 <0.001
IM30 1.19 8.10 -0.73 <0.001
IM40 1.48 8.12 -0.70 <0.001
IM50 1.69 8.14 -0.60 <0.001
IM60 2.17 8.17 -0.57 <0.001
IM70 2.83 8.23 -0.36 <0.001
IM80 3.94 8.32 -0.22 <0.001
IM90 7.97 8.64 -0.01 0.571
IM100 44.92 11.59 0.35 <0.001
Agent Avg. Avg. Pearson Pearson
C % Score coef. p-val.
BACTD0 49.48 3.05 -0.22 <0.001
BACTD1 43.17 2.73 -0.18 <0.001
BACTD10 36.83 2.36 -0.24 <0.001
BACTS0 69.33 4.00 -0.04 0.018
BACTS1 56.66 3.41 -0.06 <0.001
BACTS10 41.80 2.65 -0.03 0.099
IM0 40.70 2.32 0.06 0.001
IM10 23.12 1.39 0.01 0.651
IM20 19.61 1.20 0.03 0.058
IM30 11.41 0.72 0.10 <0.001
IM40 5.07 0.31 0.14 <0.001
IM50 4.18 0.26 0.03 0.112
IM60 4.17 0.25 0.03 0.096
IM70 4.63 0.28 -0.01 0.704
IM80 7.35 0.47 0.16 <0.001
IM90 12.63 0.80 0.11 <0.001
IM100 49.16 2.96 0.03 0.043
Table 5.33: Left: Grid, Matrix 1; Right: ER5, Matrix 2
Agent Avg. Avg. Pearson Pearson
C % Score coef. p-val.
BACTD0 50.13 5.11 -0.26 <0.001
BACTD1 44.17 4.59 -0.27 <0.001
BACTD10 35.99 3.83 -0.26 <0.001
BACTS0 69.58 6.62 -0.06 <0.001
BACTS1 57.58 5.72 -0.05 0.002
BACTS10 41.90 4.38 -0.07 <0.001
IM0 26.97 2.64 0.04 0.015
IM10 11.17 1.14 0.07 <0.001
IM20 6.00 0.63 0.03 0.145
IM30 7.69 0.82 0.15 <0.001
IM40 2.40 0.25 0.07 <0.001
IM50 3.48 0.37 0.11 <0.001
IM60 3.39 0.37 0.10 <0.001
IM70 4.02 0.43 0.14 <0.001
IM80 5.98 0.65 0.14 <0.001
IM90 11.66 1.27 0.14 <0.001
IM100 51.65 5.12 0.02 0.194
Agent Avg. Avg. Pearson Pearson
C % Score coef. p-val.
BACTD0 49.42 4.75 -0.43 <0.001
BACTD1 43.64 4.29 -0.47 <0.001
BACTD10 35.65 3.60 -0.43 <0.001
BACTS0 69.53 6.24 -0.57 <0.001
BACTS1 57.16 5.36 -0.47 <0.001
BACTS10 41.00 4.05 -0.35 <0.001
IM0 24.80 2.10 -0.11 <0.001
IM10 4.95 0.45 -0.22 <0.001
IM20 2.68 0.25 0.00 0.932
IM30 1.25 0.13 -0.04 0.021
IM40 1.43 0.14 0.09 <0.001
IM50 1.80 0.18 0.30 <0.001
IM60 2.23 0.23 0.41 <0.001
IM70 2.88 0.29 0.45 <0.001
IM80 4.72 0.48 0.58 <0.001
IM90 10.99 1.11 0.72 <0.001
IM100 48.65 4.50 0.83 <0.001
Table 5.34: Left: ER8, Matrix 2; Right: Grid, Matrix 2
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Agent Avg. Avg. Pearson Pearson
C % Score coef. p-val.
BACTD0 49.79 28.13 -0.10 <0.001
BACTD1 45.93 26.36 -0.12 <0.001
BACTD10 38.60 22.90 -0.16 <0.001
BACTS0 69.49 37.26 -0.02 0.212
BACTS1 63.14 34.35 0.00 0.949
BACTS10 48.99 27.81 0.00 0.857
IM0 74.06 39.30 0.16 <0.001
IM10 80.49 42.41 0.07 <0.001
IM20 71.99 38.56 0.09 <0.001
IM30 64.49 35.01 0.08 <0.001
IM40 35.96 21.90 0.10 <0.001
IM50 21.66 15.19 0.14 <0.001
IM60 9.89 9.63 0.04 0.021
IM70 10.74 10.02 0.05 0.007
IM80 11.49 10.37 0.05 0.004
IM90 21.11 14.86 0.05 0.008
IM100 39.95 23.59 0.10 <0.001
Agent Avg. Avg. Pearson Pearson
C % Score coef. p-val.
BACTD0 49.06 45.84 -0.18 <0.001
BACTD1 45.81 43.29 -0.18 <0.001
BACTD10 39.24 38.55 -0.18 <0.001
BACTS0 69.44 61.53 -0.02 0.213
BACTS1 62.47 56.19 -0.03 0.076
BACTS10 49.51 46.31 -0.02 0.155
IM0 76.67 66.98 0.05 0.002
IM10 55.20 50.62 0.02 0.217
IM20 44.48 42.45 0.02 0.351
IM30 22.39 25.56 0.05 0.002
IM40 7.29 14.02 0.02 0.254
IM50 4.27 11.72 0.03 0.142
IM60 4.93 12.23 0.02 0.172
IM70 5.87 12.92 0.00 0.930
IM80 6.66 13.55 0.04 0.026
IM90 13.90 19.06 0.03 0.141
IM100 43.58 41.72 0.02 0.184
Table 5.35: Left: ER5, Matrix 3; Right: ER8, Matrix 3
Agent Avg. Avg. Pearson Pearson
C % Score coef. p-val.
BACTD0 49.96 43.97 -0.30 <0.001
BACTD1 45.75 40.94 -0.31 <0.001
BACTD10 39.03 36.10 -0.30 <0.001
BACTS0 69.70 58.19 -0.28 <0.001
BACTS1 62.79 53.21 -0.22 <0.001
BACTS10 49.98 43.98 -0.25 <0.001
IM0 81.75 66.86 0.18 <0.001
IM10 79.33 65.12 0.29 <0.001
IM20 67.33 56.47 0.34 <0.001
IM30 57.95 49.72 0.53 <0.001
IM40 38.36 35.62 0.53 <0.001
IM50 13.04 17.39 0.68 <0.001
IM60 5.36 11.86 0.70 <0.001
IM70 4.80 11.46 0.65 <0.001
IM80 6.75 12.86 0.74 <0.001
IM90 14.99 18.79 0.72 <0.001
IM100 45.71 40.91 0.81 <0.001
Table 5.36: Grid, Matrix 3
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Cooperation Hysteresis - Full Tables
Full tables for the hysteresis portion of the MCC analysis of Section 4.2.4 are given here.
For each table, we compare cooperation rates after either cooperating or defecting on the
last turn. Shaded rows indicate that cooperation is higher after previously cooperating
than it is after previously defecting (i.e. hysteresis is observed) and that the diﬀerence
is statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.05). Captions give the network type and reward matrix
associated with each table.
Agent C After C After G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 68.42 30.77 2.90× 104 <0.001
BACTD1 56.94 17.92 2.91× 104 <0.001
BACTD10 58.47 13.78 3.64× 104 <0.001
BACTS0 69.26 69.49 1.12 0.290
BACTS1 37.34 38.66 34.86 <0.001
BACTS10 31.74 31.82 0.14 0.707
IM0 44.27 0.04 1.13× 104 <0.001
IM10 52.87 0.21 1.68× 104 <0.001
IM20 33.77 0.20 7.34× 103 <0.001
IM30 34.40 0.36 7.87× 103 <0.001
IM40 32.13 0.48 7.31× 103 <0.001
IM50 30.61 0.70 6.97× 103 <0.001
IM60 27.25 1.05 6.01× 103 <0.001
IM70 30.98 1.45 7.95× 103 <0.001
IM80 30.06 2.31 8.21× 103 <0.001
IM90 29.73 6.16 8.21× 103 <0.001
IM100 56.11 35.66 8.38× 103 <0.001
Agent C After C After G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 68.25 30.43 2.92× 104 <0.001
BACTD1 57.63 18.09 3.00× 104 <0.001
BACTD10 57.69 13.62 3.52× 104 <0.001
BACTS0 69.50 69.73 1.10 0.293
BACTS1 38.15 39.69 47.23 <0.001
BACTS10 31.59 31.53 5.56× 10−2 0.814
IM0 3.84 0.02 4.92× 102 <0.001
IM10 8.99 0.07 1.23× 103 <0.001
IM20 9.76 0.14 1.27× 103 <0.001
IM30 16.26 0.26 2.44× 103 <0.001
IM40 18.08 0.40 2.89× 103 <0.001
IM50 19.61 0.56 3.27× 103 <0.001
IM60 21.22 0.85 3.87× 103 <0.001
IM70 22.47 1.46 4.51× 103 <0.001
IM80 25.13 2.72 5.96× 103 <0.001
IM90 26.46 6.07 6.27× 103 <0.001
IM100 57.72 44.04 3.74× 103 <0.001
Table 5.37: Left: ER5, Matrix 1; Right: ER8, Matrix 1
Agent C After C After G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 68.17 31.88 2.69× 104 <0.001
BACTD1 57.22 17.98 2.94× 104 <0.001
BACTD10 57.50 13.91 3.45× 104 <0.001
BACTS0 69.37 69.64 1.37 0.242
BACTS1 38.44 39.18 10.87 <0.001
BACTS10 31.62 31.49 0.31 0.579
IM0 0.42 0.00 58.48 <0.001
IM10 5.86 0.04 7.70× 102 <0.001
IM20 8.07 0.13 9.79× 102 <0.001
IM30 12.35 0.21 1.70× 103 <0.001
IM40 15.73 0.41 2.37× 103 <0.001
IM50 17.21 0.56 2.74× 103 <0.001
IM60 20.36 0.90 3.69× 103 <0.001
IM70 22.80 1.42 4.63× 103 <0.001
IM80 25.28 2.28 5.84× 103 <0.001
IM90 29.43 5.30 8.23× 103 <0.001
IM100 57.40 34.55 1.05× 104 <0.001
Agent C After C After G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 68.30 31.04 2.84× 104 <0.001
BACTD1 62.40 28.57 2.31× 104 <0.001
BACTD10 56.84 25.22 1.98× 104 <0.001
BACTS0 69.33 69.37 3.76× 10−2 0.846
BACTS1 55.36 58.33 1.76× 102 <0.001
BACTS10 39.43 43.56 3.41× 102 <0.001
IM0 91.00 6.01 1.66× 105 <0.001
IM10 74.44 7.12 8.24× 104 <0.001
IM20 64.79 7.89 5.51× 104 <0.001
IM30 51.57 5.42 2.98× 104 <0.001
IM40 42.19 2.23 1.62× 104 <0.001
IM50 35.88 1.98 1.13× 104 <0.001
IM60 36.64 1.93 1.17× 104 <0.001
IM70 32.65 2.45 9.75× 103 <0.001
IM80 31.78 4.59 9.84× 103 <0.001
IM90 33.71 8.77 1.01× 104 <0.001
IM100 56.52 41.98 4.23× 103 <0.001
Table 5.38: Left: Grid, Matrix 1; Right: ER5, Matrix 2
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Agent C After C After G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 68.40 31.79 2.74× 104 <0.001
BACTD1 63.09 29.17 2.33× 104 <0.001
BACTD10 56.75 24.38 2.07× 104 <0.001
BACTS0 69.69 69.24 3.99 0.046
BACTS1 56.64 58.96 1.07× 102 <0.001
BACTS10 39.69 43.54 2.96× 102 <0.001
IM0 91.54 2.62 1.64× 105 <0.001
IM10 67.47 3.30 5.45× 104 <0.001
IM20 49.90 2.34 2.35× 104 <0.001
IM30 46.97 3.60 2.24× 104 <0.001
IM40 25.06 1.01 5.22× 103 <0.001
IM50 27.06 1.79 6.53× 103 <0.001
IM60 24.59 1.84 5.43× 103 <0.001
IM70 24.60 2.32 5.64× 103 <0.001
IM80 24.91 3.97 5.84× 103 <0.001
IM90 25.75 9.03 4.72× 103 <0.001
IM100 58.04 44.80 3.51× 103 <0.001
Agent C After C After G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 67.73 31.53 2.67× 104 <0.001
BACTD1 62.60 28.95 2.29× 104 <0.001
BACTD10 56.70 24.03 2.11× 104 <0.001
BACTS0 69.47 69.65 0.64 0.422
BACTS1 55.99 58.66 1.42× 102 <0.001
BACTS10 38.86 42.53 2.69× 102 <0.001
IM0 82.13 5.28 1.13× 105 <0.001
IM10 59.15 1.31 2.94× 104 <0.001
IM20 42.32 0.75 1.26× 104 <0.001
IM30 13.53 0.26 1.91× 103 <0.001
IM40 17.04 0.39 2.59× 103 <0.001
IM50 19.75 0.62 3.40× 103 <0.001
IM60 21.52 0.94 4.02× 103 <0.001
IM70 23.87 1.44 5.00× 103 <0.001
IM80 26.37 2.82 6.54× 103 <0.001
IM90 32.39 7.51 9.64× 103 <0.001
IM100 60.81 37.11 1.13× 104 <0.001
Table 5.39: Left: ER8, Matrix 2; Right: Grid, Matrix 2
Agent C After C After G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 68.55 31.21 2.85× 104 <0.001
BACTD1 64.96 29.68 2.53× 104 <0.001
BACTD10 60.37 24.74 2.54× 104 <0.001
BACTS0 69.44 69.56 0.31 0.575
BACTS1 62.89 63.42 5.67 0.017
BACTS10 48.07 49.61 47.28 <0.001
IM0 95.93 13.48 1.35× 105 <0.001
IM10 95.33 22.77 9.12× 104 <0.001
IM20 92.79 20.62 1.04× 105 <0.001
IM30 86.23 26.15 7.42× 104 <0.001
IM40 73.77 14.30 7.26× 104 <0.001
IM50 56.78 11.19 3.70× 104 <0.001
IM60 43.26 5.41 1.97× 104 <0.001
IM70 40.84 6.33 1.72× 104 <0.001
IM80 40.85 6.88 1.72× 104 <0.001
IM90 44.94 14.02 1.72× 104 <0.001
IM100 48.76 33.81 4.45× 103 <0.001
Agent C After C After G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 67.74 31.03 2.75× 104 <0.001
BACTD1 65.10 29.43 2.59× 104 <0.001
BACTD10 60.61 25.30 2.50× 104 <0.001
BACTS0 69.38 69.53 0.48 0.489
BACTS1 62.13 62.90 12.01 <0.001
BACTS10 48.30 50.46 93.30 <0.001
IM0 97.54 10.51 1.48× 105 <0.001
IM10 91.01 11.61 1.43× 105 <0.001
IM20 86.65 10.64 1.29× 105 <0.001
IM30 69.66 8.13 6.77× 104 <0.001
IM40 52.03 2.93 2.73× 104 <0.001
IM50 34.82 2.08 1.07× 104 <0.001
IM60 34.97 2.57 1.12× 104 <0.001
IM70 32.04 3.40 9.87× 103 <0.001
IM80 28.24 4.32 7.61× 103 <0.001
IM90 30.33 10.50 6.74× 103 <0.001
IM100 53.23 35.96 5.96× 103 <0.001
Table 5.40: Left: ER5, Matrix 3; Right: ER8, Matrix 3
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Agent C After C After G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 68.67 31.28 2.86× 104 <0.001
BACTD1 65.13 29.35 2.60× 104 <0.001
BACTD10 60.60 25.05 2.53× 104 <0.001
BACTS0 69.71 69.71 3.16× 10−5 0.996
BACTS1 62.62 62.90 1.51 0.219
BACTS10 48.91 50.86 76.04 <0.001
IM0 98.60 9.49 1.40× 105 <0.001
IM10 96.08 17.93 1.09× 105 <0.001
IM20 90.91 20.05 1.04× 105 <0.001
IM30 82.63 24.65 7.07× 104 <0.001
IM40 74.67 15.49 7.26× 104 <0.001
IM50 55.07 5.91 3.56× 104 <0.001
IM60 40.92 2.50 1.55× 104 <0.001
IM70 32.37 2.60 9.66× 103 <0.001
IM80 34.02 3.96 1.13× 104 <0.001
IM90 36.80 10.36 1.18× 104 <0.001
IM100 57.74 35.43 9.99× 103 <0.001
Table 5.41: Grid, Matrix 3
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Cooperation Conditionality - Full Tables
Full tables for the conditionality portion of the MCC analysis of Section 4.2.4 are given
here. For each table, we compare cooperation rates after being surrounded by a majority
of either cooperators or defectors on the last turn. Shaded rows indicate that cooperation
is higher near other cooperators than near defectors (i.e. conditionality is observed) and
that the diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.05). Captions give the network type
and reward matrix associated with each table.
Agent C Near C Near G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 49.69 48.71 15.70 <0.001
BACTD1 28.53 29.34 6.38 0.012
BACTD10 24.02 25.10 9.03 0.003
BACTS0 69.29 69.52 0.52 0.472
BACTS1 38.53 37.93 4.85 0.028
BACTS10 32.40 31.66 5.94 0.015
IM0 22.33 0.37 1.92× 103 <0.001
IM10 39.36 0.61 4.59× 103 <0.001
IM20 33.33 0.15 3.80× 103 <0.001
IM30 39.63 0.31 4.78× 103 <0.001
IM40 43.40 0.33 6.10× 103 <0.001
IM50 47.73 0.46 6.75× 103 <0.001
IM60 52.30 0.73 8.16× 103 <0.001
IM70 54.97 1.00 9.16× 103 <0.001
IM80 62.24 1.55 1.31× 104 <0.001
IM90 68.20 4.07 2.42× 104 <0.001
IM100 79.93 17.56 7.31× 104 <0.001
Agent C Near C Near G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 48.97 48.71 1.13 0.288
BACTD1 30.78 29.85 6.38 0.012
BACTD10 21.76 24.57 34.80 <0.001
BACTS0 69.59 69.43 0.18 0.675
BACTS1 39.54 39.02 3.62 0.057
BACTS10 32.04 31.50 2.39 0.122
IM0 6.75 0.01 8.58× 102 <0.001
IM10 14.13 0.05 1.67× 103 <0.001
IM20 16.48 0.10 1.75× 103 <0.001
IM30 24.46 0.25 2.42× 103 <0.001
IM40 33.89 0.32 3.86× 103 <0.001
IM50 35.49 0.49 3.72× 103 <0.001
IM60 42.51 0.74 5.17× 103 <0.001
IM70 48.64 1.32 6.05× 103 <0.001
IM80 55.37 2.39 9.58× 103 <0.001
IM90 59.26 5.41 1.31× 104 <0.001
IM100 73.78 27.05 4.12× 104 <0.001
Table 5.42: Left: ER5, Matrix 1; Right: ER8, Matrix 1
Agent C Near C Near G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 50.27 49.91 1.78 0.182
BACTD1 28.37 29.73 9.24 0.002
BACTD10 24.93 24.57 0.31 0.578
BACTS0 69.46 69.13 0.55 0.457
BACTS1 39.62 38.52 12.97 <0.001
BACTS10 32.62 31.49 7.59 0.006
IM0 0.58 0.00 62.71 <0.001
IM10 7.77 0.03 7.96× 102 <0.001
IM20 16.20 0.07 1.55× 103 <0.001
IM30 21.53 0.15 1.98× 103 <0.001
IM40 28.48 0.32 2.60× 103 <0.001
IM50 33.81 0.45 3.27× 103 <0.001
IM60 42.83 0.72 4.55× 103 <0.001
IM70 48.93 1.19 5.46× 103 <0.001
IM80 54.78 1.99 6.67× 103 <0.001
IM90 61.25 4.56 1.21× 104 <0.001
IM100 75.92 21.30 5.17× 104 <0.001
Agent C Near C Near G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 48.96 49.91 14.84 <0.001
BACTD1 42.33 43.28 13.89 <0.001
BACTD10 34.06 37.86 1.91× 102 <0.001
BACTS0 69.32 69.56 0.57 0.450
BACTS1 56.80 56.34 3.37 0.066
BACTS10 42.29 41.49 9.72 0.002
IM0 78.29 12.31 8.45× 104 <0.001
IM10 71.41 9.73 5.15× 104 <0.001
IM20 69.48 9.25 4.06× 104 <0.001
IM30 62.37 5.93 2.22× 104 <0.001
IM40 57.18 2.11 1.32× 104 <0.001
IM50 53.93 1.73 9.98× 103 <0.001
IM60 60.71 1.45 1.35× 104 <0.001
IM70 59.54 1.81 1.25× 104 <0.001
IM80 66.27 3.18 2.15× 104 <0.001
IM90 69.82 5.59 3.29× 104 <0.001
IM100 79.14 20.02 6.55× 104 <0.001
Table 5.43: Left: Grid, Matrix 1; Right: ER5, Matrix 2
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Agent C Near C Near G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 49.73 50.67 15.16 <0.001
BACTD1 42.96 44.80 53.76 <0.001
BACTD10 34.68 36.52 38.31 <0.001
BACTS0 69.70 68.66 8.11 0.004
BACTS1 57.86 57.22 6.09 0.014
BACTS10 42.09 41.79 1.30 0.255
IM0 70.90 9.13 6.96× 104 <0.001
IM10 64.57 4.72 3.52× 104 <0.001
IM20 54.14 3.22 1.27× 104 <0.001
IM30 55.14 4.78 1.14× 104 <0.001
IM40 42.95 1.01 5.05× 103 <0.001
IM50 46.80 1.87 5.55× 103 <0.001
IM60 48.99 1.76 6.30× 103 <0.001
IM70 53.21 2.12 8.02× 103 <0.001
IM80 55.81 3.67 9.25× 103 <0.001
IM90 60.06 8.08 1.29× 104 <0.001
IM100 73.70 27.46 4.02× 104 <0.001
Agent C Near C Near G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 49.65 49.09 4.50 0.034
BACTD1 41.80 44.89 1.24× 102 <0.001
BACTD10 30.95 36.87 2.89× 102 <0.001
BACTS0 69.46 69.83 0.74 0.389
BACTS1 57.29 56.82 2.78 0.096
BACTS10 41.22 40.91 1.16 0.282
IM0 78.44 5.61 1.02× 105 <0.001
IM10 61.60 1.29 2.52× 104 <0.001
IM20 51.29 0.71 1.10× 104 <0.001
IM30 22.23 0.19 2.01× 103 <0.001
IM40 32.66 0.32 2.76× 103 <0.001
IM50 35.22 0.52 3.35× 103 <0.001
IM60 44.56 0.77 4.81× 103 <0.001
IM70 50.08 1.23 5.45× 103 <0.001
IM80 55.45 2.44 8.02× 103 <0.001
IM90 63.14 6.14 1.73× 104 <0.001
IM100 77.04 22.04 5.42× 104 <0.001
Table 5.44: Left: ER8, Matrix 2; Right: Grid, Matrix 2
Agent C Near C Near G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 50.44 49.07 30.66 <0.001
BACTD1 46.40 45.90 3.88 0.049
BACTD10 37.36 38.96 35.79 <0.001
BACTS0 69.49 69.33 0.25 0.620
BACTS1 63.35 62.29 14.71 <0.001
BACTS10 49.55 48.22 28.85 <0.001
IM0 91.01 16.70 8.15× 104 <0.001
IM10 94.57 18.88 8.08× 104 <0.001
IM20 93.07 15.73 1.06× 105 <0.001
IM30 88.39 17.87 9.14× 104 <0.001
IM40 81.65 9.99 9.83× 104 <0.001
IM50 72.69 8.15 5.76× 104 <0.001
IM60 67.73 4.21 2.88× 104 <0.001
IM70 68.14 4.44 3.11× 104 <0.001
IM80 69.59 4.47 3.71× 104 <0.001
IM90 75.84 8.38 5.79× 104 <0.001
IM100 77.40 17.68 6.22× 104 <0.001
Agent C Near C Near G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 48.88 49.42 5.02 0.025
BACTD1 45.46 45.69 0.85 0.358
BACTD10 37.93 39.67 41.16 <0.001
BACTS0 69.40 69.58 0.24 0.624
BACTS1 62.64 61.75 9.57 0.002
BACTS10 50.14 48.69 36.14 <0.001
IM0 92.02 16.15 8.74× 104 <0.001
IM10 87.96 8.40 1.37× 105 <0.001
IM20 86.94 8.41 1.36× 105 <0.001
IM30 76.53 7.59 7.33× 104 <0.001
IM40 67.41 2.63 3.14× 104 <0.001
IM50 55.94 2.08 1.08× 104 <0.001
IM60 58.78 2.29 1.40× 104 <0.001
IM70 59.32 3.02 1.43× 104 <0.001
IM80 59.07 3.87 1.26× 104 <0.001
IM90 62.99 8.93 1.87× 104 <0.001
IM100 72.65 23.41 4.47× 104 <0.001
Table 5.45: Left: ER5, Matrix 3; Right: ER8, Matrix 3
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Agent C Near C Near G-test G-test
C % D % stat. p-val.
BACTD0 49.55 50.16 5.32 0.021
BACTD1 45.30 45.89 4.74 0.029
BACTD10 37.75 39.17 21.71 <0.001
BACTS0 69.72 69.47 0.31 0.578
BACTS1 63.00 62.09 7.82 0.005
BACTS10 50.28 49.19 17.33 <0.001
IM0 90.74 19.32 5.04× 104 <0.001
IM10 94.41 12.46 9.84× 104 <0.001
IM20 89.67 11.70 1.08× 105 <0.001
IM30 84.37 16.09 8.83× 104 <0.001
IM40 81.09 10.42 9.79× 104 <0.001
IM50 72.78 4.61 4.57× 104 <0.001
IM60 66.24 2.04 1.90× 104 <0.001
IM70 60.84 2.21 1.17× 104 <0.001
IM80 62.31 3.28 1.48× 104 <0.001
IM90 66.64 8.22 2.41× 104 <0.001
IM100 75.49 21.72 5.06× 104 <0.001
Table 5.46: Grid, Matrix 3
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Player Stratiﬁcation - Full Tables
Full tables for the player stratiﬁcation analysis of Section 4.2.5 are given here. For each
table, we compare player binning according to the 5 groups of Gruji¢ et al. [19]. Shaded
rows indicate adherence to Equation 4.1. Captions give the network type and reward
matrix associated with each table.
Agent Pure Mostly Mixed Mostly Pure
D % D % % C % C %
BACTD0 5.44 30.03 31.15 28.46 4.91
BACTD1 11.92 52.19 21.60 13.64 0.65
BACTD10 24.14 45.33 17.28 12.96 0.30
BACTS0 0.00 0.00 35.92 64.08 0.00
BACTS1 0.00 20.86 79.14 0.00 0.00
BACTS10 0.00 59.79 40.21 0.00 0.00
IM0 90.95 8.49 0.00 0.03 0.53
IM10 82.49 16.39 0.00 0.89 0.24
IM20 78.37 21.36 0.00 0.00 0.27
IM30 67.99 31.78 0.00 0.00 0.24
IM40 60.36 39.41 0.00 0.00 0.24
IM50 51.54 48.22 0.00 0.00 0.24
IM60 38.20 61.69 0.00 0.00 0.12
IM70 28.76 70.92 0.00 0.00 0.33
IM80 18.20 81.51 0.00 0.00 0.30
IM90 2.54 97.22 0.00 0.00 0.24
IM100 0.18 29.14 54.23 16.27 0.18
Agent Pure Mostly Mixed Mostly Pure
D % D % % C % C %
BACTD0 5.98 29.94 31.21 27.78 5.09
BACTD1 11.15 51.92 21.89 14.41 0.62
BACTD10 23.08 46.95 17.46 12.19 0.33
BACTS0 0.00 0.00 32.01 67.99 0.00
BACTS1 0.00 16.27 83.73 0.00 0.00
BACTS10 0.00 61.27 38.73 0.00 0.00
IM0 96.57 3.43 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM10 90.53 9.47 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM20 86.09 13.91 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM30 77.28 22.72 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM40 65.30 34.70 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM50 58.31 41.66 0.00 0.00 0.03
IM60 45.12 54.88 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM70 27.84 72.13 0.00 0.00 0.03
IM80 11.42 88.55 0.00 0.00 0.03
IM90 1.83 98.17 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM100 0.00 18.61 60.68 20.71 0.00
Table 5.47: Left: ER5, Matrix 1; Right: ER8, Matrix 1
Agent Pure Mostly Mixed Mostly Pure
D % D % % C % C %
BACTD0 5.30 28.99 31.36 29.76 4.59
BACTD1 11.45 52.43 21.07 14.64 0.41
BACTD10 23.93 45.62 18.08 11.89 0.47
BACTS0 0.00 0.00 33.73 66.27 0.00
BACTS1 0.00 18.20 81.80 0.00 0.00
BACTS10 0.00 60.56 39.44 0.00 0.00
IM0 99.79 0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM10 94.14 5.86 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM20 87.66 12.34 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM30 79.97 20.03 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM40 67.22 32.78 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM50 59.67 40.33 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM60 43.46 56.54 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM70 30.62 69.38 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM80 19.38 80.62 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM90 5.33 94.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM100 0.00 28.67 59.17 12.16 0.00
Agent Pure Mostly Mixed Mostly Pure
D % D % % C % C %
BACTD0 5.65 29.14 31.54 29.20 4.47
BACTD1 5.21 37.49 32.90 22.31 2.10
BACTD10 5.62 46.42 29.26 17.46 1.24
BACTS0 0.00 0.00 33.58 66.42 0.00
BACTS1 0.00 0.03 94.50 5.47 0.00
BACTS10 0.00 7.63 92.37 0.00 0.00
IM0 33.08 20.68 6.12 32.84 7.28
IM10 26.09 46.72 17.54 9.14 0.50
IM20 22.10 54.20 19.70 3.73 0.27
IM30 18.43 73.14 7.19 1.04 0.21
IM40 26.01 73.55 0.09 0.00 0.36
IM50 24.59 75.15 0.00 0.00 0.27
IM60 22.96 76.66 0.03 0.00 0.36
IM70 16.69 82.99 0.00 0.00 0.33
IM80 5.36 94.47 0.00 0.00 0.18
IM90 1.27 98.31 0.18 0.00 0.24
IM100 0.21 21.69 57.72 20.03 0.36
Table 5.48: Left: Grid, Matrix 1; Right: ER5, Matrix 2
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Agent Pure Mostly Mixed Mostly Pure
D % D % % C % C %
BACTD0 4.59 29.47 31.80 29.17 4.97
BACTD1 5.59 36.30 31.83 23.99 2.28
BACTD10 6.83 46.15 29.41 16.83 0.77
BACTS0 0.00 0.00 32.43 67.57 0.00
BACTS1 0.00 0.00 92.99 7.01 0.00
BACTS10 0.00 7.19 92.81 0.00 0.00
IM0 49.53 19.41 5.83 22.19 3.05
IM10 36.12 53.31 8.02 2.54 0.00
IM20 47.16 49.62 2.69 0.53 0.00
IM30 30.86 64.73 4.26 0.15 0.00
IM40 44.32 55.68 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM50 27.96 72.01 0.00 0.00 0.03
IM60 26.54 73.46 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM70 15.62 84.38 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM80 6.33 93.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM90 0.68 99.23 0.09 0.00 0.00
IM100 0.00 13.43 63.28 23.28 0.00
Agent Pure Mostly Mixed Mostly Pure
D % D % % C % C %
BACTD0 4.82 30.03 31.36 29.17 4.62
BACTD1 4.85 36.66 33.08 23.46 1.95
BACTD10 6.63 47.25 28.93 16.21 0.98
BACTS0 0.00 0.00 32.43 67.57 0.00
BACTS1 0.00 0.03 95.18 4.79 0.00
BACTS10 0.00 9.62 90.38 0.00 0.00
IM0 66.69 3.52 8.02 20.83 0.95
IM10 82.16 10.38 7.37 0.09 0.00
IM20 77.63 20.68 1.69 0.00 0.00
IM30 77.10 22.90 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM40 68.08 31.92 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM50 56.09 43.91 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM60 43.82 56.18 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM70 31.33 68.67 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM80 12.75 87.25 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM90 2.01 97.66 0.33 0.00 0.00
IM100 0.00 21.60 61.39 17.01 0.00
Table 5.49: Left: ER8, Matrix 2; Right: Grid, Matrix 2
Agent Pure Mostly Mixed Mostly Pure
D % D % % C % C %
BACTD0 5.77 28.55 31.57 28.88 5.24
BACTD1 5.92 33.08 32.34 25.56 3.11
BACTD10 6.27 43.99 28.43 20.06 1.24
BACTS0 0.00 0.00 33.25 66.75 0.00
BACTS1 0.00 0.00 72.46 27.54 0.00
BACTS10 0.00 0.47 99.32 0.21 0.00
IM0 11.42 7.22 4.35 60.89 16.12
IM10 3.55 2.57 5.83 80.74 7.31
IM20 4.76 6.48 13.73 71.21 3.82
IM30 4.32 10.33 25.65 58.28 1.42
IM40 9.35 39.91 33.58 16.69 0.47
IM50 3.91 70.00 25.53 0.38 0.18
IM60 8.91 87.40 3.46 0.00 0.24
IM70 3.34 95.21 1.18 0.00 0.27
IM80 2.69 93.91 3.20 0.00 0.21
IM90 0.92 84.44 9.64 4.79 0.21
IM100 0.24 38.67 52.25 8.73 0.12
Agent Pure Mostly Mixed Mostly Pure
D % D % % C % C %
BACTD0 5.27 29.97 31.60 28.58 4.59
BACTD1 5.30 34.29 32.19 25.74 2.49
BACTD10 7.16 42.25 28.88 20.18 1.54
BACTS0 0.00 0.00 33.14 66.86 0.00
BACTS1 0.00 0.00 76.18 23.82 0.00
BACTS10 0.00 0.47 99.23 0.30 0.00
IM0 8.93 5.86 1.48 73.02 10.71
IM10 18.34 13.67 14.23 49.76 3.99
IM20 18.79 22.43 20.03 38.37 0.38
IM30 18.17 53.91 17.54 10.38 0.00
IM40 29.17 64.62 5.71 0.50 0.00
IM50 21.51 78.49 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM60 16.51 83.49 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM70 10.44 89.56 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM80 4.29 95.71 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM90 0.33 99.44 0.24 0.00 0.00
IM100 0.00 34.88 50.86 14.26 0.00
Table 5.50: Left: ER5, Matrix 3; Right: ER8, Matrix 3
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Agent Pure Mostly Mixed Mostly Pure
D % D % % C % C %
BACTD0 5.09 29.35 30.77 29.53 5.27
BACTD1 5.62 33.82 31.80 26.15 2.60
BACTD10 7.10 42.63 29.17 19.41 1.69
BACTS0 0.00 0.00 32.78 67.22 0.00
BACTS1 0.00 0.00 74.11 25.89 0.00
BACTS10 0.00 0.44 99.11 0.44 0.00
IM0 12.22 1.30 0.71 75.41 10.36
IM10 7.90 2.75 4.47 79.20 5.68
IM20 11.27 3.82 14.08 69.32 1.51
IM30 7.16 4.44 47.93 40.30 0.18
IM40 11.72 27.37 45.36 15.56 0.00
IM50 20.83 67.46 11.36 0.36 0.00
IM60 23.99 74.79 1.21 0.00 0.00
IM70 16.69 83.31 0.00 0.00 0.00
IM80 8.08 91.86 0.06 0.00 0.00
IM90 1.15 94.41 4.44 0.00 0.00
IM100 0.00 25.80 61.95 12.25 0.00
Table 5.51: Grid, Matrix 3
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